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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1. Friedrich August von Hayek – person and influence
Friedrich August von Hayek was born in Vienna in 1899. He fought in the First World 
War  and  afterwards  studied  law,  economy,  political  sciences  and  psychology.  The  biggest 
influence on his future views and works was exerted by private seminars of Ludwig von Mieses 
who also introduced him to the economic doctrines of the so called Austrian School. In 1931 
Hayek emigrated to England where he taught at the London School of Economics. Around that 
time started his famous debate with John Maynard Keynes concerning the extent of government 
intervention.  After  the  incorporation  of  Austria  into  Nazi  Germany Hayek became a  British 
citizen. He was elected a member of the British Academy in 1944 and in 1947 he founded the 
Mont Pelerin Society whose members “include high government officials, Nobel prize recipients,  
journalists, economic and financial experts, and legal scholars from all over the world” who 
“see danger in the expansion of government, not least in state welfare, in the power of trade  
unions and business monopoly, and in the continuing threat and reality of inflation”1. After the 
Second War World Hayek moved to United States where he taught at the University of Chicago. 
In 1974, together with Professor Gunnar Myrdal, he was awarded Nobel Prize in Economics for 
“their  pioneering  work  in  the  theory  of  money  and  economic  fluctuations  and  for  their  
penetrating analysis of the interdependence of economic, social and institutional phenomena”2. 
Hayek died in Germany in 1992.
With the publication of his Road to Serfdom Hayek gained popularity rarely experienced 
by academic theoreticians. He also exercised a direct influence on many leading politicians, for 
example  Winston  Churchill,  Ronald  Reagan  and  Margaret  Thatcher,  to  name  just  the  most 
prominent. It is a famous anecdote how Thatcher “tried once to end debate on Conservative  
Party policy by slamming a copy of Hayek's [...] The Constitution of Liberty down on the table  
and exclaiming, 'This is what we believe!'”3. Hayek's works are also not forgotten today. Indeed, 
new developments in economics with their interdisciplinary, subjectivist and knowledge-centred 
approach  draw  from  the  tradition  of  the  Austrian  School  generally  and  Hayek's  works  in 
particular.
Hayek's  contribution  is  not  only to  the  field  of  economics.  In  the  history of  human 
1 http://www.montpelerin.org/
2 Nobel Foundation press release, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1974/press.html
3 Edward Fraser, Introduction to The Cambridge Companion to Hayek, Cambridge University Press, 2006; p. 1.
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sciences he is known first and foremost for his fierce critique of socialism. Although educated in 
law and economics, he far from limited his studies to those two disciplines. On the contrary, it 
would  be no exaggeration  to  call  him a renaissance man – a  man who researched different 
spheres of human life and could synthesise his ideas into an interdisciplinary theory. It is my 
belief  that  only  in  a  similarly  interdisciplinary  way of  reading  can  his  philosophy be  fully 
grasped.  I  will  try  to  follow  his  thought  by  showing  a  parallel  between  the  philosophical 
background and economic and political ideas he developed. It is my belief that although Hayek 
had  no  formal  philosophical  education,  his  works  are  based  on  common  philosophical 
foundations and show a striking continuity and coherence over the years and throughout the 
different  fields  of  his  research.  For  example,  his  early  economic  writings  are  based  on 
epistemological assumptions only later  fully developed in his more philosophical papers and 
lectures.
1.2. Goal of this paper
Philosophy and economics are in my opinion two of the most miscellaneous of the human 
sciences and their heterogeneity allows a truly synthetic approach to particular questions. I would 
like to examine the ideas of Friedrich Hayek by looking both at the philosophical foundations of 
his economic concepts as well as at the economic consequences of his philosophical conceptions. 
I  believe  that  there  is  a  far  reaching  harmony and compatibility  between his  philosophical, 
political and economic doctrines because they are all based on his strong convictions concerning 
human beings. Therefore I intend to trace and analyse those basic philosophical ideas that form 
the foundation of Hayek's thought. My goal in this paper is to show that there are three such 
notions, usually perceived as core ideals of liberalism, that constitute the basis of his economic 
theories as well as of his political and ethical concepts. In this way I hope to be able to show the 
continuity and consistency of Hayek's critique of socialism and advocacy of liberalism.
The table below suggests how the basic ideas formulated in Hayek's works can be related 
to each other.  The three philosophical principles that  form the core of classical liberalism as 
advocated by Hayek require and entail specific political and economic solutions.
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LIBERAL IDEALS ECONOMY POLITY
Individualism multiple-ends catallaxy authority of individuals
Negative Personal Freedom private property limited state
Formal Justice no patterned redistribution;
low proportional taxes and 
public spendings
Rule of Law
no welfare state
In this paper I will discuss each of these philosophical principles, show their attributes and role 
specifically in the context of Hayek's thought and their consequences for politics and economy. I 
will also attempt to explain in what way all these conceptions are influenced by Hayek's original 
conceptions of epistemology and social evolution, as well as by his knowledge-centred approach 
and individualistic methodology. I believe that it is in this original conceptualisation that lies the 
greatest value of Hayek's philosophy.
1.3. Economic orders – disambiguation of terminology
1.3.1. Liberalism
Hayek is widely recognised as one of the most important defenders of liberalism in the 
20th century therefore it would be helpful to start by explaining what does he himself understand 
by this term. The ambiguity of terminology on this subject, as Hayek points out, leads to growing 
controversies concerning the liberal movement. In my opinion one of the goals of his lifelong 
scholarly  activity  was  freeing  liberal  though  from  such  uncertainties.  Depending  on  what 
liberalism is contrasted with, it tends to mean different, indeed, sometimes quite opposite things. 
For example, when referred to as an ethical concept antonymous to conservatism, liberalism is 
understood  as  a  denial  of  acknowledged  norms  and  traditional  forms  of  society.  Classical 
liberalism  descended  from  the  European,  mostly  British  tradition,  on  the  other  hand,  was 
primarily  a  political  conception  meaning  a  social  order  based  on  free  markets,  limited 
government under the rule of law, and the primacy of individual freedom. A further notion of 
liberalism,  sometimes  referred  to  as  the  'new liberalism'  means  quite  the  opposite  in  that  it 
supports  the  welfare  state  and questions  the  relation  between  personal  freedom and  private 
property that  is  crucial  in the classical  understanding.  The liberalism supported by Hayek is 
without doubt the first one.
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I use throughout the term 'liberal' in the original, nineteenth-century sense in which it is still current  
in Britan. In current American usage it often means very nearly the opposite of this. It has been part  
of the camouflage of leftish movements in this country, helped by the muddleheadedness of many  
who really believe in liberty, that 'liberal' has come to mean the advocacy of almost every kind of  
government  control.  [...]  This  seems  to  be  particularly  regrettable  because  of  the  consequent  
tendency of many true liberals to describe themselves as conservatives.4
The  liberalism of  the  English  Whigs  endorsed  by Hayek was  the  source  of  political 
institutions that secured individual liberty acting through a 'government under law'. The liberty in 
question is mainly understood in the negative sense of Isaiah Berlin, that is, as a lack of arbitrary 
coercion, and not so much the positive freedom of self-determination that was the main concern 
of  liberalism  of  the  French  tradition.  British  liberalism  developed  partly  out  of  a  struggle 
between hostile religious sects and in the end produced principles of tolerance which remained 
its characteristic in the future. Furthermore it has a tradition of condemning state interventionism 
and advocating  minimal state as well as private initiative and “autonomous efforts either of local  
government or of voluntary organizations”5.
In his monograph on  The Iron cage of Liberty, Andrew Gamble expresses a view that 
Hayek believed as firmly in scientific liberalism as any Marxist believed in scientific socialism.6 
However, he does not elaborate on what he understands under the term of scientific liberalism. If 
it  is  supposed to  mean that  the  theory is  based on observation,  as  is  in  the case  of  natural 
sciences, than one can hardly criticise this statement. Usually, however, scientific socialism does 
not merely mean that  it  is  based on observation,  but  it  indicates  that,  in contrast  to utopian 
socialisms, it is based on an economic calculus. In that case Hayek's liberalism would rather have 
to be called anti-scientific because he decisively rejects the possibility of such a calculus and 
finds basing national economy on its dubious results a fatal error. I therefore decline the term of 
scientific  liberalism  for  Hayek's  philosophy  and  maintain  the  categories  that  he  himself 
preferred.
1.3.2 Economy and Catallaxy
The next disambiguation is required for the term of economy because Hayek believed 
that the misunderstanding of the term itself contributed highly to creating a problem that can be 
4 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, The University of Chicago Press, 2007; p. 45.
5 Friedrich August von Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London and Henley, 1978; p. 129.
6 Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996; p. 9.
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called the economy dilemma. The economy dilemma, as it was roughly understood in the 20th 
century, was a dilemma between planned economy and a free market system. Hayek rejects such 
a formulation of the problem basing his critique on the etymology of the word 'economy'.
An economy, in the strict sense of the word in which a household, a farm or an enterprise can be  
called economies, consists of a complex of activities by which a given set of means is allocated in  
accordance with a unitary plan among the competing ends according to their relative importance.7
Hayek's point is that if we use the term 'economy' to describe the activity of the market order 
then we automatically condemn it to socialism because only in this way a single end can be 
served. On the contrary, the market order is constituted by a multitude of such ends strived for by 
all  participating economies, that is individuals or groups pursuing their  own particular goals. 
Therefore  Hayek  insists  on  using  the  term  dirigism  hen  referring  to  central  planning  and 
introduces the term of catallaxy to describe the activity on the market and emphasises that, being 
a totally different thing, it should also be judged by different standards.
The term 'catallactics' was derived from the Greek verb katallattein [...] which meant, significantly,  
not only 'to exchange' but also 'to admit into the community' and 'to change from enemy into friend'.  
[...]  From this we can form an English term  catallaxy which we shall use to describe the order  
brought about by the mutual adjustment of many individual economies in a market. A catallaxy is  
thus the special kind of spontaneous order produced by the market through people acting within the  
rules of the law of property, tort and contract.8
What is achieved by the introduction of this new notion is the shifting of the dilemma itself. The 
dispute does not concern the question whether activities on the market should be planned or not 
because, as Hayek points out, some kind of planning always takes place. Rather, to put it in the 
authors own words: “It  is  a dispute  as to  weather planning is  to be done centrally,  by one  
authority for the whole economic system, or is it to be divided among many individuals”9. Based 
on his beliefs concerning human epistemic capacities as well as on the world view underlying 
economic philosophy of the Austrian School, Hayek strongly supports the position that we are 
far  better  off  if  the  planning  is  not  done  centrally  but  left  to  the  authority  of  numerous 
7 Friedrich August von Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 2, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and 
London, 1976; p. 107.
8 Friedrich August von Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 2, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and 
London, 1976; p. 108.
9 Friedrich August von Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1980; p. 79.
5
individuals.  No single person is  capable of planning the whole,  because the knowledge they 
posses  is  'imperfect,  fragmented  and local'.10.  Indeed,  he  maintains  that  the  biggest  error  of 
socialist thinking is that it tries to conceive of the market order as a simple economy subjected to 
a single plan pursuing a single end. 
1.3.3. Competition and Cooperation
A further commonly addressed opposition in terms, which Hayek finds to be a similar 
kind  of  misunderstanding,  is  the  opposition  between competition  and cooperation.  First  and 
foremost these two terms cannot be treated as opposite because they refer to two utterly different 
levels  or  stages  of  economic  activity.  Competition  in  general  is  a  method  of  adjustment  to 
external conditions in a situation where these are not and cannot be fully known. It is a procedure 
of  discovering  the  best  in  something,  whether  the  best  sportsman,  best  product  or  the  best 
service.11 Such a technical understanding of competition releases it from ethical valuation – it has 
a purely epistemological function and value. It is impersonal in that it does not favour particular 
people but relies on their actions and their outcomes. And indeed, as Hayek admits, “the general  
beneficial  effects  of  competition  must  include  disappointing  or  defeating  some  particular  
expectations or intentions”12 but being simply a procedure and not extending 'to the prediction of  
particular facts' competition is morally neutral. The point is that competition should be treated as 
a mere tool and as such it cannot be subjected to moral valuation. It is men's choices and their 
results that are judged. But only in a competitive environment are they able to make choices and 
bear their consequences.
Hayek calls competition a discovery procedure referring to the way it enables extraction 
and utilisation of knowledge that is widely dispersed in society and divided among all of its 
participants. What is meant by knowledge here concerns particular circumstances such as which 
goods or services are needed and where. I shall deal with the specific character of this knowledge 
in relation to Hayek's epistemological conceptions. It should be noted, however, that competition 
is precisely the answer to the state of imperfect knowledge that the Austrian school of economics 
assumes as its  basic conception.  Competition can be compared in their  understanding to the 
function of a negative feedback, this means to a system of information about a performance that, 
by criticising flaws, re-establishes equilibrium. Clients, by choosing some offers over others, 
10 Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 38.
11 See Friedrich August von Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London and Henley, 1978; p. 179.
12 Friedrich August von Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London and Henley, 1978; p. 180.
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send a message about their needs and preferences, which is than available to all participants. 
They  can  adjust  their  offers  accordingly  and  thus  bring  forward  what  is  usually  known in 
economics as the supply and demand equilibrium.
Competition is  not  an ideal  but  a  practical  procedure – it  is  a  means  of  transferring 
information.  Therefore  there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  perfect  competition  as  defended  by 
neoclassical economists – a state where all facts are known to all is impossible. Hayek dismisses 
the idea of a perfect competition with a statement that it  would be absurd because in such a 
situation there would be really no more need for competition -  all its tasks have already been 
completed13, there would be no more need for an information mechanism.
„The sum of information reflected or precipitated in the prices is wholly the product of competition,  
or at least of the openness of the market to anyone who has relevant information about some source  
of demand or supply for the good in question. Competition operates as a discovery procedure not  
only by giving anyone who has the opportunity to exploit special circumstances the possibility to do  
so profitably, but also by conveying to the other parties the information that there is some such 
opportunity.“14
As concerns the  alleged opposition  of competition and cooperation, at one point in his 
Constitution of Liberty Hayek observes that competition is not an exclusively individual process 
and that „successful group relations also prove their effectiveness in competition among groups  
organized in different ways“15. The basic difference between a competitive social order and a 
non-competitive one is in the possibility to experiment, in the allowance of a bottom-up initiative 
of changes and adjustments.  “Competition is important as a process of exploration in which  
prospectors search for unused opportunities that, when discovered, can also be used by others”16. 
Hayek therefore stresses the civilising power of competition. According to him this system not 
only adjusts better to any new conditions and therefore helps the preservation of culture, but also 
itself  creates new conditions continually and consequently prevents stagnation and stimulates 
constant evolution.
Although Hayek does not formulate it  that  way, I  think that the apparent antagonism 
between  competition  and  cooperation  can  be  solved  by  saying  that  they  are  mechanisms 
13 Friedrich August von Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London and Henley, 1978; p. 182.
14 Friedrich August von Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1976; p. 
117.
15 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge Classics, London and New York, 2006; p. 
33.
16 Friedrich August von Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London and Henley, 1978; p. 188.
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operating on different levels of the market. While cooperation is a mechanism that binds two or 
more participants, and therefore operates on an interpersonal level, competition on the other hand 
should rather be thought of as operating between a particular participant and the system as a 
whole. Therefore one procedure is not in opposition to the other, but rather they compliment each 
other. And in fact modern research on the field of game theory indicate that cooperation is one of 
the most competitive strategies in the sense that it yields better results than strategies based on 
defection17.
1.3.4 Market order
In  respect  to  competition  regarded  as  a  rule,  market  order  can  be  understood  as  a 
competitive game that requires both skill and luck. This means that the outcome of this game, 
our remuneration, is dependent partly on us and the decisions we make and partly on chance. 
Furthermore it is not a zero-sum game – where my gain means a loss to my opponent – but a 
game “through which, by playing it according to the rules, the pool to be shared is enlarged”18.
The fact that the market is not subjected to a single plan does not mean that there is no 
order to it. There is a difference, however, between an order that has been established by a single 
will  and  forced  upon  the  whole  of  the  system,  and  an  order  that  developed  spontaneously, 
without coordination. The difference is that between hierarchical and non-hierarchical orders or, 
to use Hayek's own nomenclature, between a taxis and a cosmos.
While  the Great  Society  may contain many organizations  within  it,  the  secret  of  its  success,  in  
Hayek's  view, is  precisely  that  it has no single directing centre. The development of the society  
depends on no single will, but is the outcome of competition between many wills, the product of  
many experiments, many mistakes, many failures as well as many successes. There must be an order  
in society, but this order should be a cosmos rather than a taxis.19
Hayek's conception of a society is therefore neither anarchist nor totally libertarian. In the field 
of economics it corresponds to his insistence against a purely laisse-faire system and in favour of 
a free market governed by rules. Market order is a spontaneous order, but an order nonetheless.
Andrew Gamble reproaches that this type of society is, similarly to the one described by 
17 See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books, New York, 1994.
18 Friedrich August von Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London and Henley, 1978; p. 186.
19 Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 37.
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Adam Smith, immune to changes and further evolution20. He means that, not unlike the socialism 
as  devised by Marx, Hayek's system is depicted as the last stage, the ultimate solution with no 
alternatives. I might agree that for Hayek there exists no acceptable alternative to liberalism at 
the present level of the human developmen. He does not however regard market order a static 
structure.  It  developed in  a  series of spontaneous,  small  steps and I  think it  is  continuously 
evolving in this way even now. That is why some rules and laws need to be constantly adjusted. 
Hayek does not object to changes in this sense. What he objects to are revolutionary changes 
intended to abolish the market order as such and introduce something completely new in its 
place.
The reason why there is no acceptable alternative to the market order in Hayek's eyes is 
that it is the only system able to support societies when populations exceed all the earlier ones to 
such a significant degree. It was a common view of Austrian economists that the size of human 
population requires an economic system no less efficient than the market order. In this sense 
Gamble's question: “Whether or not the Great Society is desirable or represents an improvement  
on what went before”21 is pointless because we have no means of comparing different systems 
working under different circumstances. The important question, however, is whether the size of 
population is the only reason to prefer liberal market order. Is it better only because it serves 
better current purposes? On the one hand Hayek tends to judge social arrangements only by the 
results they bring. On the other hand I think he believes in superiority of market order because it 
harmonizes and favours personal freedom.  The market order and its mechanisms such as the 
competition or the price system are in Hayek's view all to be treated as operational procedures 
and not subjects to moral judgements. The market order lies outside the category of justice. 
Indeed, it  is precisely the system that enables economic relations to be arranged without the 
arbitrariness.
Andrew Gamble formulates an important reproach against Hayek's analysis of the market 
order. Namely, he point out that the way Hayke presents it, the alternative between socialism and 
free market is an exclusive and exhaustive alternative.
It is essential to Hayek's argument that there is no third way. It allows him to identify socialism with  
central direction and liberalism with markets [...]. He never confronts the obvious objection that a  
combination of methods of co-ordination is not  only  possible  but necessary,  and that no system 
anywhere, not even in the Soviet Union or Hongkong, has ever relied just on central direction or just  
20 Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 27.
21 Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 31.
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on markets.22
It  is  true  that  Hayek  does  not  provide  any  analytical  argument  for  his  assumption  of  the 
impossibility of the third way and Gamble's critique seems legitimate. But I think that Hayek's 
suspicion of any intermediate solution results from the worry  that they may fall into an extreme 
position in  the manner  of  a domino effect.  “Once the state  begins  expanding and imposing 
central direction in one sphere, it cannot stop until it has come to dominate the whole society”23. 
Therefore curbs should be put on any attempt of governmental control of the market and citizens' 
freedom.
1.3.5 Democracy
Hayek is clear about the fact that from the liberal principle of equality before the law the 
result is “that all men should also have the same share in making the law”24. Yet, apart from this 
point, there are significant differences between the ideals of liberalism and democracy. Referring 
to  two  different  problems  –  liberalism being  “a  doctrine  about  what  the  law  ought  to  be,  
democracy a doctrine about the manner of determining what will be the law” – they do not 
exclude  the  other's  opposites:  “a  democracy  may  well  wield  totalitarian  powers,  and  it  is  
conceivable that an authoritarian government may act on liberal principles”25.
Liberalism,  because  of  these  three  underlying  ideals,  is  for  Hayek  an  indisputable 
political goal. Democracy, on the other hand, presents itself no such ultimate goal. It is to be 
treated as “the best  method of  achieving certain ends,  but not an end in itself”26.  Therefore 
Hayek insists on judging it by the results it yields in particular situations. One of the advantages 
of a democracy is that it involves more individuals than other forms of governance. Its other 
value rests on the fact that it allows changes in a peaceful way but it is not impossible that men 
will discover yet a better procedure to achieve this. The third advantage, important from Hayek's 
perspective, is that democracy always played the role of a safeguard of individual liberty.
I would like to suggest that there is also a different dimension to democratic mechanism 
than its obvious procedure of political determination. I think that the formation of spontaneous 
orders can be treated as a collective process of decision making that is principally democratic in 
its character. It is a democratic procedure with no other parity than being active in society in 
22 Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 84.
23 Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 85.
24 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge Classics, London & New York, 2006; p. 90.
25 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge Classics, London & New York, 2006; p. 90.
26 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge Classics, London & New York, 2006; p. 92.
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some way.  The  basic  difference between this  'emergence democracy'  and the direct  form of 
political democracy that we are used to is that it is stretched over in time – it is not the opinion of 
the current majority that prevails but the one that proved superior to the majority over a longer 
period of time. In Hayek's own words, the decision-making process of spontaneous social growth 
is characterised by a kind of 'super-individual wisdom' of cumulated experience that a simple 
majority rule lacks. Furthermore it does not have to resort to coercion to enforce itself to the 
minority.  This  feature  has  been  noticed  by  several  market  theoreticians,  including  Milton 
Friedman, who noticed:
“The characteristic feature of action through political channels is that it tends to require or enforce  
substantial conformity. The great advantage of the market, on the other hand, is that it permits wide  
diversity. It is, in political terms, a system of proportional representation. Each man can vote, as it  
were, for the colour of the tie he wants to get; he does not have to see what colour the majority  
wants and then, if he is in the minority, submit.”27
Let it be clear that hardly any sensible liberal suggests complete replacement of the government 
with market mechanisms. Both are essential for the proper functioning of the other. However, it 
is advisable that as much area as possible is subjugated to market procedures because they are 
not based on coercion of the majority.
1.4. Spontaneous orders versus social engineering
Hayek  believed  that  the  alleged  dichotomy  of  the  notions  'natural'  and  'artificial' 
constitutes the background of controversies and misunderstandings concerning ethical traditions 
of constructivism and utilitarianism for example  28.  For Hayek the dichotomy of natural  and 
artificial  in  the  context  of  spontaneous orders  is  erroneous.  Culture,  for  example,  is  neither 
natural nor artificial, it is neither transmitted genetically nor reasonably planned. Culture is rather 
a tradition of rules of behaviour that were never invented and moreover their purpose is usually 
not clear even to those who act by them. This means that one can speak of the wisdom of culture 
27 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2002; p. 15.
28 „Hume is a particularly good example since he unfortunately chose for the moral traditions that I would really  
prefer to call natural the term 'artificial' [...]. Ironically, this led to his being regarded as the founder of  
utilitarianism, despite his having stressed that 'though the rules of justice be artificial they are not arbitrary', and 
that therefore it is even not 'improper to call them laws of nature'. He endeavoured to safeguard himself against  
constructivist misinterpretations by explaining that he 'only suppose[d] those reflections to be formed at once,  
which in fact arise insensibly an by degrees”. Friedrich August von Hayek, The Fatal Conceit, The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988; Appendix A, p. 145.
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only when using the same kind of metaphorical discourse as when speaking of the wisdom of 
nature.29
It would be pointless to try to determine whether it  is culture or rather reason that is 
primary. In Hayek's understanding the development of both was rather an effect of the mutual 
reaction of those two elements on each other. It is precisely in this sense that Hayek judges it to 
be equally right to say that the thinking man created the culture, as it is to say that the culture 
created the thinking man. That is to say, reason and culture developed jointly and simultaneously 
rather than successively. Hayek conceives this development as the following: the rules that were 
acquired through a learning process determined also the categorisation of spheres of our world 
and after  some time embedded a  certain world view that made it  possible for the people to 
predict  some external  events  and anticipate  them in their  own actions.  This  is,  according to 
Hayek, what we call reason. Our mind allows us to receive culture but it is not able to design it. 
This 'third world', to use the expression of Sir Karl Popper, has been upheld through the ages by 
millions of individually participating minds.30
The sort of 'knowledge of the world' that is passed on from generation to generation will thus consist  
in a great measure not of knowledge of cause and effect, but of rules of conduct adapted to the  
environment and acting like information about the environment although they do not say anything  
about it. Like scientific theories, they are preserved by proving themselves useful, but, in contrast to  
scientific theories, by a proof which no one needs to know, because the proof manifests itself in the  
resilience and progressive expansion of the order of society which it makes possible.31
This is in general how social systems and arrangements emerge, evolve and are upheld. The way 
Hayek sees it, most (if not all) expressions of human collective existence originate by way of 
spontaneously forming systems, or to use Hayek's term: patterns, though not planned by anyone 
in particular. These types of unforced formations, usually called spontaneous orders, were first 
made an issue by Scottish social philosophers, among others Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith, 
then taken up by economists  of the Austrian School,  to be finally fully theorized by Niklas 
Luhmann and it is in his work that a detailed and thorough analysis is to be found32. For the 
29 See  Friedrich August von Hayek, Die drei Quellen der menschlichen Werte, J.C.B Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 
Tuebingen, 1979; p. 10.
30 See   Friedrich August von Hayek, Die drei Quellen der menschlichen Werte, J.C.B Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 
Tuebingen, 1979; p. 11-15.
31 Friedrich August von Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London and Henley, 1978; p. 10.
32 See e.g. Niklas Luhman, Einführung in die Systemtheorie, Dirk Baecker (Hrsg.). -1. Aufl. - Heidelberg: Carl-
Auer-Systeme-Verl. , 2002. An important notion that Luhmann introduces in this book is that of system 
interconnection – the relation between an emerging system and its environment depends on a coincidence. A 
system can evolve in an environment which generates accidental changes. Autopoietic adjustments assure a high 
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purpose of this work it is enough to say that for Hayek the mode of spontaneous orders is one of 
the  most  natural  in  human  societies  because  this  is  how  languages  and  moral  codes  have 
developed for example.  Hayek speaks of twin ideas of evolution and spontaneous order.  He 
thinks that the key to the preservation of an order lies in the ability of its elements to behave 
according to rules. In that way, even when influenced by some external factors not only is the 
whole able to adjust to the new circumstances, but does it while still maintaining its order.33
“The possibility of forming structures by a process of replication gives those elements that have the  
capacity for doing so better chances of multiplying. These elements will be preferably selected for 
multiplication that are capable of forming into more complex structures, and the increase of their  
members will lead to the formation of still more such structures. Such a model, once it appeared,  
becomes as definite a constituent of the order of the world as any material object. In the structures of  
interaction,  the  patterns  of  activities  of  groups  are  determined  by  practices  transmitted  by  
individuals of one generation to those of the next; and these orders preserve their general character  
only by constant change (adaptation).”34
The emergence of  spontaneous orders  is  also  a  basic  instrument  of  civilisation  for  it 
brought up such arrangements as money and the law – all results of spontaneous growth and not 
of the conscious design of men, according to Hayek35. Another one of these self-forming orders, 
which is maybe most significant for Hayek's philosophy, is the worldwide division of labour. 
What this order achieves is a synchronisation of many diverse activities of men that otherwise do 
not know each other36. It is the belief in the performance of this particular spontaneous order that 
allows  Hayek  and  other  advocates  of  the  free  market  to  argue  its  effectiveness  and  self-
efficiency. If an order has the ability to adjust itself spontaneously to the changes there is no need 
for any invasive actions by social  engineers.  Moreover,  such actions will  only be treated as 
further intrusive changes to which the system will attempt to adjust  according to its internal 
rules.
The greatest appeal that spontaneous orders have for liberal thinkers is that they exclude 
level of coordination and interconnection between the two level – the system and the environment. Under the 
spontaneity of an order Luhmann understands that all processes and mechanism are immanent to the system and 
nothing is imported from outside. Historically determined state of the system evolves by means of self-
organisation on the inducement of changes occuring outside of it. 
33 See  Friedrich August von Hayek, Die drei Quellen der menschlichen Werte, J.C.B Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 
Tuebingen, 1979; p. 16.
34 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Fatal Conceit, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988; Appendix C, 
p. 151.
35 See  Friedrich August von Hayek, Die drei Quellen der menschlichen Werte, J.C.B Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 
Tuebingen, 1979; p. 25.
36 See  Friedrich August von Hayek, Die drei Quellen der menschlichen Werte, J.C.B Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 
Tuebingen, 1979; p. 17.
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coercion on the procedural level. “What is important in this case is that all individuals observe  
the established rules of conduct without needing to be commanded to obey them. The order is  
spontaneous because it arises out of the individual wills of the participants”37.  This happens 
mostly  without the participants' conscious and, more to the point, without them knowing what 
the general plan or direction of the development is. Indeed, it is the fragmented knowledge of all 
participants that cummulates in the emerging order and particularly the purpose of the market 
order (if one can speak of a purpose of something that is not intentional) is “to cope with the 
inevitable ignorance of everybody of most of the particular facts which determine this order”38.
 I think that by situating market system next to such structures as language and morality 
Hayek  placed  it  behind  the  scope  of  reasonable  criticism.  It  is  simply pointless  to  criticize 
languages and try to replace them with better solutions, although this has been tried more than 
once and the failure of these ventures shows my point best. Even if we would all agree that such 
artificial  languages  as  Interlingua,  Latino  sine  Flexione  or  Esperanto  (the  most  popular 
constructed language) are better (in the sense of being easier and more logical) they will never be 
able to substitute our natural languages because they simply do not catch on. The fact that people 
use the complicated languages that were unpremeditatedly evolving through history rather than 
adopt simple languages deliberately invented by a single person or a small group of people may 
be  hard  to  explain  but  it  certainly  shows  that  there  is  something  uncontestedly  useful  and 
valuable  in  a  system that  is  composed of  uncountable  tiny influences  for  all  its  users.  And 
similarly, just as it would be hard to explain why language communication works, it is difficult 
for  the  market  system  as  well.  We  are,  however,  well  able  to  describe  certain  rules  and 
mechanisms in work there. I think that whereas connotations and grammar rules are for language 
communication, price networks and competition are for the market system.
An interesting feature of spontaneous orders, especially when it concerns ordered groups 
of people of a significant size, is that in order to participate in them particular members have to 
obtain certain qualities. Otherwise mechanisms exist that arrange for those who do not submit to 
the pattern to be excluded.39 I found an instructive and fresh way of analysing these mechanisms 
in the works of Robert Axelrod. He researches the rules of governing the game theory using 
computer simulations and tries to explain how the results can be applied in social orders. One of 
his well known experiments was a computer tournament of the Prisoners Dilemma. Scientist of 
37 Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 38. 
Included a quotation from Hayek, Knowledge, Evolution and Society.
38 Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 38. 
Included a quotation from Hayek, Knowledge, Evolution and Society.
39 See  Friedrich August von Hayek, Die drei Quellen der menschlichen Werte, J.C.B Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 
Tuebingen, 1979; p. 21.
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different  disciplines  as  well  as  non-professionals  were  invited to  submit  computer  programs 
describing different strategies for the game. All submitted programs played against each other 
and  the results were than submitted to complex mathematical and sociological analysis. Two 
outcomes that are mostly interesting from the point of view of this paper are as follows: 1) most 
successful were those strategies that cooperated with their opponents; 2) after more rounds of the 
tournament the cooperative strategies eliminated the uncooperative ones40.
Believing in the self-organisatory capacity of social systems, it is surprising for Hayek 
that people generally find it easier to imagine a single mind overseeing the whole complexity of 
data and circumstances or a group of omniscient agents, than to imagine or understand a system 
that works as a  combination of fragments of knowledge,  to use Hayek's expression. He argues 
against the possibility of a conscious design as an origin of social orders.
Such an order, leading to the utilisation of much more information than anyone possesses, could not  
have been 'invented'. This follows from the fact that the result could not have been foreseen. [...] All  
that man could do was to try to improve bit by bit on a process of mutually adjusting individual  
activities, by reducing conflicts through modifications to some of the inherited rules. All  that he  
could deliberately design, he could and did create only within a system of rules, which he had not  
invented, and with the aim of improving the existent order.41
This means that a particular person is well able to introduce singular changes and adjustments to 
the system as  solutions  to  definite  problems that  he or  she confronts.  No particular  person, 
however, is able to change or design the system as a whole. The reason for this in a double one. 
On one hand it follows from Hayek's epistemological assumptions that people are equipped only 
with limited epistemic capacities. On the other hand it results from the logic of the system itself – 
there is no external agent and therefore no God-perspective is possible. A functioning system 
cannot be frozen, rearranged and than started again. Neither can all innovations be introduced 
simultaneously. Each change, however small, causes unpredictable and uncountable outcomes 
which can turn out to be counter-productive to each other. In other words, social systems, in 
Hayek's opinion, cannot be approached from a holistic perspective – it cannot be determined and 
explained as a whole.
Hayek's argument against the logical possibility of social engineering is practically the 
same as the one of Sir Karl Popper. He argued that “it is for many reasons quite impossible to  
40 For details of the Prisonner's Dilemma computer tournament and its analysis see Robert Axelrod, The evolution 
of cooperation, New York, Basic Books, 1996.
41 Friedrich August von Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London and Henley, 1978; p. 11.
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control all, or nearly all these [social] relationships; if only because with every new control of  
social  relations  we  create  a  host  of  new  social  relations  to  be  controlled.  In  short,  the 
impossibility is a logical impossibility”42.  Popper's argument is basically that any attempt of an 
overall  social  reform  would  require  such  a  number  of  particular  actions  that  it  would  be 
impossible  to  foresee  their  results  when  joined  and  interrelated.  Furthermore,  once 
simultaneously implemented,  those unitary reform would each yeld some results but again it 
would be impossible to say which changes result from which reforms. The complexity of the 
social realm makes it impossible, according to Popper, to study it as a whole. The  'selectivity of  
all observation and description' to which human agents are doomed by their epistemic capacities 
makes all attempts at holistic sciences futile. Hayek adopts a Popperian position in this regard 
and  it  might  be  suggested  that  this  is  the  reason  why their  conceptions  of  liberalism have 
generally so much in common.
An important problem with social constructivism, according to Hayek, is that its principle 
can be formulated in a modest and innocent way, its implications however are serious and, in his 
view, false. The constructivist assumption is that men are the constructors of their own society 
and civilisation. As such they are also able to change their institutions according to their needs 
and wishes. Expressed in this way the formula of social constructivism sounds innocent enough, 
as with Hayek, but it is too often understood to mean something much less moderate. “As soon 
as it is extended [...] to mean that man was able to do this [create the institutions of society and 
civilisation] because he was endowed with reason, the implications become questionable. Man  
did  not  possess  reason  before  civilisation.  The  two  evolved  together.43 Hayek's  argument 
therefore is that the assumption of social constructivism implies that men have godlike abilities 
which  to  him is  an  absurdity,  and,  more  importantly,  an  absurdity fatal  in  its  consequences 
because it leads them to such experiments as the Soviet Union.
Andrew  Gamble  criticises  Hayek  for  advocating  spontaneous  orders  without 
demonstrating  that  they  are  always  superior  to  orders  consciously  man-made44.  This  is  a 
legitimate critique strictly speaking, however I think that Hayek would reject it as meaningless 
for  the  following  reason.  He  does  not  try  to  show  that  spontaneous  orders  are  better  than 
constructs would be because based on his epistemological assumptions social constructs on the 
scale of civilisation are not possible. It is no use trying to defend spontaneous orders because 
there exists no realistic alternative to them on the discussed level.
42 John Gray, Liberalisms. Essays in Political Philosophy, Routledge, London and New York, 1991; p. 16. Included 
a quotation from Popper, Poverty of Historicism.
43 Friedrich August von Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London and Henley, 1978; p. 3.
44 Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 39.
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1.5. The Austrian School – anti-rationalism and subjective theory of value
The name 'Austrian School of Economics' refers to a group of economists who, working 
mostly  at  the  Vienna  University,  developed  theories  of  society  and  economics  generally 
characterised by the application of methodological individualism in their analysis. This means 
that they worked under the conviction that only social phenomena can be approached only from 
the angle of rationally acting individuals. This was an approach contrary to those of Karl Marx 
and the German School who conceived accumulated entities as classes and nations as subjects of 
analysis.  The  originality  of  the  Austrian  School  rests  also  in  their  rejection  of  common 
mathematical theories of equilibrium.
Carl Menger is regarded as the founder of the Austrian School. His work  Grundsaetze 
der Volkswirtschafslehre  formulated main ideas and methodology of the new approach. Among 
his direct students were Friedrich von Wieser and Eugen Böhm von Bawerk. The next generation 
of  Austrian  economists  brought  forth  such  thinkers  as  Joseph Schumpeter  and  Ludwig  von 
Mieses.  Their  work was continued by Oskar Morgenstern,  who introduced game theory into 
economic analysis, and Friedrich von Hayek, who received a Nobel Prize in 1974. Most of them 
were not only academics but they were also publicly active. Most of the representatives of the 
Austrian School emigrated before World War II and continued their work in Great Britain and 
USA  and  nowadays  Austrian  economics  is  mostly  present  in  the  works  of  American 
representatives of radical liberal theories. They draw primarily on works of Mises and Hayek.45
Menger's  pioneer  work was concerned with  the  theory of  value.  He insisted that  the 
notion of value cannot be grasped objectively but only in its relation to marginal utility. Value is 
always  determined  for  a  certain  quantity  of  a  goods  by  a  certain  person  under  certain 
circumstances.  The assessment  of  value  is  thus  subjective.  This  insight  explains  the  famous 
Paradox of Value: How is it possible that diamond, that has hardly any utility, is so expensive 
while water, indispensable to life, is practically worthless (in the sense of its price)? Analysed 
from the perspective of Menger's value theory the question is formulated in a wrong way because 
it concerns values of diamonds and water as a category itself. Value however is a reflection not 
only of the direct utility of an object, but also its scarcity and complex social interrelations.
Furthermore Austrian economists revolutionised the way of thinking about the relation 
between work and value. Traditional theories calculated value of an item on the ground of work 
time necessary for its production. Now it is widely accepted that the relation is reverse: work 
time is spend on production of goods because they are valuable.
45 See Wien und der Wiener Kreis, hg. Volker Thurm, Facultas Verlag, WUV, Wien, 2003.
17
The representatives of the Austrian School were liberals as concerns political convictions. 
The limited role of the state in market activities was based on their theory of value: because 
value  cannot  be  determined  objectively,  but  all  individuals  have  to  act  as  consumers  and 
suppliers  based  on  their  subjective  assessments,  any  state  intervention  has  to  be  seen  as 
interference  with  the  plans  of  its  citizens.  Also  observations  concerning  money  were  an 
additional reason for rejection of a planned economy and conscious interference in the market. 
Menger and his followers pointed to the fact that the establishment of money as a means of 
payment occurred in an uncoordinated and spontaneous way. This development took place as a 
result of the fact that some goods have a larger value not due to their practical utility but due to 
the fact that they can be easily exchanged for other goods.
The  significance  of  the  Austrian  school  of  economics  is  its  unique  way of  posing  a 
problem and  formulating  different  questions  than  those  generally  asked  by  the  mainstream 
economy.  It  was  the shift  of  perspective  that  allowed Austrian economists  to  come up with 
theories that were revolutionary and while others, though based on classical thinkers, updated 
their ideas in modern times and circumstances. Peter Klein notices that
„throughout most of this century 'the economic problem' has been seen as the allocation of resources, 
the  problem of  finding  a  distribution  of  productive  resources  to  supply  a  set  of  competing  and  
potentially unlimited demands – for which a solution can in principle be computed by an outside  
observer  (and,  by  implication,  a  central  planner).  For  Hayek  and  the  Austrians,  by  contrast,  
economics is about the coordination of plans, the means by which a 'highly complex order' of human  
cooperation emerges from the plans and decisions of isolated individuals, operating in the world of  
tacit and dispersed knowledge.46
The general approach to the market understood it in a static, state-of-matters way and 
accordingly  tried  to  describe  them by means  of  developing  theoretical  equilibria  that  were 
supposed to correspond to the ideal characteristics of the market. On the contrary, Heyek and his 
Austrian  colleagues  treated  the  market  as  a  dynamic,  constantly  changing,  developing  and 
adjusting  mechanism.  Therefore  they  focused  on  agent-relative  features  of  the  market  and 
emphasised the significance of learning and discovery procedures involved in it. This subject-
centred  approach  of  the  Austrian  school  resulted  from  the  different  methodological  and 
epistemological  assumptions  but   it  was  also  related  to  what  Klein  describes  as  the 
„interdisciplinary flavour of the Austrian tradition”47. This means that the analysed agent on the 
46 The Fortunes of Liberalism. Essays on Austrian Economics and the Ideal of Freedom, edited by Peter G. Klein, 
Routledge, 1992, p. 1.
47 The Fortunes of Liberalism. Essays on Austrian Economics and the Ideal of Freedom, edited by Peter G. Klein, 
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market was not reduced to a homo economicus but rather treated in its complexity and with all 
his imperfections.
The unique and essential contribution that Hayek made to the Austrian tradition was his 
rejection of  rationalism as the basis  of epistemology.  His  predecessors,  notably Ludwig von 
Mises,  basically agreed  with such socialist  thinkers  as  Oskar  Lange who believed that  „the 
function performed by the market could be understood intellectually, and therefore, in principle,  
improved upon”48. Hayek decisively rejected this rationalist assumption. He rejected the idea that 
the mind was allegedly capable of self-knowledge and of mastering the reality. By doing this, 
Gamble argues, “Hayek challenged the epistemological basis of all modern economics”49.  In a 
way Hayek radicalised the Austrian approach by his rejection of its rationalist foundation and by 
those means he drew a strict line between liberal and socialist economic theories.
Andrew Gamble points out that Hayek's turn towards anti-rationalism was not so much an 
introduction  of  a  new  perspective  to  the  Austrian  school,  as  a  reintroduction  of  what  he 
understood to be one of its traditional foundations - “the anti-rationalism of the Scottish political  
economists and David Hume”50. It was this tradition that Hayek always averted to as the basis of 
true  liberalism.  An  infection  with  liberalism,  as  Gamble  formulates  it,  was  the  fundamental 
danger to all modern ideologies because it inexorably led to attempts of social engineering and 
thus  to  socialism  and  collectivism.  Only  anti-rationalist  approach  could  secure  the  ideal  of 
individualism and therefore ws the only acceptable epistemology for a liberal theory of politics 
and economics.
Apart from the anti-rationalism, the Austrian tradition in economics is characterised by a 
strongly subjective approach.  This is  visible mostly in the theory of value developed by the 
Austrian economists. This theory abandons the classical notion of the intrinsic value of goods. 
No thing has objective value as such. The classical labour theories of value were wrong in trying 
to asses values of goods by calculating the time and effort needed for their production. Hayek 
and other Austrian economists argued that value, on the contrary, originates from a subjective 
relation between an individual  and the good in  question.  The  assessment  of  value  therefore 
cannot be objective and definite because it is always based on subjective utility valuation made 
by each particular  person separately.  The  price  that  is  achieved on the market  is  simply an 
average estimation resulting from all subjective values.
By adopting the subjective theory of value rather than the classical labour theory Hayek 
Routledge, 1992, p. 7.
48 Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 18.
49 Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 18.
50 Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 18.
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and  his colleagues had to look for a new solution to the universal problem of economy. The 
question  “how  to  establish  priority  between  a  multiplicity  of  ends  competing  for  a  limited  
quantity of means”   had to be answered through “  analysis of the behaviour of the economic 
subject”51 rather than by developing complicated calculi for the assessments of values and then 
by means of political coercion forcing them to the market. Such an approach, as Gamble notices, 
was damaging to the exchange mechanisms of the market because these are based on the fact that 
different  individuals  attribute  different  values  to  particular  goods.  Also  the  monopoly  of 
productive resources in collectivist economies distorts the price system and prevents 'true' prices, 
those representing the subjective preferences of consumers, from being established52.
From  these  two  basic  ideas  underlying  Austrian  economics  Hayek  developed  his 
innovatory interpretation of a classical economic notion of equilibrium. In his essay Economics  
and Knowledge he emphasises that the only relevant equilibrium in the market circumstances is 
knowledge  relative.  The  author  points  out  that  usually  economists  tend  to  overlook  the 
significance of time and individual perspective when analysing market phenomena. This is often 
indicated  by  simplified  models  showing  perfect  (and  impossible  conditions)  used  for  the 
analysis. Hayek points out the very limited usefulness of such models and therefore emphasises 
the simple fact that the subjective data available to individual actors on the market scene are 
never identical with the objective facts. The objective fact that on the market N number of a 
certain item is available is of very small importance. What counts on the real market (not its 
model simplification) is that X number of people know about the availability of Y number of this 
item. The problem, according to Hayek, is that  economic analysis  usually assumes “that the 
subjective data coincide with the objective facts”53, although this is never the case.
The two assumptions: 1) irrationality of the agents, and 2) their imperfect knowledge of 
the  market,  lead  to  rejection  of  economic  modelling  in  general.  The  use  of  such  models  is 
significantly  limited  and their  employment  for  purposes  of  reform may lead  to  catastrophic 
results.  Fortunately  some  representatives  of  contemporary  economy,  aware  of  this  problem, 
develop  what  is  knows  as  Imperfect  Knowledge  Economics.  The  leading  thinkers  of  this 
conception are Edmund Phelps and Roman Frydman. In my view the concepts developed by 
those economists can be seen as a continuation of the critique on the ration expectation approach 
as issued, among others, by Friedrich Hayek.
51 Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 60. 
Included a quotation from Hayek, Collectiivist Economic Planning.
52 Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 61.
53 Friedrich August von Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1980;  p. 44.
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1.6 Epistemology, dispersed knowledge theory
Seeing  how important  for  the  Austrian  School  and for  Hayek especially  the  specific 
conception of knowledge is, I think it is necessary to give some more thought to this particular 
topic.  Hayek,  having recognised the  significance of  epistemology for  the  economic  sciences 
developed his own conception and, similarly to Popper based on it his philosophy of liberalism. 
He worked with two major insights developed by the Austrian tradition: “first, that knowledge is  
always  imperfect  in  human societies,  and second,  that  the  cost  of  any  economic  activity  is  
subjective”54. The importance of the assumption of imperfect knowledge is so crucial because it 
lies at the base of the two-sided debate that dominates modern economics:
“The defenders of free markets are the 'new classical' economists, whose theories depend on the 
assumptions of hyper-rational human agents with 'rational expectations' and instantaneous market  
clearing; the sceptics, usually carrying some sort of 'Keynesian' label, view expectations as more  
problematic and prices as slow to adjust. Hayek, in stark contrast, bases a defence of the market not  
on human rationality, but on human ignorance!”55
The second assumption concerning the subjectivity of the economic value results,  as already 
mentioned,  from the  rejection  of  the  labour  time calculus.  To use  a  formulation  of  Andrew 
Gamble,  it  is “in terms of the alternative output which the same resources could be used to  
produce”56 rather than in terms of the input of labour, that the value of goods should be assessed 
according  to  Austrian  economists.  This  is  the  reason  why the  particular  knowledge  that  is 
significant for Hayek's theory is the subjective type and, no less importantly, a decentralized type 
of that cannot be replaced by statistical data and is not accessible to any central authority.
Hayek's understanding of our cognitive skills can be summarized in a simple sentence: 
“all man's mind can effectively comprehend are the facts of the narrow circle of which he is the  
centre”57. He also does not believe in the existence of anything like a Human Reason conceived 
as a singularity, as a collection of all human knowledge. The closest to the conception of such a 
Reason with a capital R is what Hayek calls an interpersonal process,  which consists of  an 
infinite number  of individual cognitive actions that can be communicated to the others, can be 
used by the others, influenced and tested but, very importantly, it can never be apprehended as a 
54 Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 67.
55 The Fortunes of Liberalism. Essays on Austrian Economics and the Ideal of Freedom, edited by Peter G. Klein, 
Routledge, 1992, p. 6.
56 Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 67.
57 Friedrich August von Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1980; p. 14.
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whole  by  a  single  person.  Gamble  also  points  out  the  significant  role  that  the  notion  of 
abstraction plays in Hayek's epistemology – it is the faculty that enables men to deal with entities 
that otherwise are not accessible to them58. The conclusion that Hayek derives from his epistemic 
theories for ethics and practical philosophy in general is that “no man is qualified to pass final  
judgement  on  the  capacities  which  other  possesses  or  is  to  be  allowed  to  exercise”59.  This 
approach allows granting a de jure equality to all people in the exercise of their judgements, 
although de facto their abilities and natural endowments differ and are far from being equal.
The inequality of natural endowments, knowledge and judgement skills is,  in Hayek's 
opinion, definitely a positive thing for human communities. He argues that thanks to this the 
diversity of our complex civilisation is possible without coercion. If we all had equal skills, than 
either we would all have to be doing the same thing or else someone would have to arbitrarily 
assign us to different functions and occupations. This not being the case, each individual is able 
to find a domene in which he or she is better skilled than the others, has a wider knowledge or a 
better approach. And even if a specific occupation in which one could fulfil ones capabilities in 
the best way does not yet exist, by the method of trial and error he is free to look for it, invent it 
and therefore enrich our civilisation with yet another new design. Such a creative and innovative 
development is possible only based on de facto differences. As Hayek writes, “there is all the  
difference in the world between treating people equally and attempting to make them equal”60. 
The equality before the law by no means has to be based on actual equality of any particular 
human feature neither on the assumption of them possessing equal knowledge. Rather, a liberal 
society is  arranged in such a way that law carries out the function of a cathalysator for the 
dispersed knowledge and particular actions based on it:
“If the law thus serves to enable the individual to act effectively on his own knowledge and for this  
purpose adds to his knowledge, it also embodies knowledge, or the results of past experience, that  
are utilized so long as men act under these rules. In fact, the collaboration of individuals under  
common rules rests on a sort of division of knowledge, where the individual must take account of  
particular circumstances but the law ensures that their action will be adapted to certain general or  
58 Gamble also point out that abstraction „resides in the general ruales of the market order, but it is also at the 
heart of modern science and social science”. The explanaition for this state of things could be that while the 
faculty of abstract thinking is so crucial in human percetion of the world it is slao the one that emerges as a rule 
and procedure in most of spontaneous orders developed in the course of civilisation. See Andrew Gamble, 
Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 45.
59 Friedrich August von Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1980;  p. 15.
60 Friedrich August von Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1980;  p. 16.
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permanent characteristics of their society.”61
There  are  specific  mechanism that  ensure  proper  functioning  of  a  system  based  on 
dispersed knowledge used in bits by millions of individuals. One such mechanism is the famous 
Smithian  invisible  hand62 –  a  sort  of  negative  feedback  regulating  prices  and  providing  all 
participants of the market with information about their performance as well as about the demand 
and supply relations. The price systems collate all bits of knowledge that particular people have 
and integrate them into an information network accessible to all. The agents may not understand 
the  structure  of  this  network  nor  how  the  feedback  mechanism works  but,  as  Peter  Klein 
observes, they are  rule followers  who learned in a process of evolution how to respond to the 
signals they observe63.
In his study on Hayek's epistemology and market theory Andrew Gamble characterizes 
this individual knowledge relevant for economic decision as “local, dispersed, fragmented, and 
much of it [...] tacit”64. This particular kind of knowledge is so significant owning to its details, 
nuances and attention to minor differences – all that is being lost in statistical knowledge can be 
used in central planning. In the process of generalisation of data it is precisely these little bits of 
information  that  are  being  lost  that  make all  the  difference  when it  comes  to  making right 
decisions. The limits of our cognitive capabilities make it impossible first to add up particular 
knowledge  of  all  individuals  without  performing  some serious  abstractions  and  secondly  to 
provide all individuals with the same knowledge. As Hayek emphasises, it is utterly unnecessary 
for all actors on the market scene to have the same knowledge in order to be able to cooperate or 
to trade with each other. “The whole acts as one market, not because any of its members survey 
the whole field, but because their limited individual fields of vision sufficiently overlap so that  
through many intermediaries the relevant information is communicated to all”65.
Hayek tries to demonstrate that the economic problem of the society is, shortly speaking, 
“a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality”66 and that 
61 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge Classics, London & New York, 2006; p. 
138.
62 The 'invisible hand', as Adam Smith calls it, is the mechanism by means of which egoistically inspired actions of 
individuals bring about common profit. In particular, so Hayek, it can referr to the way by which making use of 
my specific knowledge not only do I popularize it by putting it on the market (and so allow others to make a 
similar use of it), but I also provide others with a good or service which would not otherwise be accessible or 
even known to them.
63 The Fortunes of Liberalism. Essays on Austrian Economics and the Ideal of Freedom, edited by Peter G. Klein, 
Routledge, 1992, p. 6.
64 The Cambridge Companion to Hayek, ed. Edward Faser, Cambridge University Press, 2006; p. 115.
65 Friedrich August von Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
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66 Friedrich August von Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
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a competitive system is the answer to it. In his essay titled  The Use of Knowledge in Society 
Hayek gives a following definition:  “Competition [...] means decentralized planning by many 
separate persons”67. The dispersed knowledge needs a decentralized kind of planning to be used 
efficiently and non-arbitrarily. It might be questionable whether decentralized planning with the 
lack  of  coordination  it  exercises  could  really  make  an  efficient  use  of  the  information 
disseminated throughout the system. Hayek argues however, that for successful establishment of 
economic relations only a sufficiently high probability is required – shortfall and uncertainty are 
intrinsic features of the market  and they do not  stand in the way of effective integration of 
countless bits of information into a single order.
Hayek supposes that one of the reasons why some people find it hard to believe in smooth 
functioning of market economy is that it is not based on any expert knowledge. He thinks that 
being used to the high position and esteem of natural sciences in our world we are more likely to 
trust  systems  that  work  in  a  similar  way.  The  high  degree  of  specialisation  of  scientific 
knowledge favours the formation of expert authorities. And because this seems to be working 
well, we expect similar experts to design our economic relations. But Hayek reminds us that the 
scientific kind of knowledge is not the only kind, and not always the most relevant. For example, 
in case of any commercial enterprise the significant kind of knowledge is “the knowledge of the  
particular  circumstances of  time and place”68.  This kind of  knowledge cannot  be efficiently 
exercised by any other instance as by the man on the spot, as Hayek formulates it.
“It is with respect to this [knowledge of particular circumstances] that practically every individual  
has some advantage over all others because he possesses unique information of which beneficial use  
might be made, but of which use might be made only if the decisions depending on it are left to him  
or are made with his active co-operation.”69
I hope that at this point it is clear why individualism goes hand in hand with market economy 
and why it is one of the three fundamental ideals of liberalism.
67 Friedrich August von Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1980; p. 79.
68 Friedrich August von Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
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2 INDIVIDUALISM
2.1. Methodological individualism
The  debate  between  individualism and holistic  theories  revolves  around  the  question 
whether  the  social  dimension  of  human  reality  is  subservient  to  the  individuals  or  do  the 
“distinctive human properties emerge only when individuals come together”70. In the context of 
political  philosophy  individualist  position  states  that  rights  of  individuals  are  fundamental. 
Collectivist theories on the other hand maintain that some rights are social in their origin and 
thus independent of individual rights. “According to communitarians, individuals are constituted 
by the institutions and practices of which they are a part, and their rights and obligations  derive  
from those same institutions and practices”71.
The term 'methodological individualism' stems from works of Max Weber and his student 
Joseph  Schumpeter.  As  the  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy  formulates,  their  doctrine 
demands that all kinds of collective entities always be understood as “solely the resultants and 
modes of organization of the particular acts of individual persons, since these alone can be  
treated as agents in a course of subjectively understandable action”72. Action is characterised by 
Weber as motivated by an intentional state. In his opinion it is also interpretatively accessible to 
the  agent.  It  is  essential  to  differentiate  Weber's  politically  neutral  position,  which  aims  at 
interpreting social phenomena, from the political ideology of individualism as advocated by the 
Austrian  School  and  traceable  as  far  as  Thomas  Hobbes.  The  most  significant  influence  of 
Weber's work on methodological individualism was in the field of sociology where his general 
theory of action had a big impact. Theories of the Austrian School, on the other hand, affected 
economic and political theories.
In regard of Weberian theory of action, economics developed a discussion on rational 
agency and the  notion  of  so called  homo economicus.  Hayek's  position  within  the  Austrian 
School was exceptional in this context because he did not mind referring to intentional states of 
the  agents  on  the  market  and  emphasised  only  limited  usefulness  of  statistical  approach  in 
economic analysis. “Thus Hayek insists that, in effect, all macroeconomic analysis is incomplete  
70 Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, gen. ed. Edward Craig, Routledge, London and New York, 1998; vol. 4, 
p.484.
71 The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Second Edition, gen. ed. Robert Audi, Cambridge University Press, 
1999; p. 719.
72 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/methodological-individualism/
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in  the absence of  “micro” foundations”73.  Significantly,  despite  his  regard  for  intentionality, 
Hayek  understood  that  the  outcomes  of  peoples  actions  on  the  market  were  not  its  direct 
consequences (at least not from the individual's perspective) but emerged in an unpredictable 
way.  The  advantages  of  a  decentralised  economic  system  stem  in  great  part  from  this 
epistemological  circumstance  and  are  best  understood  when  seen  from  the  perspective  of 
individuals involved in it:
“The problem with ignoring the agent's perspective, in Hayek's view, is that it can easily lead us to  
overestimate our powers of rational planning and control, and thus to fall into “rationalism.” By  
contrast, the central virtue of methodological individualism is that it helps us to see the limitations of  
our own reason.”74
In this  regard Lorenzo Infantino notices in the preface to his book  Individualism in Modern 
Thought that the reification of collective concepts performed by methodological collectivism is 
not only an obstacle to the understanding of social mechanism but it also constitutes a basis for 
harmful beliefs “in the myth of the great Legislator or Planner who, sure of his ability to bend  
the  situation  to  his  own  designs,  aims  at  moulding  and  remoulding  norms  and  institutions  
intentionally”75. He  argues  that,  on  the  contrary,  social  arrangements,  though  results  of 
intentional  human  actions,  emerge  independently  of  those  intentions  and  take  the  form  of 
“cascades of unforeseeable events”. In other words, social forms are unconscious compositions 
of decisions and actions taken up by all individuals. Moreover, these forms are seen as entities 
only because theories regard them as such. Social sciences, according to Hayek, “do not deal  
with given 'wholes' but their task is to constitute these wholes by constructing models”76.
Hayek's reason for favouring methodological individualism over collectivism is related to 
his critique of the 'abuse of reason' and also to his belief in the possibility of bringing about 
spontaneous orders. These emerge as “unintended consequences of intentional human actions”77. 
In this model, which Infantino calls Mandeville-Smith model, individuals are autonomous and 
motivated by their personal interests. The autonomy consists in the fact that there is no authority 
over the individuals supervising or ordering their actions. They do not have to submit to any 
73 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/methodological-individualism/
74 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/methodological-individualism/
75 Lorenzo Infantino, Individualism in Modern Thought, From Adam Smith to Hayek, Routledge, London and New 
York, 1998; p. xi.
76 Friedrich August Hayek, Scientism and the Study of Society, in Modes of Individualism and Collectivism, ed. 
John O'Neill, Gregg Revivals, Aldershot, Hampshire, 1992; p. 46.
77 Lorenzo Infantino, Individualism in Modern Thought, From Adam Smith to Hayek, Routledge, London and New 
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intentional order but rather an unintentional order arises from their own actions.
The background of  anti-individualist  movement  in  all  social  sciences,  from economy 
through  sociology, up to philosophy, lies in the double claim of constructivism on one hand and 
in uncritical  rationalism on the other,  writes Infantino. The two claims of constructivism are 
“that unintentional order is impossible and that, on the contrary, the conscious organization of a  
complex society  is  possible”78. The uncritical  rationalism stems from Cartesian tradition and 
recognises hardly any limits of human reason and its power. It is the inclination towards utopian 
models  that  Hayek  and  other  individualists  reject  in  rationalism.  Moreover,  the  collectivist 
approach assumes the kind of inequality of agents that bestows some of them the with ability to 
regulate lives of others. And, as Infantino rightly notices, “this claim coincides precisely with the  
ambition to assert a 'privileged point of view on the world', to hand over the monopoly of truth to  
a class of 'chosen ones''79. Hayek even argues that common grounds can be found here for such 
distinct philosophers as Comte and Hegel. They both seem to try to suppress the individual and 
subordinate it to a superior collective and both their philosophies gave foundations to totalitarian 
systems.
2.2. Political theory of individualism – Lock, Kant, Smith, Bentham, Mill
This  section is  based  on Michael  Oakeshott's  work  Morality  and Politics  in  Modern  
Europe and is intended as a short introduction of individualist positions in political philosophy 
prior to Hayek. These conceptions were, as Hayek himself emphasises, of great influence to his 
formulation of liberalism. I believe that a presentation of these positions will allow me to regard 
Hayek's philosophy in the right perspective.
In his book Oakeshott writes that political theory of individualism begins with the idea of 
the  heterogeneity  of  individuals  and  the  multiplicity of  their  activities  and  variety  of  their 
opinions. Those activities and opinions overlap and often collide with each other. This state of 
affairs  does not have to be subject to  positive or negative valuation but  it  simply has to be 
acknowledged. Subsequently a question has to be answered about the the kind of government 
that is proper in view of these circumstances. Michael Oakeshott emphasises in this context the 
desirability  of  an  impartial  government  that  is  not  itself  involved  in  the  collisions  between 
individuals.
78 Lorenzo Infantino, Individualism in Modern Thought, From Adam Smith to Hayek, Routledge, London and New 
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“The office of government is not to impose other beliefs and activities upon its subjects, not to tutor  
or to educate them, not to make them better or happier in a way other than that which they have  
chosen for themselves, not to direct them, lead them or manage them; the office of government is  
merely to rule. And ruling is recognised as a specific and limited activity. The image of the ruler is  
not that of the manager but that of the umpire whose business it is to administer the rules of a game  
in which he does not himself participate.”80
Oakeshott argues that the ideal of individualism requires such a manner of governance that is 
able to unite all individual interests under the rule of common rights. From the historical point of 
view it  required  abrogation  of  the  system of  feudal  and  class  privileges.  Such governments 
started to appear in Europe already in 16th century but it was first the 17th century that brought 
philosophers who theorized this political experience. Hobbes and Locke have to be mentioned as 
thinkers who “saw to the bottom of the task of anyone who wants to construct a political theory 
of individualism”81.  They both begin with an imaginative state of nature inhabited by free and 
independent individuals who pursue their own goals with no earthly authority superior to their 
own. An introduction of a new instance in a position of an impartial umpire occurs for reasons of 
convenience. In Locke's conception the government is not bestowed with sovereignty but its 
functions are strictly limited to umpirage.
“[Government's]  purpose is not to deprive a subject of his self-determination; it is to preserve his  
liberty and his property [...]. The ruler does not provide his subjects with rights and duties; these 
they already have from the Law of God and they need no others. What the ruler provides is a means  
of redress to any subject who is denied, by the action of his neighbour, the enjoyment of his rights.”82
In this regard, when Locke introduces a sort of 'common good' in the form of the “maintenance 
of the authority of the umpire” it is not to be understood in a purely collectivist way but rather as 
a good shared by all  individuals.  Moreover,  Oakeshott  emphasises Locke's  insistence on the 
'indestructible self-determination' of individuals articulated by the necessity of a consent to any 
kind of subordination and in this manner authorization of a ruler.
Oakeshott agrees that Locke's conception of individual, because of it reference to God, is 
80 Michael Oakeshott, Morality and Politics in Modern Europe, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 
1993; p. 49.
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not satisfactory from a philosophical point of view. It is however a testimony of “the high level  
of  individuality  which  emerged among Western  European peoples  as  the  counterpart  of  the  
desuetude of feudal societies”83.  It bears witness to the fact that a philosophical theory of the 
individual in polity was needed. Later thinkers managed to develop it much further, Kant being 
maybe closest to achieving this goal. Not unlike Locke, Kant bases his theory on the conviction 
that human beings have a disposition to be self-determined, that is, to make their own choices 
and to act upon rational deliberation. It is significant for political reference that, according to this 
conception,  the  assumption  of  this  disposition  for  oneself  necessarily  entails  assumption  of 
identical disposition for all other people. Oakeshott explains that
“if a human being claims this right to be an individual, to be self-determined, it follows that each  
man must recognize a similar right in every other man. To deny the right of self-determination to  
others is to remove the foundation upon which a man claims it for himself, because he claims it for  
himself on account of his being a man [...]. Hence, the fundamental rule of the moral and rational  
human life is to cultivate one's own individuality and recognize the right of all other men to cultivate  
their own individualities.”84
What is interesting in this conception is that on the one hand individuals are primary (and “a 
civil society is never more than an association of individuals”), on the other hand individuality is 
a feature existent only among other individuals. In this regard, the task of a government is to 
“limit by external laws the freedom on any individual to the extent of its agreement with the  
freedom of all other individuals”85.  Oakeshott emphasises that the objective of a government is 
to facilitate rational and moral life through eliminating any arbitrary interference of others by 
means of exercising controlled nonarbitrary interference of law. The authority of the government 
is limited to guarding the law and does not extend to imposing substantive activities such as 
determining what a good life is supposed to be for example.
Smith develops a similar conception of individual although, as Oakeshott writes, he does 
it  “rather  clumsily  and  empirically”  in  comparison  to  Kant's  logical  reasoning.  What  is 
interesting in Smith's analysis is that he emphasises that natural beneficence and love of others 
are not necessary conditions for men to live and function in communities. Smith believes that a 
“disposition not to injure one another” is sufficient. The sense of utility of a society will allow 
83 Michael Oakeshott, Morality and Politics in Modern Europe, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 
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its  preservation,  if  its  members will  not  show harmful  inclinations towards each other.  Thus 
justice can be defined as “readiness to refrain from doing injury”, and although it is a condition 
of upholding a society, it  does not arise from a regard for multitude but from the regard for 
individuals  qua  individuals.  Again  not  unlike  Kant,  Smith  believes  that  the  objective  of  a 
government  is  “to  provide  the  conditions  of  justice  for  its  subjects”  and not  to  change  the 
subjects themselves. Among its duties is setting down rules of conduct which respond to current 
problems and circumstances, providing means of exchange and preventing practices harmful to 
the enterprise, like monopolies and privileges86.
The originality of Bentham's political theory of individual is that its is strongly concerned 
with the characters of rulers as well as with the characters of those being ruled. He presents 
individuals as rational and sentient beings who determine their conduct “by a desire for pleasure  
and an aversion to pain”. They are also the best judges of matters concerning their feelings and 
perceptions, yet they tend to be intolerant and try to impose upon others their own beliefs. Their 
activities are guided not by the aim of self-improvement but solely the improvement of their 
conditions.  They are  understood to  be egocentric  in  that  their  primary concern  is  their  own 
interest  and  good.  Bentham  is  more  radical  than  the  previously  discussed  philosophers  in 
stressing  the  separateness  of  individuals.  “They  compose  no  'community'  which  could  be  
supposed to have an 'interest'  or a 'good'  of  its  own”87.  Yet,  they need to be subjected to a 
government which would secure conditions in which they all can enjoy their rights and make use 
of their abilities.
“Not to allow each man to make his own choices for himself in respect of pleasure and pain is to  
deny his character as a sentient and rational being; but when men enjoy this right of making their 
own choices they are apt to exhibit a disastrous propensity to be intolerant – to disallow in others 
what they claim for themselves. And from this predicament springs both the need for government and 
the proper character of government.”88
Bentham conceives  the  role  of  government  in  a  strictly  utilitarian  way –  it  is  supposed  to 
maintain  the  highest  possible  level  of  pleasure  among  its  subjects  by  inflicting  the  lowest 
possible  level  of  pain.  “In  other  words,  government  is  a  device  for  making  intolerance  
unprofitable”.  Thus  it  seems  that  tolerance  is  for  Bentham's  theory  the  kind  of  normative 
86 See Michael Oakeshott, Morality and Politics in Modern Europe, Yale University Press, New Haven and 
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principle that justice is in other theories. It does however indicate the radicality of Bentham's 
conception of the individual as particular and isolated.
Concerned  not  only  with  the  characters  of  the  individuals  subject  to  a  government, 
Bentham reflects also on the fact that the rulers themselves are human beings vulnerable to the 
same  weaknesses.  “The  power  necessary  for  umpirage”  writes  Oakeshott  “is  all  to  easily  
diverted to the imposition upon their subjects of what rulers themselves believe to be good”89.  
The rulers may try to use their position to exercise intolerance although at least in theory their 
task is fully neutral. It is different to the political theory developed by John Stewart Mill who 
tried to improve Bentham's conception of rule, yet came to the conclusion that the objective of 
the government is to support the perfection of people.
Oakeshott believes that the theory formulated by Mill is only apparently a political theory 
of individualism while substantially it moves towards collectivism. The main difference between 
his philosophy and the one formulated by Bentham is that the former asserts the possibility of 
self-improvement of individuals while the latter insisted that only their circumstances could be 
improved.  Mill  believes  in  the progress  of  human kind and many of  his  political  principles 
originate not from the concern for preserving individuals but for providing conditions for this 
development by means of trial and error. Yet the belief in the perfectability of men implies a 
teleological world view and in the end contradicts diversity of individuals.
“[Mill]  had no absolute objection to uniformity; he believed that in the end true opinions would  
establish themselves and that there was a single condition of well-being appropriate to all men, what  
he  objected  to  was  uniformity,  the  suppression  of  opinion  and  of  individual  efforts  at  self-
improvement at the present time. For he understood the progress of mankind to be achieved by 
experiment [...].  In the final analysis, the individual for Mill  is not an end in himself:  he is an  
instrument and a servant of racial progress.”90
Thus Mill not only removes the individual from the fundamental position in his political theory, 
but  he  also  does  not  seem  to  sympathise  with  the  conviction  of  most  theoreticians  of 
individualism that politically right is prior to good. As the priority of the right over the good is 
fundamental for liberal politics I will address it again in due course.
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2.3. Liberal individualism
Isaiah  Berlin  believes  that  liberal  individualist  analysis  of  societies  begins  with  John 
Stewart Mill and Jeremy Bentham. They claimed that properties of societies are a simple sum of 
the properties of their members with no new quality resulting from the composition. This radical 
individualism has been strongly criticised both by collectivist thinkers, as well as by some later 
liberals  who recognised  that  indeed some form of  a  new quality  emerges  when  individuals 
interrelate in a society and also that they themselves are influenced and to some extent shaped by 
it.
Yet  the  most  characteristic  feature  of  the  individualism  advocated  by  liberals  and 
democrats  which  also  explicitly  separates  it  from Marxism and other  collectivist  theories  is 
obviously its conception of the individual and its authority.  “From the democratic assumption  
that the ultimate and only source of authority for the rightness or wrongness of legislation and 
wider social action is the moral sense of the individual, there follows the basic concept of the  
inalienable right  of  the  individual”91.  Alternative are  those theories  which profess that  some 
individuals, experts, are “wise enough to detect the direction of history” or discover true answers 
to such questions as how to live and what to strive for. No inalienable rights can be found in such 
theories because they require  individuals to submit to the course of history and to adopt a life 
compatible with the right answers to the questions above. Resistance is hardly possible because 
“those  who  wish  to  act  differently”  writes  Isaiah  Berlin,  “necessarily  place  themselves  in  
opposition to the juggernaut of history, that is to say, are behaving suicidally, which proves that  
they are irrational, blind, mad, not worth listening to, and indeed a nuisance and, if incurably  
set  on  their  path,  to  be  swept  away  as  an  obstacle  to  progress.”92 The  result  is  that  the 
community becomes detached from the individuals which make it up. It becomes impersonal and 
impervious to an individual's experience, wishes and needs. A danger related to this approach is 
also that it tends to sacrifice real individuals to abstract ideals.
Historically  individualism  can  be  associated  with  those  periods  of  time  which  were 
influenced by the spirit of renaissance, while collectivist ideologies brought about totalitarian 
regimes. Hayek often points out that the Nazis referred to their socialist revolution as a 'counter-
Renaissance'. Hayek believes that this and similar political movements were a “decisive step in  
the destruction of the individualist civilisation built up since Renaissance”93.  Individualism for 
91 Isaiah Berlin, Democracy, Communism and the Individual, p. 3, available at 
http://berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk/lists/nachlass/demcomind.pdf
92 Isaiah Berlin, Democracy, Communism and the Individual, p. 4, available at 
http://berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk/lists/nachlass/demcomind.pdf
93 Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 79.
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him is the central ideal of Western civilisation responsible for its character, development and 
spreading, and as such it is worth preserving.
But  importantly,  more  than  the  historical  analysis,  economist  thinkers  significantly 
influenced the liberal theory of individualism. It is noticeable for example in the fact that several 
classical economy theoreticians play an important role in Infantino's recount of individualism. 
Particularly Bernard de Mandeville and Adam Smith appear as Hayek's predecessors. They all 
agree that the search for happiness is an individual venture and they ground this conviction in a 
general assumption concerning human nature. Man is an egocentric in his wishes as well as in 
the ability to take care of himself better than anyone else and he “observes the world primarily  
from a personal perspective”. Man is however also a social being and this he is in two senses. 
First,  “his  humanisation  is  a  product  of  the  inter-subjective  relationship,  which  continually  
produces  outcomes which  are not  due  to  human planning  and wisdom”,  and secondly,  in  a 
narrower sense, man is a social being because “each of his actions contains 'limitations' and 
'conditions'”94.  What  the  author  means  by  conditions  of  human  actions  is  the  necessary 
relationship between an individual and an Other who is seen through this personal perspective.
“The objective of each is to fulfil his own plans, the services of the Other are a means towards this  
fulfilment;  but  the  Other  is  also  a  series  of  'limitations'  and  'conditions'  to  which  each  must  
subordinate himself in order to have in exchange the availability of others without which his needs  
remain unsatisfied. [...] Yet, the fact of seeking the services of the Other obliges Ego to satisfy Other's  
demands. Their respective perspectives intersect.”95
This can also be interpreted by means of thinking of the individual as an autonomy and the Other 
as a condition of the individual's actions. In the social reality the autonomy of individual cannot 
be fully suppressed because it is the source of actions and thus of the social order itself. It is, 
however, always determined by its conditions. Individual's actions have to take place in a social 
reality, among other individuals that condition it, because otherwise the agent would not have 
any motivation to act and his actions would have no meaning.
94 Lorenzo Infantino, Individualism in Modern Thought, From Adam Smith to Hayek, Routledge, London and New 
York, 1998; p. 34.
95 Lorenzo Infantino, Individualism in Modern Thought, From Adam Smith to Hayek, Routledge, London and New 
York, 1998; p. 34.
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2.4. Ethical pluralism
“The separation between science and ethics”96 as well as the belief that each individual is 
equally entitled to search for his own answers to crucial questions about life and then to live 
according to his convictions leads to value pluralism. The postulate of such separation can be 
traced as far back as  Humean distinction between facts and values. No 'ought' can be derived 
from an 'is'. Ethics cannot be conclusively derived from science or deduced by a single human 
reason. A similar stance is taken by Isaiah Berlin when he differentiates between natural sciences 
and  humanistic  disciplines.  The  former  “are  concerned  with  types,  [...]  concentrate  on 
similarities  and  look  for  regularities”97 while  the  latter  deal  with  individuals.  Their 
methodologies  are  distinct  and  not  interchangeable.  Thus  it  follows  that  values  and  their 
hierarchy cannot be found by means of a scientific method but have to be searched for by each 
individual separately.
Socialism is  a doctrine with a single comprehensive ethical  code to be applied to all 
members of a community.  Hayek believes that  it  might have been of advantage in the early 
stages of human civilisation. The groups of hunter-gatherers needed a strong sense of collectivity 
without which individuals would not have been able to survive. On the present stage of human 
development however, “socialism is an atavism”98. Hayek believes that different times demand 
different moralities. Though this can be easily criticised as the worst kind of moral relativism and 
even conformism, it is rather intended to mean that morality develops continually and together 
with all others manifestations of civilisation. It is one of the orders that emerge spontaneously in 
the course of individuals' decisions and actions. The conditions of social environment implicate 
certain modes and rules of conduct  which change in response to the changes in  the society. 
Andrew Gamble interprets this changes as going from natural instincts to abstract rules.
The morality of the Great Society is one of individual freedom and responsibility. Over the course of  
many generations, according to Hayek, the 'good natural instincts' of the tribal band were gradually  
subdued by  culturally  developed  rules  of  conduct  which  no longer  concerned  concrete  ends  and  
concrete needs of known people, but were purely 'abstract rules of behaviour having little to do with 
what our instincts told us to do'.99
96 Lorenzo Infantino, Individualism in Modern Thought, From Adam Smith to Hayek, Routledge, London and New 
York, 1998; p. 8.
97 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/berlin/
98 Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 26.
99 Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 29. 
Included quotation from Hayek, Knowledge, Evolution and Society.
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Social arrangements and rules of conduct are thus to be understood as the “accumulated wisdom 
of many generations”.  Their value is verified by the test of time. In evolutionary terminology, 
they have proven to yield best results for societies and thus they should not be lightly set aside or 
tempered with.
John Gray suggests that it was precisely the “monist tradition in ethics and philosophy” 
that influenced the development of liberal theories. Gray argues that it is this break that
“motivates Berlin in assigning to liberty a privileged place among the political values he judges to  
be worthy of promotion. For, as Berlin sees it, it is an inexorable result of the truth that some basic  
moral  and  political  goods  are  incommensurable,  and  the  central  excellences  of  human  life  
competitive and sometimes uncombinable, that moral and political dilemmas are insusceptible of  
any definitively rational solution.”100
This basically agrees with Hayek's view that there can be no ultimate answer to ethical dilemmas 
that could be found by one person, presumably an authority, and then communicated to all the 
others. Hayek insists on plurality of liberal societies and the right of everyone to construct their 
own hierarchy of values.
2.5. Individualism in a liberal state
The reverence with which Hayek seems to treat traditional values, rules of conduct and 
social arrangements are not a sign of conservatism. As Gamble notices, “a major gulf between 
conservative and liberal positions lies in their attitude to authority”101. Hayek respects the ideals 
of  freedom,  individualism  and  justice  because  they  resulted  through  an  accumulation  of 
dispersed  knowledge  and  experience  of  all  people.  No  single  person  however  can  have  an 
authority to compare with it. In conservative, as well as in socialist world-views there is only one 
morality and one religion right. Liberals, on the other hand, insist that all individuals be allowed, 
especially in those spheres of life, far reaching freedom. It is a common characteristic of liberal 
theories that they generally recognize the priority of right to the good. This priority is meant in 
two senses: “first, that individual rights cannot be sacrificed for the sake of the general good 
[...] and, second, that the principles of justice that specify these rights cannot be premissed on  
any  particular  vision  of  the  good  life”102.  Thus  the  acknowledgement  of  the  principle  of 
100 John Gray, Liberalisms. Essays in Political Philosophy, Routledge, London and New York, 1991; p. 47.
101 Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 103.
102 Michael Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencubered Self, in Communitarianism and Individualism,  
ed. Shlomo Avineri, Oxford University Press, 1992; p. 13.
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individualism requires opposition to teleological political concepts.
The implications of the ideas gathered under the notion of individualism are profound for 
the constitutions of all communities, states in particular. Two main consequences of this ideal for 
the political structure of a liberal society are: 1) that individuals have to have a private sphere 
immune from any coercion, and 2) that they should be able to pursue they own plans of life and 
develop  their  particular  talents.  The  second principle  requires  that  all  people  have the  same 
chance to educate themselves, the same access to posts and the same possibility of developing 
their plans. The achievement of their goals cannot be barred by any legislative obstacles other 
than the prohibition to harm others. “The triumph of liberal civilisation, for Hayek, is measured 
by the extent to which these obstacles have been progressively removed”103.
Individualism also  implies  the  sort  of  equality  of  all  members  of  a  community  that 
requires the abolition of all privileges. It requires equality before the law but on no account does 
it require sameness. Indeed, Hayek often emphasises how advantageous for society as a whole is 
its diversity. Liberal society, rejecting coercion, is able to develop only by means of competition 
of different ways of life,  beliefs  etc.  This renunciation of any monopolies is  what motivates 
Hayek to adopt J.S.Mill's view on education. The importance of a common education and access 
to knowledge and its resources are of course undisputed, but if it is directed by a monopolized 
centre, it can be a dangerous weapon.
„A general State education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one  
another: and the mould in which it casts them is that which pleases the predominant power in  
the government, whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of the  
existing generation“104.
Whether we like it or not knowledge is one of the goods that is acquired at a certain price and it 
is probably the most important of all such goods. And this is just more the reason for not leaving 
it up to the judgement and decision of some singular person or group, but to let the competitive 
system strive for its variety, quality and usefulness. Hayek therefore supports the idea of private 
education establishments. By creating a competition for the state schools they would, first of all, 
provide the needed diversity and give the possibility to chose according to one's convictions and 
goals, and secondly stimulate development and a high level of education.
Not only education, but all other monopolistic social arrangements are bound to induce 
opposition. People are not homogeneous and their beliefs, wishes and needs are different. In all 
103 Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 80.
104 J.S. Mill, after Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge Classics, 2006; p. 325.
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cases where this pluralism comes along, the alternatives are coercion or freedom of choice. Thus 
the ideal of individualism can be understood as one of the foundations for the cardinal ideal of 
personal freedom for any liberal theory and every liberal state. 
The privileged status  of  freedom among the  ends of  political  life  derives for Berlin  from the  
constitutive role he conceives moral conflicts to have in political life, and from the source of such  
conflict in the ineradicable diversity of men's purposes. Berlin's advocacy of the priority of liberty  
is grounded, then, in the doctrine of value-pluralism, which he always promoted.105
2.6. Subjectivism
Subjectivism as the base of liberal political thought should be introduced in two ways. 
First of all it points to the origin of law that is elicited in the Kantian way from the autonomous 
subject. The law needs to have a categorical foundation and a general form. Otherwise law would 
favour certain ends and thus disrespect the autonomy of individuals. As Sandel points out, many 
liberal thinkers (especially from the Anglo-American tradition, to which Hayek can be assigned – 
especially in this context) attempt to implement this Kantian procedure without referring to any 
metaphysical background. Thus they work with the notion of an unencumbered self rather than 
with the transcendental subject. “For the unencumbered self” writes Sandel “what matters above 
all, what is most essential to our personhood, are not the ends we choose but our capacity to  
choose them”106.  The priority of the individual to its ends implicates the priority of the right to 
the good. Accordingly, a society that recognises the priority of the subject, a society governed by 
the principle of individualism cannot accept any constitutive107 conceptions of community. The 
individual has to remain free and independent.
While in the sphere of politics individualism and subjectivism require a liberal society 
where  people  have  secured  as  much  freedom  as  possible,  in  economics  they  call  for  a 
microeconomic approach. Just as in all other social sciences, an attempt to grasp the object of 
studies as a collective unit without regard to the individuals assembled in it, can lead only to 
catastrophic results  and misunderstandings.  Thus Hayek recommends to  formulate  economic 
problems in terms of “preferences, intentions, calculations, and choices of individual agents”108.
105 John Gray, Liberalisms. Essays in Political Philosophy, Routledge, London and New York, 1991; p. 48.
106 Michael Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencubered Self, in Communitarianism and Individualism,  
ed. Shlomo Avineri, Oxford University Press, 1992; p. 19.
107 Constitutive is understood here as opposite to merely cooperative.
108 Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 153.
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“The points which we want to stress are that [...] we must start from what men think and mean to do,  
from  the  fact  that  the  individuals  which  compose  society  are  guided  in  their  actions  by  a  
classification of things or events in a system of sense qualities and concepts which has a common  
structure and which we know because we, too, are men, and that the concrete knowledge which  
different individuals possess will differ in important respects.”109
The point  that  Hayek tries  to  make is  that  in  all  social  sciences  studied objects  have to  be 
approached always in relation to men and seen from their perspective. For economics this means 
that value is also a subjective quality of things. Value is “a judgement economizing men make  
about the importance of the goods at their disposal for the maintenance of their lives and well-
being”110,  writes Carl Menger. The processes of judgement,  valuation and finally choice is a 
constitutive part of human condition and it cannot be eluded. Only immortals living in a world 
where goods are free and plentiful for all would be able to live without need. As it is, need is a 
fundamental experience of all individuals and it is ultimately subjective. Being unable to free 
themselves from need, individuals are compelled to choose among their possibilities and make 
economic calculations considering their means and the goals they want to achieve.
Subjectivism  in  economy  has  also  its  origin  in  the  character  of  knowledge  being 
employed on the market. Hayek supposes that one of the reasons why some people find it hard to 
believe  in  smooth  functioning  of  market  economy  is  that  it  is  not  based  on  any  expert 
knowledge. He thinks that being used to the high position and esteem of natural sciences in our 
world  we are  more  likely to  trust  systems  that  work  in  a  similar  way.  The  high  degree  of 
specialisation of scientific knowledge favours the formation of expert authorities. And because 
this seems to be working well, we expect similar experts to design our economic relations. But 
Hayek reminds that the scientific kind of knowledge is not the only kind, and not always the 
most relevant.  For example in the case of any commercial  enterprise  the significant  kind of 
knowledge is “the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place”111. This kind of 
knowledge cannot be efficiently exercised by any other instance as by the  man on the spot, as 
Hayek formulates  it.  From here it  is  easily seen why individualism goes hand in  hand with 
market economy:
“It is with respect to this [knowledge of particular circumstances] that practically every individual  
109 Friedrich August Hayek, Scientism and the Study of Society, in Modes of Individualism and Collectivism, ed. 
John O'Neill, Gregg Revivals, Aldershot, Hampshire, 1992; p. 35.
110 Carl Menger, Problems of Economics and Sociology, quote after Lorenzo Infantino, Individualism in Modern 
Thought, From Adam Smith to Hayek, Routledge, London and New York, 1998; p. 102.
111 Friedrich August von Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1980; p. 80.
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has some advantage over all others because he possesses unique information of which beneficial use  
might be made, but of which use might be made only if the decisions depending on it are left to him  
or are made with his active co-operation”112.
The particularity of knowledge available to all individuals makes them the ultimate authorities 
when it comes economic decisions. Similarly, the particularity of men in general implies their 
individual authority in the face of any circumstances that directly concern them.
2.7. Authority of the individual
Andrew Gamble believes that there is a crucial paradox underlying Hayek's philosophy. 
This paradox is to be seen in his alleged inconsistency in acknowledging individual's authority. 
Hayek and other liberals preach autonomy of individuals but when it comes to deciding about the 
kind of society they are to live in, they deny people the authority to change the status quo.
Liberal doctrine enshrines the sovereignty of the individual as its key organizing principle – in the  
polity, the economy, and the society. Hayek agrees that individuals are sovereign, but argues that  
individuals can be allowed to make their own choices only within the general rules which underpin a  
free  society.  Individuals  cannot  be  allowed  to  choose  those  general  rules  without  endangering  
freedom and prosperity. The paradox at the heart of Hayek's thought emerges once again. Individuals  
are sovereign in the market order [...] But individuals are not sovereign when it comes to determining  
the rules of that market order.113
The answer to this alleged paradox is that people have the authority in those dimensions which 
they can apprehend with they limited epistemic capacities and which they are actually able to 
change directly. Thus they are autonomous in their corresponding private spheres and have the 
authority to make individual decisions. These of course will have an influence on the whole 
society,  most  evidently  the  political  decisions  made  within  the  framework  of  democratic 
procedures. Yet no single person has the authority to decide about the environment as such for all 
the  others.  Neither  was  market  order  invented  and  introduced  in  such  an  'artificial'  way. 
According to Hayek, it developed spontaneously out of uncountable decisions of autonomous 
individuals throughout the ages. Individual authority does not reach into this evolutionary and 
historical dimension.
112 Friedrich August von Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1980; p. 80.
113Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 113.
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Another reproach that Gamble formulates against Hayek's theory is that he has no other 
conception of authority than “authoritarian in form – top-down, centralized, and hierarchical”.  
It seems that in Gamble's eyes Hayek is an anarchist who “has no conception of other, more 
democratic forms that authority and governance”114. But I would argue that it is precisely the 
kind of dispersed authority that can be found in the mechanisms of a free market that is a most 
democratic form of authority. This kind of authority lays the foundations for a special type of 
order which Hayek chooses to call 'cosmos'. In contrast to a 'taxis', which is an order designed 
consciously  by  men,  cosmos  arises  spontaneously  and  is  the  result  of  more  than  just  one 
conception.  Cosmos  is  a  spontaneous  compromise  between  individual  autonomies  and  their 
particular goals. There are however special situations that require other measures than depending 
on impulsive and automatic formation of compromises – situations such as the state of war.
2.8. How does socialism resemble a state of war
In  The Road to Serfdom, in a chapter dedicated to showing why planned economy is 
incompatible with democracy, Hayek brings up the example of a military general who has been 
put  in  charge  of  a  campaign and given  the  control  of  all  the  means  he  might  need  for  the 
accomplishment of his task. Throughout history whenever a war was going on the command has 
always been delegated to a single person. Even in democratic societies in the face of war people 
mandate their power to a single person. What is their reason for acting in this way? Why do free 
people  in  a  well  functioning  society  decide  to  waive  their  sovereignty  and  agree  to  be 
autocratically  governed  by  a  single  military  man?  Do  they  think  that  such  a  system  of 
governance is generally better than the one they had before the war? Why do they suddenly trust 
his judgement more than they have trusted their own for the past years of peace and are thus 
prepared  to  yield  their  authority?  It  is  because  people  realize  that  drawing  up  a  successful 
military plan is an undertaking that requires coordination and skills. And they realize also that „a 
complex whole in which all the parts must be most carefully adjusted to each other cannot be  
achieved through a compromise between conflicting views“115.
The specifics of a state of war is that it is a pretty clear and contrasted, but unnaturally 
dichotomous situation. The range of choice is drastically narrowed and the number of ends is 
reduced to a single one – the victory. All possibilities, questions and values are suspended. They 
are up in the air depending on the result of the war. And in a situation, where everyone agrees on 
114Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 37.
115Friedrich August von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, The University of Chicago Press, Routledge, London, 2007; 
p. 106.
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this single dominant end (or rather, when such a single end is forced upon all by the threat of 
war) and moreover they know that is has to be worked against the clock, they realize that arguing 
about the means to achieve their specified end is no way to go. It is for this reason that they 
choose a specialist who is best qualified to achieve the goal they specified.
Hayek often emphasises the difference between agreeing on the means and agreeing on 
the ends. In a normal situation people are not required to agree upon common ends. In fact this 
would be impossible in a large community of free individuals116. What makes them free is their 
ability to pursue their own plans in life. And given the heterogeneity of people, the diversity of 
their characters, needs and experience one cannot reasonably assume that they will all want the 
same. There is however a way of reconciling all the different ends (or at least a great majority of 
them) by agreeing upon the means. For many reasons for Hayek the agreement on the means is 
both much more desirable and possible. First of all it is technically impossible to know what 
ends all the others want to pursue. Secondly, even if we all knew what goals all other members of 
our society have, we would soon realize that many of them contradict one another. How should 
some be convinced to resign from their goals in order to allow others to pursue theirs? According 
to Hayek, “what makes agreement and peace in such a society possible is that the individuals  
are not required to agree on ends but only on means which are capable of serving a great variety  
of purposes and which each hopes will assist him in the pursuit of his own purposes”117.
Agreeing on means, that is setting some rules defining what ways of pursuing our goals 
are admissible, does not of course give anyone certainty whether it will benefit him in particular. 
It  is  the  beauty  of  well  formulated  general  rules  that  they  are  not  specific  in  addressing 
individuals. Whenever the development of some situation is unforeseeable, whenever the future 
outcome can not be predicted with certainty, there is a room for changes left where individuals 
can work for their goals and hope to achieve them. By giving a person the chance to pursue his 
plan (but only the chance, and no certainty) a general rule gives this chance also to others. That is 
why, 
“when agreeing on such a rule, we say that 'it is better for all of us if...' we mean not that we are  
certain that it will on the end benefit all of us, but that, on the basis of our present knowledge, it  
gives us all a better chance, though some will certainly in the end be worse off than they would have  
been if a different rule had bean adopted.”118
116A different question is weather we would like to live in a world where all would have the same goal in mind.
117Friedrich August von Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1976; p. 
3.
118Friedrich August von Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1976; p. 
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The insistence on agreeing on common rules rather than on common ends, in fact does 
not give everyone equal chances but gives all the freedom of choosing their own goals. This is 
precisely the quality of life which is denied in the state of war, when the external conditions 
enforce people to renounce their private ends. And, according to Hayek, the same thing happens 
in the case of a planned economy.  The difference is  that  it  is  not an external condition that 
imposes the single end, but some politician, a visionary and ingenious planner who dictates the 
common single goal.  
“The various kinds of collectivism, communism, fascism, etc., differ among themselves in the nature  
of the goal toward which they want to direct the efforts of society. But they all differ from liberalism  
and individualism in wanting to organise the whole society and all its resources for this unitary end  
and  in  refusing  to  recognize  autonomous  spheres  in  which  the  ends  of  the  individuals  are  
supreme.”119
Hayek's argument is that in a scale of a country, a nation or any other community of such 
significant dimension (both, considering the number of people and the size of its territory) no 
plan can be realistically and reasonably drawn, unless this plan is to serve one single end only. In 
other words planning an entire economy is possible, but if one assumes that the only thing to be 
considered in such a plan is the victory in a war. The planner is then permitted to nationalize 
private property (e.g. fabrics, land) in order to incorporate them and their work into the war 
effort. He is authorized to order retraining of people and relegate them to works that he finds of 
the highest use and importance. He will probably even be allowed to control the media in order 
to secure the transmission of information, so crucial for security reasons, but also for example to 
prevent spreading panic in the society. And all  this is possible only because the priority of the 
single end is commonly recognized and accepted.
In a state of peace, Hayek argues, in order to be able to plan the economy in a similar 
way, systems like communism or fascism needed to formulate a clear end and make sure of its 
dominance. For only if the whole economy has one precise aim is it possible to direct it with any 
efficiency. The question is however, why should the whole economic effort be directed as to the 
satisfaction of only one end? And more importantly, who should decide as to which end is to be 
pursued? There are no satisfying answers to those questions from the liberal point of view. The 
ideal of individualism cannot be reconciled with the regime of a single end economy in a free 
119Friedrich August von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, The University of Chicago Press, Routledge, London, 2007; 
p. 100.
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society during the times of peace.
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3 FREEDOM
In this chapter I undertake the task of discussing the ideal of freedom underlying Hayek's 
conception  of  liberalism.  I  start  with  explaining  the  general  notion  of  freedom  and  its 
systematics. The most important differentiation from the point of view of Hayek's philosophy is 
the differentiation of positive and negative freedom introduced by Isaiah Berlin and therefore I 
shall devote some more time to relating his vitally important  Four Essays on Liberty. I shall 
present Berlin's theory in close reference to Hayek's conceptions in order to give first general 
idea about  the latter's  notion of  freedom. Subsequently some more thought  will  be given to 
specific concepts that build essential features of personal negative freedom defended in Hayek's 
works. I will analyse the notions of coercion, power, arbitrariness and responsibility in context of 
Hayek's conception of personal freedom. In the section on freedom and law some thought will be 
given to the difference between the conceptions of autonomy of Hayek and Kant. In the section 
on  private  property I  shall  analyse  the  connection  between  economic  freedom and personal 
freedom in  general.  The  last  section  will  be  devoted  to  summarising  Hayek's  discussion  of 
freedom as a political ideal and placing it in relation to other ideals of liberalism, as well as 
showing its place in the general perspective of the author's philosophy.
3.1. Notion of freedom
I will not deal with the distinction between the notions of freedom and liberty, which is 
sometimes made to indicate the difference betweens one's ability to do something and having 
permission to do so. Hayek, as well as Berlin and Mill, uses the terms 'freedom' and 'liberty' fully 
interchangeably and I shall do the same. Yet, “there are at least two basic ideas in the conceptual  
complex we call  'freedom'”,  states the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  First  of  those 
ideas is autonomy understood as rightful self-government, second is optionality – an “overall  
ability to do, choose or achieve things”120. In both of these cases judgements concerning freedom 
can be correctly made in  regard to individuals  as  well  as in regard to  communities  such as 
nations.  The  difference  between  autonomy  and  optionality  can  be  best  explained  with  the 
example of slaves and slave owners. A slave who belongs to a kind and tolerant owner may have 
some freedom in the sense of optionality (e.g. he can choose how to dress, what to do in his off-
120 Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, gen. ed. Edward Craig, Routledge, London and New York, 1998; vol. 3, 
p.753.
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duty time, etc.), yet he is not autonomous because his optionality is entirely dependent on the 
kindness of his master. A slave who belongs to a severe owner is neither autonomous nor free in 
the sense of having open options. The difference between autonomy and optionality can also be 
expressed as the difference between freedom de jure and freedom de facto.
In this context Hayek's notion of freedom is rather to be associated with optionality and 
its  extent  is  to be measured with the number of possibilities  that  are  open to an individual. 
Autonomy in sense of being able to pursue any goals that individual assumes for himself would 
be in Hayek's eyes too close to the ideal of positive freedom. However, he would by no means 
object to autonomy in the sense of “right to act on one's own judgement about matters affecting  
one's  life,  without  interference  by  others”121.  In  this  sense  autonomy  figures  in  liberal 
conceptions of justice as the demand of priority of right over the good. I believe that for Hayek 
the  essential  difference  between  those  two  notions  of  autonomy would  be  in  the  notion  of 
coercing agency. In the second, negative and political understanding of autonomy, there is talk of 
others  who interfere,  a  human  agency exercising  coercive  influence  which  is  absent  in  the 
definition of autonomy in the positive sense122.
As the distinction between negative and positive understandings of freedom results in 
being so crucial, for any further discussion on this topic I shall devote the following section to 
recount Isaiah Barlin's theory as formulated in his Four Essays on Liberty. I think it is necessary 
also  for  a  second  reason,  namely  that  Hayek,  being  an  economist  and  not  a  philosopher, 
sometimes fails  to present a thorough analysis of philosophical notions which he uses in his 
political studies. This is the case with the notion of freedom which, although used sometimes 
inconsistently,  is  in  my  opinion  closest  to  that  presented  by  Berlin  as  negative  freedom. 
Therefore I will try to present Berlin's analysis together with its reference in Hayek's thought.
3.1.1. Isaiah Berlin's distinction of positive and negative freedom
Isaiah Berlin provides us with a complex survey of the notion of freedom123 in his Four 
Essays on Liberty and the two most important aspects in our context are his distinction between 
the positive and negative freedom as well  as his  account of John Stewart  Mill's  theory.  The 
question of freedom remains now as ever because it is the ultimate political question that cannot 
121Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, gen. ed. Edward Craig, Routledge, London and New York, 1998; vol. 1, 
p.587.
122 More on Hayek's conception of autonomy and its difference to Kantian idea will be said in the section Freedom 
and Law.
123 Berlin uses the terms freedom and liberty synonymously, and Hayek similarly thinks that there is no referential 
difference between the two words.
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be reduced to any kind of technical deliberation of means. Berlin recognises that freedom is an 
end in itself  and that it  is  not reducible to any other value.  I  think that this can be seen as 
principally  consistent  with  Hayek's  understanding  because  the  latter  often  emphasised  that 
freedom should  be  understood  not  as  a  value  as  such,  but  rather  as  the  basis  for  all  other 
values124. From the political point of view the questions that Berlin is concerned with are those of 
obedience and coercion. Why can I not live a life I wish to? Why should I obey anyone? If I do 
not obey,  can the exercise  of coercion upon me be justified? The way Isaiah Berlin  sees it, 
distinct answers to the question of the permissible scope of coercion and limitation of personal 
freedom are what constitutes the basic difference between the two major political conceptions. 
Hayek, again, would agree because for him the fundamental difference between liberalism and 
socialism consists in their different regard and valuation of personal freedom. This might have 
been more obvious in the time of the Cold War but it remains, in my view, unaltered till today.
For the sake of further analysis it is important to clarify first what Berlin understands 
under the term of coercion because his  definition of freedom will  result  from it.  He defines 
coercion as a deliberate interference in a sphere that was independent and unrestricted otherwise. 
A political coercion therefore means that one is obstructed in achieving his end. The precondition 
of deliberate interference rules out all those situations where we are stopped from achieving our 
goals by reasons independent from anyone's will, like natural disasters or endowments – in this 
sense there is no point of speaking of a lack of freedom to read if one is blind. My freedom to 
read can be limited only by a rational and conscious agent who, for example, censors the books. 
This probably does not bring up any controversies yet. However, it becomes problematic when it 
comes to such questions as those of poverty and social justice. Berlin states clearly that one can 
understand economic  inability as  a  sort  of  slavery only if  one  believes  that  the  the  lack  of 
economic means is a direct result of other peoples' decisions and moves. One would have to see a 
clear line of consequence between someone's actions and someone else's shortage of money. The 
author generally does not believe that such a direct consequence exists and he therefore does not 
accept  tempering  with  freedom as  a  solution  to  economic  problems.  The  earlier  mentioned 
irreducibility of freedom to any other value such as social justice, happiness or fairness means 
that reduction of individual freedom, which may bring about increase for example of justice, but 
no increase of personal freedom of anyone else, is an absolute loss of freedom as such. Isaiah 
Berlin  believes  that  notions  of  'social  freedom'  or  'economic  freedom'  are  but  misleading 
conceptual constructs that cannot compensate the loss of actual personal freedom. To use a not 
fully canonical formulation, inspired by the game theory, one could say that both, for Berlin and 
124  See introduction to Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge Classics, London and New York, 2006.
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Hayek, only such changes are acceptable, which bring about a Pareto improvement concerning 
the individual freedom. In the game theory a Pareto improvement is defined as a change that, 
while making one participant better off, does not make any other worse off. This means that not 
only the amount of freedom as a sum is higher but also that no single person loses because of this 
change. 
PERSONAL FREEDOM
It should be strictly distinguished between what could be called an 'inner freedom' and the 
freedom in its normal sense, as a practical independence form the coercion of others. Berlin is 
convinced that should this difference be not clearly realised, it can lead not only to a theoretical 
confusion, but more importantly to “justification of oppression in the name of freedom”125.  It 
would be temptingly easy to rule a society of ascetics but that does not mean that they would be 
free in a political sense. For in this sense freedom is measured not with fulfilled desires but with 
the  desires  that  are  potentially  fulfillable.  The  freedom  that  we  are  concerned  with  is  the 
“opportunity to act, not the act itself”126. It does not matter, if one wants to go a certain way or 
not. What matters is how many ways are open to him. Only these ways that are opened or closed 
as a result of human activity count for this determination of the scope of freedom, whereas in 
order to be justly called an oppression or violation of freedom a way has to be closed as a result 
of a conscious action of another person127.  It  is precisely in this  sense that Hayek speaks of 
freedom as a relation of men to men.
Personal freedom understood as above is what in Berlin's nomenclature is called 'freedom 
from' and which in Mill's opinion is the only kind of freedom that deserves this name128. Clearly 
in practice it cannot be unlimited because it interacts with personal freedom of other members of 
society. Therefore in order to secure some room for freedom of one person, the freedom of all the 
others has to be limited accordingly. This limitation of freedom, as Mill, Berlin and Hayek all 
agree, is a justification for coercion if necessary – importantly, it is the only justification for 
coercive limitation of  personal  freedom. It  is  interesting to  point  out  that  the  conception  of 
individual freedom in a political context is a fairly modern idea. As Berlin notices, it does not 
appear in the ancient Roman legislation, which after all is one of the bases of our contemporary 
law. I think that beginnings of political personal freedom are rather to be looked for in British 
125 Isaiah Berlin, Freiheit. Vier Versuche, Verlag S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main, 1995; p. 41. My translation.
126 Isaiah Berlin, Freiheit. Vier Versuche, Verlag S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main, 1995; p. 44. My translation.
127 See Isaiah Berlin, Freiheit. Vier Versuche, Verlag S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main, 1995; p. 42.
128 Isaiah Berlin, Freiheit. Vier Versuche, Verlag S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main, 1995; p. 207.
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law – especially such legislative achievements as Magna Carta Libertatum and Habeas Corpus 
Act129.
The ideal of individual freedom is not an issue in the legal thought of ancient Greeks, 
founders of democracy, either. And although it might now seem to us contra-intuitive, freedom 
indeed  does  not  require  democratic  environment.  Berlin  argues  that  individual  freedom 
principally  can  be  reconciled  with  authoritarian  political  systems.  He  emphasises  that  the 
important issue is not who is controlling me and interfering in my private sphere, but rather how 
much control does he have and how radical the interference is130. A tyranny of majority can be 
just as bad and coercive – or maybe even worse through its overwhelmingness – than a tyranny 
of a single despot. The relationship between freedom and democracy is a complicated one: it is a 
mistake, according to the author, to identify the „desire for sphere where one can act freely“ with 
„a desire for political self-determination“131. The latter, often confusingly also called freedom, is 
a freedom of a totally different kind than the former one, the basic liberal ideal – it is not a 
'freedom from' but a 'freedom to'. The conflict between these types of freedom and privileging 
one of them as a main goal on the political agenda was in Berlin's eyes the ground of the biggest 
ideological antagonism of the 20th century.132
The 'freedom to', also called by Berlin 'positive freedom', rises from the desire of being 
one's own master, the desire of leading a life defined and determined only by oneself. It may be 
helpful to think of 'positive freedom' as answering the question: “Who is the master?”, while 
'negative freedom' concerns the question: “In which area am I the master?”133. The fine yet most 
significant difference between this understanding of freedom and the negative one, the freedom 
from coercion,  can be easily overseen.  Just  as the author  notices himself,  “the freedom that  
consists of being one's own master and the freedom that consists of having one's decisions not  
interfered by others may at a first sight look as two logically close concepts, one formulated  
129I feel obliged to mention at this point that similar bills have been issued in the Kingdom of Poland around that 
time. Although hardly as famous as the English documents, Polish acts also stated liberty of king's subjects 
(obviously only the male nobility part of population), illegality of internment without trial and other limitations 
of the sovereign's power.
130 Isaiah Berlin, Freiheit. Vier Versuche, Verlag S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main, 1995; p. 209. It is typical to blame 
particular politicians for the oppression of their people, and they naturally bear the responsibility for their 
decisions, but the real problem is not in the character and disposition of particular individuals holding power – 
for these qualities are rather hard, if not impossible to change. The problem is in the power itself that these 
people have and are able to use for coercion. Agreeing with Benjamin Constant the author of Four Essays on 
Liberty believes that too much power in one hand will always lead to harm. See p. 246.
131 Isaiah Berlin, Freiheit. Vier Versuche, Verlag S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main, 1995; p. 210. My translation.
132 Not only the 20th century, but also such historical moments as the French Revolution are great examples that the 
freedom in the positive sense can destroy much of what freedom in the negative sense stands for. The self-
government which is the main postulate of democracy does not necessarily mean 'the government of each by 
himself' but rather means 'the government of each by all the others'. See Isaiah Berlin, Freiheit. Vier Versuche, 
Verlag S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main, 1995; p. 245. 
133 See Isaiah Berlin, Freiheit. Vier Versuche, Verlag S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main, 1995; p. 46. My translation.
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positively, the other negatively, that mean basically the same thing”134. Berlin however thinks 
that,  from the historical  point of view these two ideas have developed in opposite and even 
conflicting directions.  He shows how from the notion of positive freedom, which he calls  a 
metaphor for self-mastery, in order to evade problems with 'slavery to nature' etc. a philosopher 
has to introduce some division of the subject separating the lower, empirical part from the higher, 
reasonable  one  which  he  conceives  as  independent  of  the  slavering  forces  of  nature.  The 
philosopher might even go as far as to introduce a higher instance of some kind, for example a 
community,  that  stands  over  the  individual  and  therefore  its  freedom prevails  over  personal 
freedom. From here it takes only a small step to the exercise of coercion on individuals justified 
by communal ends treated as a higher good.
FREEDOM IN THE CONTEXT OF POLITICS AND ETHICS
It is remarkable that under such conditions it is so much easier to imagine a 'wise and 
enlightened person'  who would claim to know what is  best  for the others.  If  people are but 
elements of a greater whole, in order to be able to make judgements as to the true goal and 
purpose of men, all  one has to grasp is this one whole,  and not the plurality of individuals. 
Characteristic for this line of thought is that it is assumed that “rational goals of the 'real' nature 
of all men coincide or that they should be brought to such unanimity [...]. Doing irrational,  
stupid and wrong things is not part of freedom. Forcing the empirical self to the right ... is not  
tyranny  but  liberation”135.  Isaiah  Berlin  points  to  the  fact  that  as  soon  as  one  manages  to 
convince oneself that the real goal of men is identical with their freedom, one can easily ignore 
their actual desires and subject them to oppression. From this argumentation it should be clear 
that for Berlin, and similarly for Hayek, the two basic liberal ideals, the ideals of freedom and of 
individualism, coincide – both in the sense of agreeing logically as well as simultaneously taking 
place in social reality.
Another  problem with  the  understanding  of  freedom as  a  possibility  to  do what  one 
desires is that it leads to a kind of stoical self-denial: if I cannot do something, I simply have to 
let go of this desire and in this way become free. This technique of Epictetus may work in case of 
natural restrains, as mentioned above, but it obviously has no use in the political sphere. Berlin 
admits  however that  there is one point that  makes the notion of positive freedom useful for 
134 Isaiah Berlin, Freiheit. Vier Versuche, Verlag S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main, 1995; p. 211. My translation.
135 Isaiah Berlin, Freiheit. Vier Versuche, Verlag S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main, 1995; p. 229. My translation. 
Berlin accredits this view to both scholastic and communist thinkers, as well as to Jacobins but also to Spinoza, 
Locke and Montesquieu.
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political struggle of liberals: “the main value of a political, 'positive' right to participation in  
government rests on the fact that with its help liberals are able to protect what they hold to be  
the ultimate value – the individual 'negative' freedom”136.
Even if one would lean toward the opinion that rational powers of man should govern his 
emotional, empirical, weaker side, the passage from the individual to the social level is more 
than dubious. According to Berlin there is no justification for the view that some higher elements 
of a community have right or duty to govern and suppress others or to force the irrational to act 
rationally.  It  would  indeed  be  highly  paternalistic.  The  author  argues  that  “what  concerns 
questions of ethics there can be no experts, because ethics and morals are no special sciences 
[...]  but rather they concern the right  use of  universal human abilities”137.  This argument  is 
analogous to Hayek's rejection of specialists' authority in the area of economics based on his 
epistemological  assumptions138.  It  also  agrees,  in  my  opinion  with  Hayek's  insistence  that 
“knowledge exists only as the knowledge of individuals” and that “the sum of the knowledge of  
all the individuals exists nowhere as an integrated whole”139. From this he concludes that there 
can be no case for oppression of freedom on grounds of expert knowledge.
A helpful way of analysing a theory of freedom seems to be by looking at its reference to 
law. Isaiah Berlin notices that most of the 18th century declarations of human rights, or speaking 
more generally, all conceptions that conceive of societies as being outcomes of a design, whether 
it be according to rational laws, to the laws of nature, of history or any higher instance, tend to 
regard law as a liberating principle140. Even Kant in Berlin's interpretation believed that men find 
their  true  freedom in  giving  up  the  primary boundless  and lawless  freedom and submitting 
themselves to law. Berlin agrees rather with Bentham, who stresses that “it is not the task of law 
to liberate, but to limit”141. I think that it is also quite similar to the position defended by Hayek. 
Law, limiting the scope of free action of an individual is a necessary interference, its purpose 
being securing spheres of free action of other members of society. Law, only however when in its 
proper dimension of abstract general rules, assures that “we are not subject to another man's will  
and are therefore free”142.
Isaiah Berlin believes that the moral legitimacy of those limits on personal freedom, that 
secure  the same scope of freedom for others, enjoys a universal recognition. The author also 
136 Isaiah Berlin, Freiheit. Vier Versuche, Verlag S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main, 1995; p. 248. My translation.
137 Isaiah Berlin, Freiheit. Vier Versuche, Verlag S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main, 1995; p. 234. My translation.
138 See the section on dispersed knowledge.
139  Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge, London and New York, 2006; p. 23.
140 Isaiah Berlin, Freiheit. Vier Versuche, Verlag S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main, 1995; p. 230.
141 Isaiah Berlin, Freiheit. Vier Versuche, Verlag S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main, 1995; p. 230. My translation.
142 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge, London and New York, 2006; p. 134.
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shows with the examples of Constant, Mill and Tocqueville that this universal principle is one of 
the  two  basic  principles  of  liberal  tradition.  This  rule  says  that  “there  are  limits  to  the  
inviolability of men and that these limits are not affectedly drawn but result from rules which  
have been accepted for such a long time and so universally, that the obedience to them is a part  
of our conceptions of a normal human being and also of an inhuman action”143.  The second 
principle of the liberal tradition positions law over all power – only the law has an absolute 
validity and this means that “all men, regardless of what rules them, have an unconditional right  
to avoid inhuman handling”144. Only application of these two principles – absolute Rule of Law 
and limitation of inviolability – constitutes what the liberals believe to be a truly free society.
Isaiah  Berlin  ends  his  essay  Two  Concepts  of  Liberty with  a critique  of  monistic 
conceptions  according  to  which  there  exists  a  single  ultimate  answer to  moral  and political 
questions. Similarly to Hayek, who by means of his epistemological theory rejects the possibility 
of  any comprehensive  and  definite  solutions  in  domains  concerning  human beings  –  Berlin 
defends plurality. He criticizes “the assumption that all values could be arranged on a single  
scale”145 which would mean that one only needs to look at this scale to see which of the values is 
the highest of all. First of all this would mean that our moral decisions are nothing more than 
simple calculations. But the real subversive danger of such an assumption lies in the depreciation 
of freedom. To support this opinion the author brings forward argumentation of Lord Acton who 
believed that “the necessity of choice between absolute claims is an inevitable feature of human  
existence. This gives to liberty its value – liberty is an end in itself”146.
FREEDOM IN THE CONTEXT OF ECONOMY
This, so far, were the most significant points of Berlin's theory in regards to ethics and 
politics. However, he does not limit his analysis to those two contexts, but is also concerned with 
freedom  in  its  economic  aspect.  It  happens  only  too  often,  he  writes,  that  proponents  of 
liberalism and who advocate the priority of negative freedom are believed to be enthusiasts of 
laisser-faire. The author decisively renounces this doctrine and argues that it actually leads to 
grave violations of negative freedom. As he often does in his argumentation, Berlin adduces 
historical  facts  to  support  his  points.  He  reminds  that  unhindered  laisser-faire  brings  about 
violations  of  basic  human  rights  understood  as  protection  against  oppression  and  that  legal 
143 Isaiah Berlin, Freiheit. Vier Versuche, Verlag S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main, 1995; p. 248. My translation.
144 Isaiah Berlin, Freiheit. Vier Versuche, Verlag S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main, 1995; p. 248. My translation.
145 Isaiah Berlin, Freiheit. Vier Versuche, Verlag S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main, 1995; p. 255. My translation.
146 Isaiah Berlin, Freiheit. Vier Versuche, Verlag S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main, 1995; p. 252. My translation.
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systems that facilitate this economic regime clearly have failed to secure the exercise of negative 
freedom by vast groups of people. At this point it is however essential to not commit the error of 
over-interpretation  –  even  in  a  situation  in  which  as  a  result  of  poverty  or  lack  of  proper 
knowledge an individual is not able to exercise his basic negative freedom, however secured for 
him by the law, it does not mean that it becomes less essential. Berlin finds it important to stress 
the difference between preconditions of freedom and the freedom itself because he thinks that, in 
their eagerness to create social and economic conditions in which freedom would have its proper 
value and accessibility, people forget the freedom itself. The end does not justify the means. It is 
not  permissible  to  try  and  achieve  a  social  system where  all  could  enjoy their  freedom by 
violating the freedom already existent on the way147.
What could be seen as an opposite of laisser-faire on a simple scale measuring freedom 
would be a society with a disproportionately strong government. Again the views of Berlin and 
Hayek are much the same. Both the philosopher and the economist think that too much power in 
one  agency  necessarily  ends  with  reduction  of  personal  freedom.  There  have  been  many 
philosophers, beginning with Plato and ending with Marx, who believed that accumulation of 
power is desirable as long as it is used in a rational way. Oligarchy of enlightened philosophers 
and scientific central planning have at least one thing in common: people under those systems 
are  subjected  to  an overwhelming control  in  nearly  all  spheres  of  their  lives.  I  would  even 
venture to say that in Hayek's eyes both of these systems would be socialist, because as Kukathas 
rightly notices “the distinctive feature of  socialism, in his  understanding,  is its aspiration to  
organize society in accordance with some common purpose”148. A common purpose can hardly 
ever, with the possible exceptions of the state of war, truly be the purpose of all. Necessarily it 
contradicts goals of some citizens and therefore a coercive imposition of a common goal violates 
the personal freedom of some. Also, Berlin rejects the assumption of rational use of accumulated 
power with the following argumentation: “all paternalistic regimes, no matter how benevolent,  
cautious, impartial and rational, have always in the end leaned towards treating the majority of  
people as subordinate, as incurably foolish or irresponsible”149. As a consequence of this alleged 
immaturity of people it was justified to postpone their liberation ad infinitum.
147 See Isaiah Berlin, Freiheit. Vier Versuche, Verlag S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main, 1995; p.55-57.
148 The Cambridge Companion to Hayek, ed. Edward Fraser, Cambridge University Press, 2006; p. 182.
149 Isaiah Berlin, Freiheit. Vier Versuche, Verlag S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main, 1995; p. 65. My translation.
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3.2. Hayek's notion of freedom
Throughout  his  life  Hayek  has  defended the  notion  of  freedom as  negative  personal 
freedom in the understanding of classical liberals. Interestingly his reason for that was of an 
epistemological origin. “The case for individual freedom”  writes Hayek in the first chapter of 
The Constitution of Liberty “rests chiefly on the recognition of the inevitable ignorance of all of  
us concerning a great many of the factors on which the achievement of our ends and welfare 
depends”150.  Bluntly  formulated,  people  need  liberty  because  they  are  not  omniscient  and 
therefore they need to “leave room for the unforeseeable and unpredictable” and because they 
can never know which one of them is right. In Hayek's opinion leaving individuals free to engage 
in the process of trial and error increases the chances of improvement and innovation as well as 
of finding a balance in social cohabitation.
Significantly,  Hayek's case for freedom as he calls it,  is formulated from a somewhat 
utilitarian  perspective.  He  speaks  extensively  about  the  benefits  that  society  draws  from 
individuals' freedom and the benefits that individuals draw from freedom of others.
“The benefits I derive from freedom are thus largely the result of the uses of freedom by others, and 
mostly of those uses of freedom that I could never avail myself of. It is therefore not necessarily  
freedom that I can exercise myself that is most important for me. [...] What is important is [...] what  
freedom some person may need in order to do things beneficial to society. This freedom we can 
assure to the unknown person only by giving it to all.”151
Thus from the perspective of utility and from the belief in the value of progress of humanity 
Hayek arrives at a demand for universal individual freedom. All people have a claim for freedom 
which should be recognised not only on the basis of their condition of being human, autonomous 
and rational, but also on this practical reason that its recognition is more beneficial for all.
3.2.1. Status, value and neutrality of freedom
I have already mentioned that Hayek suggests understanding of freedom as a basis for 
values  rather  than  as  a  value  itself  and  that  in  my opinion  Berlin's  conception  of  freedom, 
although he does call it a 'value', is similar in its meaning. In the introduction to his Four Essays 
on Liberty Berlin states clearly that  there are various types of negative freedom that are not 
150 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge, London and New York, 2006; p. 27.
151 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge, London and New York, 2006; p. 29.
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desirable. To use some of his own examples, freedom of a slave holder to use his slaves in an 
arbitrary way and the  freedom of  an employer  to  exploit  his  workers  are  both examples  of 
negative freedom. This is an analytical fact, Berlin suggests, and it makes no sense to try and 
tamper  with  the  definition  of  freedom in  such  a  way as  to  have  it  mean exclusively good. 
Freedom encompasses all possible things, both desirable and undesirable. Therefore I would like 
to suggest that freedom, especially the freedom in Hayek's philosophy, should not be interpreted 
as a simple value, but that it should be regarded in a procedural rather than a substantial way. Its 
value, for lack of a different word, lies in the role it plays in the evolution of civilisation and 
development of values.
“It  is  one  of  the  characteristics  of  a  free  society  that  man's  goals  are  open,  that  new ends  of  
conscious effort can spring up [...]. It is a fact which we must recognize that even what we regard as  
good or beautiful is changeable – if not in any recognizable manner that would entitle us to take a  
relativistic position, then in the sense that in many respects we do not know what will appear as  
good or beautiful to another generation. Nor do we know why we regard this or that as good or who  
is right when people differ as to whether something is good or not.”152
Hayek believes that it is only in the environment of freedom that, first of all, values can emerge 
as a part  of civilisation,  and secondly,  that  problems concerning them can be solved by the 
method of trial and error. In this sense it can be said that “it is in a regime of liberty that human 
purposes are best served and other important goods most effectively promoted”153.
Thus  positioning  freedom  at  the  very  base  of  human  civilisation  and  making  it  a 
condition of development of values, Hayek needs to assume its neutrality. By the same token he 
also grants a certain priority to freedom as 'chronologically' the origin of all values. Considered 
synchronically however, the priority and the privileged position of freedom among political goals 
is rather due to Hayek's belief in value-pluralism. In his essays on liberalism John Gray agrees 
that “indeed, Hayek seems generally to want to work with a concept of individual freedom that is  
value-neutral inasmuch as it is intelligible and useful to all, regardless of their view of the nature  
and  sources  of  liberty's  value154”.  In  Gray's  interpretation  it  is  characteristic  of  liberal 
philosophies in general, and of philosophies of Hayek and Berlin in particular, that they ground 
priority  of  liberty  in  their  rejection  of  ethical  monism  and  in  their  doctrine  of  political 
individualism.
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To support the thesis of value-neutrality of Hayek's notion of freedom Gray adduces the 
example  which  “compares  the  situation  of  a  conscripted  soldier,  well-fed  and  comfortably  
housed, with that of a wandering vagabond, dependent for his survival on his wits”. It may be 
that the vagabond does not value his freedom highly. Yet it does not change the fact “that it is his  
freedom that is lost when he is eventually conscripted”155.
3.2.2. Coercion
“Coercion is a technique for forcing people to act as the coercer wants them to act, and 
presumably contrary to their own preferences”, reads the definition in Routledge Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy. Coercion is usually exercised by means of a threat or a dire consequence that will 
follow in case of not acting according to the coercer's demand. In contrast to compulsion, which 
makes “alternatives physically impossible”, coercion “does not destroy the preferred alternative  
as much as destroy its appeal by increasing its cost”156 . For the purpose of this work however 
the  more  important  distinction  is  that  made  by  David  Zimmerman  between  coercion  and 
exploitation. In his understanding the specific feature of coercion is that it necessarily restricts 
freedom whereas exploitation is merely making use of a situation in an opportunistic way. Let 
me quote an example explaining this difference.
“A kidnaps B, brings him to the island where A's factory is located, and abandons him on the beach.  
All the jobs in A's factory are considerably worse than those available on the mainland. The next day  
A approaches B with the proposal 'Take a job in my factory and I won't let you starve'. This example  
is a genuine coercive offer, according to Zimmerman, but of there were two factories on the island,  
and the owner of the second learns of B's plight and rushes to the beach before A can get there in  
order to make the same kind of offer to the kidnapped worker, then A's offer is merely opportunistic  
exploitation.”157
Zimmerman's point is that although the effect of both offers is the same for the victim, the first is 
a result of deliberate action. The first factory owner deliberately robs the worker of his freedom 
while the second only takes advantage of the worker's situation of limited freedom. Although we 
might find both cases morally reproachable, it cannot be denied that they differ in respect to 
155 John Gray, Liberalisms. Essays in Political Philosophy, Routledge, London and New York, 1991; p. 55.
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agency and responsibility. This difference is crucial for Hayek's discussion of freedom because, 
as was already mentioned in the discussion of Berlin's philosophy, both Hayek and Berlin define 
freedom as absence of coercion only in the sense of being done intentionally and inflicted by 
men.
For Hayek the existence of a human agency is a necessary condition of coercion which 
separates it from simply being compelled by circumstances. “Coercion occurs when one man's 
actions  are made to  serve another  man's  purpose”,  writes  Hayek.  Similarly to  Zimmerman, 
Hayek emphasises that coercion does not eliminate choice fully but “the alternatives before me 
have been so manipulated that the conduct that the coercer wants me to choose becomes for me 
the least painful one”158. Moreover, coercion is conditioned not only by the existence of a human 
agent,  but it  also requires certain intentionality of his action. Again like Zimmerman, Hayek 
believes that only such action that is exercised with the purpose of using someone else for one's 
goal can be rightly defined as coercion.
Coercion plays such an important role in Hayek's philosophy because he believes that 
“political power usually means the power to coerce”. It is precisely what makes this type of 
power different and more dangerous than others. He argues that “it is not power in the sense of  
an extension of our capacities which corrupts, but the subjection of other human wills to ours,  
the use of other men against their will for our purpose”159. This is a point crucially important for 
Hayek because it indicates that not all power is bad. There is, for example, nothing wrong with 
the power wielded by a director of a company whose workers submit their efforts voluntarily. 
Also, Hayek continues, coercion has to be distinguished from “the conditions or terms on which 
our fellow men are willing to render us specific services or benefits”.  Unconditional life in a 
society is impossible. To satisfy our needs and wishes we all depend upon others and have to 
accept the condition upon which they agree to render us their services. Yet as long as the society 
is free and pluralistic, “these mutual services are voluntary, and each can determine to whom he  
wants to render services and on what terms”160. In a free and pluralistic society no one is coerced 
by some conditions of a service even, and this may seem counter-intuitive,  if  this  service is 
available only by a monopolist provider. Hayek's reason for this is the following:
“If, for instance, I would very much like to be painted by a famous artist and if he refuses to paint  
me for less than a very high fee, it would be absurd to say that I am coerced. The same is true of any 
other commodity or service that I can do without. So long as the services of a particular person are  
158 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge, London and New York, 2006; p.117.
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not crucial to my existence or the preservation of what I most value, the conditions he exacts for  
rendering these services cannot properly be called coercion.”161
It  thus  becomes  clear  that  for  Hayek  coercion  requires  not  only  intentionality  and  the 
impossibility to evade it, but it also requires that the subject of coercion be grave and indeed a 
critical  one. In this manner a monopolist  owner of a spring in an oasis, to use again one of 
Hayek's examples, denying water to someone can rightly be called a coercer.
There are basically two ways of preventing coercion: one is formal equality, the other is 
plurality.  “Whenever  there  is  a  danger  of  a  monopolist's  acquiring  coercive  power”,  writes 
Hayek, “the most expedient and effective method of preventing this is probably to require him to  
treat  all  customers  alike”162.  According  to  the  author  this  method  has  proven  successful  in 
curbing coercive political powers. He does not however discuss any particular reasons why it 
should work in other cases too. The second method of preventing coercion seems to me less 
controversial. Plurality on the market automatically and necessarily produces competition and a 
competitive environment, in its nature, is irreconcilable with coercion. This holds true also for 
plurality and monopoly in regard to politics. “A complete monopoly of  employment,  such as  
would exist in a fully socialist state in which the government was the only employer and the  
owner of all the instruments of production, would possess unlimited powers of coercion” writes 
Hayek and quotes Leon Trotsky who said that “In a country where the sole employer is the State,  
opposition means death by slow starvation”163. Thus socialism appears to be the ultimate source 
of  coercion  and in  consequence  a  system fundamentally  incompatible,  indeed destructive  to 
freedom. But socialism is only one particular example of collectivism that endangers freedom. 
Hayek discusses also another one, namely the collectivism represented by labour unions.  As 
Andrew Gamble notices,
“Unions offend Hayek because, although they begun as voluntary associations, they have developed  
into  coercive  organizations  which  restrict  the  freedom  of  their  own  members,  and  which  are  
employed  to  persuade  governments  of  the  merits  either  of  general  collectivist  schemes  or  of  
measures that will provide particular benefits for their members”.164
Unions  are  in  in  fact  an  interesting  example  of  coercive  institutions  that  developed  out  of 
spontaneous orders. Yet they have lost their purpose and value the moment they became sources 
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of  monopolistic  power  controlling  the  supply  of  a  certain  type  of  labour.  By  preventing 
competition unions not only exercise coercion on employers but also on all workers who do not 
want to submit to them. 
Additionally  to  the  two  methods  of  preventing  coercion  mentioned  earlier,  formal 
equality and plurality,  Hayek discusses a further method that is commonly applied in liberal 
societies, namely having a secure private sphere where the individual is protected from others' 
interference.  In order to exist  and fulfil  its function properly,  the private sphere needs to be 
secured by private property and rights and laws of ownership. I will discuss those in more detail 
in a separate section of this chapter.
3.2.3. Government and arbitrariness
In the view of liberals such as Hayek, the basic political action to be undertaken in order 
to prevent the most dangerous art of coercion was keeping central power in check and therefore 
he always pleaded for some kind of federal government. He believed that dividing power was the 
most natural way of limiting it165 and he shared this view with such political theoreticians as Lord 
Acton,  Alexis de Tocqueville  and Burckhardt.  Andrew Gamble calls  them  “the three patron 
saints of Hayek's liberal international”166. All of them strongly opposed any form of centralism 
believing that such a power was the arch-enemy of personal liberty. Therefore they advocated 
small, and if possible multinational states, because in such circumstances it is more difficult for 
any strong centres of   dominance to develop.
The postulated limitation of governmental power is the reason why Hayek is concerned 
with democratic institutions. He goes as far as to speak of an “irreconcilable conflict between 
democracy  and  capitalism”.  The  problem with  democracy,  he  believes,  is  not  so  much  an 
intrinsic characteristic of this system, but a shape it took in the accidental curse of historical 
development. He points out that “it is now generally taken for granted that in a democracy the  
powers of the majority must be unlimited, and that a government with unlimited powers will be  
forced to secure the continued support of a majority, to use its unlimited powers in the service of  
special  interests”.167 The  reason  for  this  is  not  because  all  politicians  believe  in  state 
interventionism  or  because  they  all  from  the  start  have  autocratic  inclinations.  Rather,  the 
mechanisms and rules of the political game force them to try to expand the power in order to 
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keep it at all.
“The ruling party would not retain a majority if it did not buy the support of particular groups by the  
promise of special benefits. [...] The root of the evil is thus the unlimited power of the legislature in  
modern democracies, a power which the majority will be constantly forced to use in a manner that  
most of its members may not desire.”168
This regrettable development of the democratic movement was mostly due to the fact that 
people believed that once the power was taken away from arbitrary kings, aristocracies and other 
narrow groups of influence, and given to whole of society there was no more danger of it being 
misused. It was believed that the will of majority will be “an adequate test of justice”.  But, 
according to Hayek, these beliefs failed to notice two crucial things. First of all they failed to 
notice  that  “in practice  this  majority  opinion  usually  represents  no  more  than the  result  of  
bargaining rather than a genuine agreement on principles”169 and is thus vulnerable to pressure, 
manipulation and other expressions of power. Secondly, they failed to notice that rule of majority 
can be just as arbitrary as the rule of any autocrat. There is no difference in the way a minority 
discriminates a majority and the way a majority discriminates a minority.
Hayek  admits  that  modern  times  require  a  different  and  and  possibly  even  more 
comprehensive form of government as it was the ideal of classical British liberals. For example 
he agrees that  the increased population density in modern societies resulted in the increased 
number of collective needs which should be satisfied by a government. Thus it follows that the 
extent  of governmental  authority needs  to  be enlarged in comparison to  the classical  ideals. 
Hayek  however  emphasises  that  despite  this  fact  there  remain  certain  rules  that  cannot  be 
violated by any government of a free society, no matter what changes have occurred. He names 
three such rules: 
1. “government does not claim a monopoly and new methods of rendering services through  
the market  [...] are not prevented;
2. the  means are raised  by taxation  of  uniform principles  and taxation is  not  used  as an  
instrument for the redistribution of income; and,
3. the  wants  satisfied  are  collective  wants  of  the  community  as  a  whole  and  not  merely  
collective wants of particular groups”170
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In my opinion the first two points seem clear and consistent with the rest of Hayek's theory. The 
formulation of the last rule however may be problematic. I find it unclear what is meant by the 
'community as a whole'. Obviously it would be hard to find needs shared by all members of a 
community with no exceptions. If  however it does not mean every last one of the community's 
members, how many members are enough to constitute a legitimate need?
However imperfect, Hayek's attempt at formulating minimal rules deciding the extent of a 
government  are aimed at  limiting its  power.  For it  is  an opinion generally shared by liberal 
thinkers  that  'it  is  not  the  source  but  the  limitation  of  power  which  prevents  it  from being  
arbitrary”171. Therefore they all postulate that all kinds of power should be limited. For one thing 
it means that as much authority as possible should be in the hands of local institutions rather than 
in  the  hands  of  a  central  government.  This  also  means  –  and  it  rarely  seems  obvious  to 
contemporary theoreticians who are used to positivist conceptions of law – that even the state 
legislative power has to be limited. The  restriction of the power of legislative bodies that Hayek 
proposes is that they should be able to pass only laws in the form of general rules. He argues that 
no laws are legitimate, if they affect specific groups or aim for specific results.
3.2.4. Freedom and law
It  is  necessary  to  say  more  on  the  relation  between  freedom  and  law  in  Hayek's 
philosophy. In this regard Hayek often adduces, very often not explicitly, the theory of Immanuel 
Kant. He is however interested only in the legal doctrine connected to a man's freedom of action 
and does not deal with ethics and inner freedom. Also, his manner of analysis is completely 
different  from  the  Kantian  method.  For  one  thing,  Hayek's  reasoning  lacks  the  Kantian 
complexity but is more straight forward and commonsensical. Still, there are several fundamental 
ideas that, though developed in somewhat different ways, provide a common denominator for 
both theories. For one thing both philosophers analyse the conditions that allow people to coexist 
at the same time maintaining their individual freedom. They are also both concerned with the 
need of restriction of governmental authority172.
In his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant writes that the only unconditioned 
and natural right is "freedom (independence from being constrained by another's choice), insofar  
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as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law"173 and that 
for this reason freedom is the only legitimate basis for the state. He argues further that only 
freedom of the citizens,  and not  for  example the imposition of any particular  conception of 
happiness, is its rightful purpose. He also determines that law is the limitation of an individual's 
freedom so far as it is necessary to make it compatible with equal freedom of others174. Thus 
Hayek is basically in agreement with Kant when he writes:
“It should be remembered that, so far as man's actions toward other persons are concerned, freedom 
can never mean more than that they are restricted only by general rules since there is no kind of  
action that may not interfere with another person's protected sphere, neither speech, nor the press,  
nor the exercise of religion can be completely free. In all these fields [...] freedom does mean and 
can mean only that what we may do is not dependent on the approval of any person or authority and 
is limited only by the same abstract rules that apply equally to all.”175
This means that law is to be seen both as a restriction of freedom, as well as its condition as far 
as people are social beings, living and acting always among other people.
There are, however, also some differences between the conceptions of the origins of law 
in Kant's and Hayek's philosophies. As already mentioned, Hayek does not write much on the 
topic of moral laws (apart for mentioning that morality is one of many spontaneous orders). 
Therefore Kant's conception of autonomy as self-legislation, of “the self-imposition of universal  
moral law” is not a notion that can be directly related to Hayek's theory. Further differences, in 
my opinion, can be found between Kantian discussion of social contract and Hayek's belief in the 
spontaneous development of social orders.  “The second discussion of social contract comes in  
[Kant's] essay "Theory and Practice" in the context of an a priori restriction on the legitimate 
policies  the sovereign  may pursue”.  The original  contract  is  understood there as  an idea  of 
reason as  opposed to  a  factual  historical  event.  Yet  it  has  to  be recognised as  forcing “the 
sovereign to "give his laws in such a way that they could have arisen from the united will of a  
whole people and to regard each subject, insofar as he wants to be a citizen, as if he has joined  
in voting for such a will"176. I find this conception incompatible with Hayek's strong rejection of 
any collective notions such as the  general will  that is at the basis of Kantian theory of social 
contract. Furthermore, in Kant's doctrine the origin of social contract is apart from any empirical 
experience. For Hayek, on the other hand, the law, although neither a result of any particular 
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design  nor  of  a  decision  of  an  actual  person,  it  is  a  consequence  of  the  actual  historical 
development of humanity. Law in the sense of general abstract rules developed gradually in a 
transition  from specificity  to  generality,  from  privi-leges  to  leges;  according  to  Hayek  the 
institution  of  the  Rule  of  Law,  which  can  be  understood as  a  counterpart  to  Kantian  social 
contract, developed precisely on the basis of the experience of generations.
Despite  this  serious  theoretical  difference  Hayek  recognises the  importance  of  the 
German tradition of  Rechtsstaat and of Kantian contribution to social philosophy among other 
movements promoting political freedom. In The Constitution of Liberty the author acknowledges 
that:
“[Kant's] chief contribution is indeed a general theory of morals which made the principle of the  
rule of law appear as a special application of a more general principle. His celebrated 'categorical  
imperative', the rule that man should always “act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the  
same time will that it should become universal law”, is in fact an extension to the general field of  
ethics of the basic idea underlying the rule of law. It provides, as does the rule of law, merely one  
criterion to which particular rules must conform in order to be just.”177
 
As concerns the origins of particular legal systems, Hayek believes that they can no more 
be results of deliberate design than moral rules are. It is more correct, in Hayek's opinion, to 
think of rules of conduct in a similar way as of the laws of nature – they are not man-made but 
men can endeavour to find them. A scientist investigates nature in order to find out the laws that 
govern our physical  reality.  Respectively,  it  is the task of the social  scientist to discover the 
corresponding laws that govern social reality.
3.2.5. Responsibility
A further  crucial  dimension  of  freedom  in  Hayek's  view  is  responsibility  for  taken 
actions. In the Constitution of Liberty he writes that these two concepts are indeed inseparable178. 
Therefore,  depriving  someone  of  freedom,  does  not  mean  only  depriving  him  from  the 
opportunities it  brings but  also from the burden which is  inseparable from it,  the burden of 
bearing consequences for one's actions. Responsibility, on one hand, is the criterion on the basis 
of which it can be decided if an individual is capable of freedom. On the other hand it is the basic 
tool that allows him to make any rational use of it. Any contemporary philosopher formulating a 
177 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge, London and New York, 2006; p. 172.
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criterion of freedom based on individual responsibility would meet with the critique of being 
discriminating towards all those incapable of such a responsibility. Clearly, on these grounds at 
least such groups of people as children, senile and mentally ill are left out. Yet I believe that this 
critique would not bother Hayek much. He would probably answer that it is precisely because we 
believe some individuals incapable of bearing the consequences of their actions that we decide it 
is legitimate for others to restrain their freedom, for instance, by placing custody over them.
Further Hayek argues the significance of the notion of responsibility, both in the fields of 
morality and economics, by pointing to the fact that no judgement or comparison would make 
sense without clear view of the nature of consequences. In an essay on the sources of moral 
values Hayek writes that morality rules presuppose striving for excellency as well as awareness 
that some people are more successful at it than others179. In other words morality would not make 
sense  at  all  without  the  notion  of  comparison  because  moral  esteem would  not  be  possible 
without both the assumption of personal responsibility and the tool of comparison. But ethical 
considerations  were  not  central  in  Hayek's  works  as  he  was  mainly  interested  in  questions 
considering social arrangements. Therefore the freedom he was analysing was not a subject of 
ethics or ontology but it was freedom in a political and juridical sense. His were the practical, 
even  procedural  categories,  not  ethical  or  ontological  and  so  he  focused  on  the  tasks  of 
responsibility in the reality of market economy, analysing it in a corresponding way. He stressed 
that “it is of the essence of a free society that a man's value and remuneration depend not on  
capacity in the abstract but on success on turning it into concrete service which is useful to  
others who can reciprocate”180. Thus, as Hayek emphasises, it is the subjective judgement of 
other members of the society,  their  estimation of our achievements that  decide what  we are 
subjected to.
The freedom of action subordinated to the responsibility for one's choices in the reality of 
a free market means that, as long as there are no discriminatory laws, there is no one else to 
blame or praise for the situation of an individual except from him or herself. Therefore the task 
of law and the government is perceived by liberals only as protection of people while they strive 
to achieve their goals; it is neither the task of the government, nor is it the purpose of law to 
secure some particular outcome or result  in the actions of citizens.  Hayek states clearly that 
“while the protection of the law was to assist all in the pursuit of their aims, government was not  
supposed to guarantee to the individuals particular results of their efforts”181.
179 See Friedrich August von Hayek, Die drei Quellen der menschlichen Werte, J.C.B Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 
Tuebingen, 1979; p. 40.
180 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge, London and New York, 2006; p. 71.
181 Friedrich August von Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London and Henley, 1978; p. 133.
63
Furthermore, thanks to the fact that we have the notion of responsibility for our actions, 
in other words that we perceive our actions as highly influencing the results we achieve, we can 
be induced without coercion to make contribution to the welfare of the whole community. This 
occurs in a following way: an individual, conscious of the fact that, apart from uncontrollable 
chance factors, he is the main architect of his own fortune. He naturally directs his attention to 
those factors which he can control or influence in some way and therefore invests in his work all 
available effort, knowledge and skills. These however do not get lost once used by him but they 
add to the pool of the market from which all its participants share. Although the share is never 
equal, the bigger the pool, the higher the gains that all participants may expect. In this sense 
liberal theoreticians always believed that only by means of personal responsibility best efforts 
and therefore  best  economic results  can be achieved without  the  need  of  coercively forcing 
people to work. Hayek writes that:
“to enable the individual to use his knowledge and abilities in the pursuit of his self-chosen aims 
was regarded both as the greatest benefit government could secure to all, as well as the best way of  
inducing these individuals to make the greatest contribution to the welfare of others. To bring forth  
the  best  efforts  for  which  an  individual  was  enabled  by  his  particular  circumstances  and  
capabilities, of which no authority could know, was thought to be the chief advantage which the  
freedom of each would confer on all others.182
In this context freedom appears to be not only a value or a basis for other values, but also its 
worth  lies  in  its  usefulness  for  the  functioning  of  societies.  Free  action  induced  by  the 
consciousness of responsibility plays the role of a knowledge catalyst enabling its flow among 
different members of a community and a market.
3.2.6. Freedom and the market system
At this point it is clear why for Hayek the market system is not only working hand in 
hand  with  the  ideal  of  individualism  but  also  with  the  liberal  ideal  of  freedom.  From  his 
perspective, where the problem of division of labour is replaced by the problem of division of 
knowledge, the power relations are also differently defined. By making the best use of dispersed 
knowledge,  the  competitive  system of  a  free  market  prevents  the  formation  of  authoritative 
power. It efficiently stimulates cooperation and exchange of knowledge and other goods without 
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the need for coercion.  The sphere of personal freedom is well secured by the mechanism of 
competition, where dispersion of knowledge implicates the dispersion of power. According to 
Hayek it is only such a system of decentralized power that allows cooperation without coercion – 
people freely choose their occupation, ways and methods of work and freely enter into contracts 
or partnerships. Peoples' choices being governed by their own judgement and their profits being 
direct results of their decisions, the system of competition is best reconcilable with the liberal 
understanding of freedom.
A critique of Hayek's theory of a competitive market system often issued by socialist or 
left-wing thinkers maintains that even such a system does not defend us from the authoritative 
power of a planning board because exactly the same power is being exercised by the group of 
capitalists. However Hayek answers to this that the quality of power of a single planning board, 
as in a socialist state, cannot be compared with the quality of power exercised by all singular 
capitalists added together. As long as these capitalists do not form some kind of a council and act 
individually following their particular ends no such power monopoly arises.
3.2.7. Drawing the line
Obviously  all  actions  of  men  living  in  a  society  and  interacting  with  other  men 
necessarily have some effect  on others.  No human action takes place in  a vacuum. The big 
question however is where to draw the line – which consequences are admissible and which are 
an unacceptable threat to the freedom of others? Many thinkers tend to imagine this line as an 
objective, analytical outcome of the definition of freedom. I do not think this to be true. In my 
opinion  it  is  rather  strongly  dependent  on  historically  accidental  circumstances.  Recall  the 
example of birth control that  J.S.Mill  gives in his  On Liberty as  a permissible restriction of 
personal  freedom.  As  many in  his  times,  Mill  is  strongly concerned  with  the  possibility  of 
overpopulation of the earth. He argues therefore that introduction of some kind of 'child licences' 
would be a reasonable way of dealing with the problem. He finds that a law limiting the number 
of children a couple is allowed to have is a justified restriction of their freedom, for if they had 
more children, these would be a threat to the rest of the population – for example concerning 
food  supply  and  scarcity  of  employment.  Considered  however  from  our  contemporary 
perspective a law limiting the number of children would most likely be seen as the harshest kind 
of intrusion into the private sphere of the individual, a sphere that is by contemporary liberals 
understood as a temple of inviolable freedom.
John Gray in his essay on J.S.Mill rightly notices that
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“in laying down a necessary condition of legitimate limitation of liberty, [Mill's principle of liberty]  
disallows  an  indefinitely  large  range  of  interferences  with  personal  freedom  [...].  These  are:  
restrictions  of  liberty  designed  to  prevent  individuals  from  causing  harm  to  themselves;  and  
restrictions designed to bring an individual into conformity with the received moral ideas of his  
community.”183
Generally speaking Hayek agrees with Mill's formulation. The first group of restrictions would 
not be compatible with his ideal of responsibility. The second group of restrictions would be 
contradictory to the moral pluralism of liberal society.
As  concerns  specific  rules  restricting  personal  freedom  in  accordance  with  Mill's 
principle, I believe that Hayek would object to the idea of defining them by means of rational 
deliberation. He would rather say that they should be 'discovered' in the same way as scientists 
discover rules of nature. The spontaneous order expressed in customs and traditions is the only 
dimension of social reality and it evolved in parallel with freedom. Its limits therefore should be 
found within the order itself. Indeed, at one point Hayek refers to freedom as the biggest benefit 
of tradition184. He supposes that “a successful free society will always in a large measure be a  
tradition-bound society”185. These views are an expression of Hayek's anti-rationalist approach to 
social sciences. His “esteem for tradition and custom, of grown institutions, and of rules whose  
origins  and  rationale  we  do  not  know  [...]  is  based  on  the  insight  that  the  result  of  the  
experimentation  of  many  generations  may  embody  more  experience  than  any  one  man  
possesses”186.
3.2.8. Private property
Hayek is very clear about the nature of goals worth pursuing and he believes that these 
are hardly ever purely economic goals. An economy however is so essential because material 
wealth is in most cases indispensable to the achievement of, for the lack of a better expression 
called, higher goals. Economic goals, in his opinion, are never ultimate ends for men, but always 
means for the achievement of other ends. Yet it means that freedom as such is hardly possible 
without economic freedom. Hayek also emphasises:
183 John Gray, Liberalisms. Essays in Political Philosophy, Routledge, London and New York, 1991; p. 2.
184 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Fatal Conceit, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988; p. 63.
185 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge, London and New York, 2006; p. 55.
186 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge, London and New York, 2006; p. 55.
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“For the British tradition [political and economic liberalism] are inseparable because the basic  
principle of the limitation of the coercive powers of government to the enforcement of general rules  
of just conduct deprives government of the power of directing or controlling the economic activities  
of the individuals, while the conferment of such powers gives government essentially arbitrary and 
discretionary power which cannot but restrict even the freedom in the choice of individual aims  
which all liberals want to secure. Freedom under the law implies economic freedom, while economic  
control, as the control of the means for all purposes, makes a restriction of all freedom possible.”187
Hayek makes two different points here. On the one hand, Rule of Law secures personal freedom 
of individuals by limiting the coercive power of government and by submitting people only to 
general  abstract  laws.  This  means  that  they  are  able  to  pursue  their  goals  freely  and 
independently from central authority and that they are free to use their time and resources in 
accordance with their own ideas. On the other hand, economic freedom,  “by multiplying the  
number of decision-making centres” supports the dispersion of power and allows people to “to  
create  spheres  of  autonomy  which  were  relatively  free  from  control  by  traditional  power  
centres”188. Private  property  means  having  the  means  to  achieve  the  goals  one  chooses 
independently of all others. Making economic decisions is possible and makes sense only with 
the assumption of private property. In this sense it can be said that personal freedom requires 
economic freedom which, in turn, requires the institution of private ownership.
There is a problem closely related to the area of freedom and private property with which 
Hayek is very concerned in many of his writings. It is the idea of equal incomes advocated by 
socialist ideologists. Hayek finds it highly destructive for the economy and civilisation for one 
thing because such an arrangement would take away the signals that otherwise make it possible 
for  people  to  chose  in  which  direction  they  should  invest  their  energy  and,  even  more 
importantly, it would take away from them the only incentive by which free people can be made 
to follow moral rules – namely the different esteem they receive from others189. Thus inequality 
of remuneration is for Hayek a sort of double incentive – it stimulates economic activity without 
the need of exercising coercion, and it also constitutes the material evidence of a successful life. 
This seems to be a thought in the tradition of protestant ethics and it is probably not wrong to 
read Hayek also in this way. However he himself does not speak of any particular morality or 
ethical system in this regard. He argues that all moral rules are based on a different valuation that 
187 Friedrich August von Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London and Henley, 1978; p. 132.
188 Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 70.
189 See Friedrich August von Hayek, Die drei Quellen der menschlichen Werte, J.C.B Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 
Tuebingen, 1979; p. 38.
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we show to different people depending how well their behaviour complies with common moral 
views and beliefs. In this way a moral behaviour becomes a subject of social valuation190. For 
Hayek, the ability to judge different actions and behaviours in different ways is the condition of 
morality as such.
Although the above argument on the necessary connection between moral systems and 
inequality of  remuneration may be controversial,  most  people  agree  with Hayek's  point  that 
socialist politics of equal incomes was not able to provide a stimulation for economic activity.
“The real problem for socialism which Hayek identifies was not whether a socialist economy could  
set equilibrium prices,  but whether a socialist  economy could provide the incentives required to  
allow dispersed information to be utilized in producing goods and services. Kornai argues that the  
market,  competition and private property are inextricably  linked.  Only capitalist  institutions can 
ensure  that  market  co-ordination  will  actually  deliver  an  efficient  economy.  The  problem  of  
knowledge, or information is therefore a problem also of incentives.191
Gamble thus recognises the accuracy of Hayek's critique of socialist economies based on the one 
hand, on the conviction that only free market is able to make good use of knowledge dispersed 
throughout the society, and, on the other hand, on the observation that only free market naturally 
motivated people to effort. It is a problem widely observed in socialist countries – people did not 
feel motivated to work for something that did not belong to them. If something belongs to all, it 
does not belong to anyone, was a common phrase. So in order to achieve any economic results, 
people had to be coerced to work. This resulted with no unemployment, but also with very low 
efficiency.  In  this  sense Hayek's  argument  is  a  historical  one:  experience  suggests  that  only 
private ownership provides a strong creative incentive without the need of coercion. 
There are several critiques concerning Hayek's theory of private property and I would like 
here to address some of them. First of them involves the distinction of positive and negative 
freedom and was formulated by Andrew Gamble in his monograph on Hayek's liberalism. He 
writes that 
“There is [...]  a suspicion of positive freedom in Hayek's fourth condition,  freedom to own and  
acquire property. In a society in which the opportunities to own and acquire property were limited  
not by the arbitrary decision of rulers but by laws which allowed only members of one minority  
group to hold property, would it be justifiable to advocate the redistribution of property to increase  
190 See Friedrich August von Hayek, Die drei Quellen der menschlichen Werte, J.C.B Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 
Tuebingen, 1979; p. 39.
191Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 69.
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the total sum of liberty?”192
I am convinced that Hayek's answer to this question would be a resounding no – redistribution of 
property would not be justified even in that case. It would however be advisable to change the 
laws so that all were equal before them. Moreover, I do not think that Hayek would agree to 
interpret freedom to own property as a positive freedom. This would mean that every last person 
should have unlimited means to purchase whatever they dream of, which is obviously absurd. I 
think he rather means the freedom of private ownership which is necessary for securing a private 
sphere where the individual is independent from others and from the government, and which 
enables him to participate in the market exchange. This freedom is non-restriction of options 
meaning that no one should be restricted by law or by others in using his money and other 
means, acquiring and owning property. It does not mean however that an income of those means 
should be secured by the state or in any other way.
The formal design of institutions would also be, I think,  Hayek's answer to a second 
reproach  that  Andrew Gamble  formulates  in  his  study  The Iron  Cage  of  Liberty,  where  he 
expresses his concern that it is not so much the power of the state that we should be worried 
about,  but  the real  power exercised nowadays  by large-scale  international  companies193.  The 
author points out that in the case of such companies the ideal of dispersed knowledge is simply 
not any more the case. Surprisingly Hayek does not deal with the problem of monopolies as 
influencing knowledge (and therefore power relations). He is critical of monopolies only in so 
far as they make it difficult for others to enter the market. It thus means that he recognises the 
restriction of freedom but does not see that it occurs by means of coercive exclusion rather than 
natural scarcity. I agree with Gamble that Hayek does not attribute sufficient importance to the 
problem of enterprise monopolies. It may be that it is only recently that this phenomenon has 
become  so  grave.  Still,  Hayek's  solution  to  the  problem lays  in  the  legislature  -  “gradual  
improvement of our law of corporations, patents, and taxation”194. Reproachable however is that 
he fails to enunciate what reforms exactly could be introduced.
192 Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 41.
193 Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, 1996; p. 72.
194 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge Classics, London and New York, 2006; p. 
231.
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3.3. Freedom as a relation of men to other men
The first  chapter of  The Constitution of Liberty  deals with the disambiguation of the 
notion of freedom. The author clearly states that what he understands under this term is neither a 
metaphysical property of human beings, nor a natural quality that accrues to men in the minute 
of their birth. Hayek does not deal with any such ontological deliberations, rather he is interested 
rather with the social reality of human life and all significant conditions of this reality are results 
of social interactions. Therefore what is described with the concept of freedom is for Hayek not 
„the range of physical possibilities“195 but the ability of acting according to one's own will rather 
than upon the will of others.
Hayek agrees that the question as to how many possibilities of action an individual has is 
a  very  important  one,  but  his  freedom  does  not  depend  upon  the  answer  to  it.  In  his 
understanding  „the  only  infringement  on  [freedom]  is  coercion  by  men“196 and  so  Hayek 
maintains that „freedom presupposes that the individual has some assured private sphere, that  
there is some set of circumstances in his environment with which others cannot interfere“197. 
Such a formulation clearly belongs to the tradition of English political philosophy. For example, 
John Stewart Mill recognizes a sphere of man's life, in which the society has no or only indirect 
interest and in which the man is not subjected to it's restrictions. According to Mill this sphere of 
freedom consists of the liberty of consciousness and expression, but also, more importantly in 
Hayek's context, it „requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit  
our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow“198.
The talk of a life plan is especially close to Hayek's approach. For him it is crucial that 
men are able to draw up projects (economic, but not exclusively199) on the basis of the existing 
law and circumstances and then to sensibly expect the results of their actions. I think it can be 
reasonably  suggested  that  the  whole  of  Hayek's  ethics  is  based  on  these  two  fundamental 
concepts: freedom and responsibility. An individual is free to choose his ends as well as the ways 
of achieving them – but the price of such a freedom is the irrevocability of the consequences200. 
195 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge Classics, London and New York, 2006; p. 
12.
196 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge Classics, London and New York, 2006; p. 
12.
197 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge Classics, London and New York, 2006; p. 
13.
198 John Stewart Mill, On Liberty, Dover Publications, Inc., Mineola, New York, 2002; p. 10.
199 Hayek rejects the common view according to which the economic in our lives is distinct from the other life 
spheres. In The Road to Serfdom (p. 125) he maintains that there is no such thing as a strictly economic end. He 
thinks that for reasonable people all economic activities and gains are nothing but means for other, non-economic 
ends.
200 See: Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge Classics, London and New York, 
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According to Hayek the recognition of this principle is the guarantee of a free society.
This principle, however, can be easily abused when interpreted in a purely libertarian 
way,  as  done,  for  example,  by  Robert  Nozick.  I  shall  not  dwell  on  Nozick's  extravagant 
libertarian philosophy more than is necessary to make my point here. I just need to mention that 
his conception of freedom as formulated in Anarchy, State and Utopia is quite controversial, for 
one thing, because it is defined in terms of rights, particularly property rights, in contrast to most 
theories of freedom in which liberty is primary and fundamental to rights. He argues basically 
that  whenever a person is  capable and ready to repay for the negative results of his actions 
towards others, there is no legitimate ground of forbidding or stopping him from doing it. If, for 
example, society establishes that retribution for a broken arm is 10 000 Euro, than as long as one 
has this amount of money, there is no reason why he should not simply go around breaking other 
people's arms and paying them off201. Such a line of reasoning is not very appealing for at least 
two reasons. First of all Nozick fully disregards in his example the freedom of the victims. What 
if one of them prefers an unbroken arm over the 10 000 Euro? Yet the freedom of which Hayek 
speaks  is  rather  a  freedom of  entering  into  contracts  with  each  other  and  not  an  infantile 
understanding of freedom as doing whatever one wants.
The second criticism against Nozick's argument is that he mixes two different things: the 
liberty of action seen from the perspective of the perpetrator and the consequences from the 
perspective of the affected person. In the chapter on Limits to the Authority of Society over the 
Individual  Mill  draws a  very crucial  distinction which is  maybe best  illustrated by his  own 
example:
If, for example, a man, through intemperance or extravagance, becomes unable to pay his debts, or,  
having undertaken the moral responsibility of a family, becomes from the same cause incapable of  
supporting or educating them, he is deservedly reprobated, and might be justly punished; but it is for  
the breach of duty to his family or creditors, not for the extravagance.202
I am convinced that this would also be the position taken by Hayek. The deed is never to be 
punished or forbidden as such but always only because it affects others in an inadmissible way. 
2006; p. 63.
201 In  Chapter  4  of  his  Anarchy,  State,  and  Utopia  Nozick deals  with  the  questions  of  prohibition,  risk  and 
compensation. He analysis  situations in which two persons,  X and Y are involved,  and finally he adopts a 
conception  of  compensation  which  „presumes  reasonable  precautions  and  adjusting  activities  by  X.  These 
activities would place X (given Y's acts) on a certain indifference curve I; Y is required to raise X above his 
actual  position by an amount equal  to the difference between his position on I and his original  position.  Y 
compensates X for how much worse off Y's action would have made a reasonably prudently acting X.“ (Robert 
Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Blackwell, Oxford, 1980; p. 58) 
202 John Stewart Mill, On Liberty, Dover Publications, Inc., Mineola, New York, 2002; p. 68.
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So basically the personal freedom of one individual ends where the same personal freedom of 
another begins.
The basic premise underlying the principle of individual freedom and responsibility is the 
belief  that  the  individuals  in  question  are  rational  beings.  „It  presupposes  that  a  person is  
capable of learning from experience and of guiding his actions by knowledge thus acquired“203. 
As Hayek admits, this premise is not something we know for sure but it is rather a belief that we 
share  with  others,  it  is  a  sort  of  reciprocal  acknowledgement  between  the  participants  of  a 
society. But what this intersubjective relation has to implicate is also a mutual recognition of 
judgement  capacity  of  others.  This  reciprocity  of  freedom  yielded  upon  one  another  that 
constitutes  this  social  concept  of  Hayek  can  be  based  both  on  moral  as  well  as  on 
epistemological reflection.
The first of these considerations is based on a certain humbleness which requires us to 
respect the values of others, even if we do not approve neither understand them – it is based on 
one of the other liberal ideals, the ideal of individualism. Because, as Hayek writes:
„Believing in freedom means that we do not regard ourselves as the ultimate judges of another 
person's  values,  that  we  do  not  feel  entitled  to  prevent  him  from pursuing  his  ends  which  we  
disapprove so long as he does not infringe the equally protected sphere of others. A society that does  
not recognize that each individual has values of his own which he is entitled to follow can have no  
respect for the dignity of the individual and cannot rally know freedom.“204.
A similar  humbleness,  as  I  call  it,  may also  result  from the  consciousness  of  our  cognitive 
limitation.  According  to  Hayek such  a  disposition  is  also  characteristic  for  the  individualist 
approach. In his interview with Franz Kreuzer he explains how he understands the difference 
between this and a collectivist approach. A collectivist thinker assumes that individual reason is 
able to comprehend the whole intelligence, while an individualist believes that limited individual 
reason is able to unfold in ways that are not fully comprehensible to itself any more. This means 
that  individualism  is  based  on  the  view  that  epistemic  capabilities  of  individuals  are  quite 
limited205. In this sense, as Hayek further explains, the cooperation or simply interaction of many 
individual minds leads to a structure of a higher order – to something that cannot be grasped by a 
203 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge Classics, London and New York, 2006; p. 
68. There the author admits that individuals who do not fulfil this requirement cannot be granted  freedom to the 
same extent. And this is actually so in most of the societies where children and insane do not have civil rights 
and remain under the control of their parents or custodians.
204 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge Classics, London and New York, 2006; p. 
69.
205 See: Markt, Plan, Freiheit. Franz Kreuzer im Gespräch mit Friedrich von Hayek und Ralf Dahrendorf,  Franz 
Deuticke Verlaggesellschaft m. b. H., Wien, 1983; p. 27.
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single mind any more. The collectivist approach on the contrary assumes that the human mind is 
able of grasping  and comprehending this aggregated reason. Needless to say, Hayek supports the 
individualist view206.
An  individualist  epistemology as  shortly  described  above  in  my  opinion  implies  the 
possibility of only individual responsibility. And I think also that Hayek is right when he states 
that „responsibility, to be effective, must be individual responsibility“207. This does not however 
consequently deprive Hayek's notion of responsibility and freedom of their social dimension. For 
it is this concrete and objective environment that will make the evaluation and eventually judge a 
man's actions.
„It is of the essence of a free society that a man's value and remuneration depend not on capacity in  
the abstract but on success in turning it into concrete service which is useful to others who can  
reciprocate. And the chief aim of freedom is to provide both the opportunity and the inducement to  
insure the maximum use of the knowledge that an individual can acquire.“208
It might, at the beginning, seem odd to speak of freedom as a means rather than as a value 
as such – but that is precisely how Hayek understands it. For him freedom is not simply a value, 
but more a ground for other values. I think he sees it as a sort of Darwinian mechanism that was 
invented  by societies  to  help  their  preservation.  It  is  thus  remarkable  that  in  Hayek's  view 
freedom is a consequence of human activity – it is the historical result of a political struggle of 
generations of men, it is a right established by people for themselves. This historical origin is 
only a further argument supporting our sociological understanding of freedom.
In favour of his historical approach Hayek adduces ancient Greek constitutions that
„have taken it  for granted that liberty is a state's highest good and for this reason alone make  
property belong specifically to those who acquire it [...]. An important aspect of this freedom [...]  
was made possible not only by the separate control of various means of production, but also by  
another  practice,  virtually  inseparable  from  the  first:  the  recognition  of  approved  methods  of  
transferring this control.”209
206 This, I am convinced, is one of the reasons why Hayek believes that an economy directed from numerous 
decision centers simultaneously works better than a centrally planned one. An economy constituted by myriads 
of catallaxies is a system of a higher order that could be grasped by any planners mind or minds.
207 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge Classics, London and New York, 2006; p. 
73.
208 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge Classics, London and New York, 2006; p. 
71.
209 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Fatal Conceit, The University of Chicago Press, Routledge, London, 1991; p. 
30. In other works, however, Hayek argues that it was first the Schotish Enlightment that developed a clear idea 
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This notion of personal freedom derives also from a Greek distinction between the public and 
private spheres. Hayek argues that the recognition of the private sphere together with the private 
ownership was a necessary condition for the formation of trade and larger social groups. In this 
sense the recognition of personal freedom and private property is seen as a civilizing factor. Also 
from  his  reflections  on  the  historical  developments  of  cultures,  the  author  comes  to  the 
conclusion that it was often the exceedingly powerful governments that led to the decline and 
collapse  of  their  countries.  Instead  of  protecting  the  citizens  and  their  properties  these 
governments tended to abuse their power and  „effectively suppressed private initiative”210.
Given this conception of right to freedom it is understandable why for Hayek the socialist 
economy in particular, and any kind of collectivism are in general major threats to it. First of all 
they tend to substitute (in the sphere of economics, but then consequently in all other spheres of 
life also) the individual subject with a collective one. Adopting a public, social or any other 
common end, means choosing one particular system of values over all others and consequently 
dictating how and what lives people should lead – necessarily in many cases against their will 
and  beliefs.  This  leads  to  such  obvious  acts  of  dictation  as  condescending  assignments  of 
occupation,  place  of  residence  etc.,  but  also  consumption  or  entertainment  possibilities.  So 
generally it can be said that all collectivist systems necessarily patronize their subjects.
More importantly however these systems drastically restrict peoples' personal freedom by 
exercising control over too broad a scope. Hayek is convinced that “in modern society [...]  the 
essential requisite for the protection of the individual against coercion is not that he possess  
property but that the material means which enable him to pursue any plan of action should not  
be all in the exclusive control of one other agent”211.  This basic principle is obviously being 
broken by systems that centrally control the economy and where the means of production belong 
to the state. All branches of the economy (and for that sake of life as well) are clearly strongly 
interrelated and therefore once the point when too much depends upon too few decision makers 
is exceeded, then everything is indirectly under their control. It is not possible to speak of any 
freedom left in such a situation – at least not of a freedom as Hayek understands it. To me this is 
a conception somewhat similar to the one of a world-state as objected to by Hannah Arendt – in 
whichever of these options one chooses, Hayek is always certain that personal freedom developed as a result of 
the evolution of civilisation, it developed alongside men and their always more complex societies and 
interrelations.
210 Friedrich August vonHayek, The Fatal Conceit, The University of Chicago Press, Routledge, London, 1991; p. 
32.
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123.
74
both cases the objection is directed against a totalitarian control: in a world-state the control 
extensive is so to say – over the whole physical realm of the earth; in a socialist state the control 
is in a sense intensive – involving all spheres of life.
It seems thus that independence, in the sense of the lack of control by others, is crucial for 
Hayek's conception of personal and economic freedom. He goes even so far as to assert, that 
precisely the indifference towards others is what secures the freedom:
„it should be mentioned that we are independent of the will of those whose services we need because  
they serve us for their own purposes and are normally little interested in the uses we make of their  
services. We should be very dependent on the beliefs of our fellows if they were prepared to sell their  
products to us only when they approved of our ends and not for their own advantage.”212
To express  it  in  Kantian terms,  it  is  desirable  that  people treat  themselves (at  least  when it 
concerns their economic relations) sometimes as means only and not always as ends. This is so 
because  such  an  egocentric  attitude  leads  in  consequence  to  disinterested  (meaning  both: 
indifferent as well as impartial and unselfish) help and cooperation between complete strangers. 
This thought is nothing new in the philosophy of economics. Indeed, it was famously formulated 
by Adam Smith in his  Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations  where he 
writes:
“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but  
from their regard for their own interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity but to their self-
love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages. Nobody but a beggar  
chooses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow citizens.”213
This example shows why I argued that Hayek seems to place market activities and mechanism 
outside the scope of moral judgement and rational critique. It is an order like the natural one, 
whose rules are not based on ethical considerations but evolved with the purpose of maintaining 
the order and facilitating its functioning. For example, a rule not to cheat customers, although it 
might seem to us now a moral norm, had a purely pragmatic origin – a cheating salesman would 
loose all customers who, having realised his practices, would eventually choose other salesmen. 
In this context Gamble reminds us about Hayek's theory of spontaneous orders and points to the 
way in which these relate to personal freedom.
212 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge Classics, London and New York, 2006 ; p. 
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“Civilisation has been built not on transparent rational foundations, but on the evolution of rules  
and institutions the rationale for which no one has ever fully understood. Hayek's argument is that it  
is not necessary to understand them. In seeking to understand them, human beings are too ready to  
denounce submission to the impersonal forces of the market, without realizing that the alternative to  
submitting  to  those  impersonal  and  seemingly  irrational  forces  is  submission  to  'an  equally  
uncontrollable and therefore arbitrary power of other men'.”214
Summarising, in Hayek's view, the rules and mechanisms of the market have emerged in course 
of the evolution of civilisation. People are subordinate to them in a way that can be compared to 
the way they are subordinate to physical laws. In a liberal understanding of the word it cannot be 
said that one is unfree because gravitation attracts him down to earth, and market laws should be 
treated in the same way. Being dependent on judgements and decisions of a single person, on the 
other hand, has all characteristics of arbitrariness and coercion and therefore is to be regarded as 
a limitation or violation of freedom.
214 Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 45. 
Included a quotation from Hayek, The Road to Serfdom.
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4. JUSTICE
“Justice does require that those conditions of people's lives that are determined by government be  
provided equally for all. But equality of those conditions must lead to inequality of results.”215
This, in short, is the main thesis of Hayek's conception of justice. In this chapter I will try 
to show the grounds of this belief and his argumentation in favour of this statement. I shall start 
by  clarifying  the  general  notion  of  justice  and  by  placing  it  in  philosophical  and  juridical 
contexts. For this purpose I will shortly explain different positions in the philosophy of law, such 
as conventionalism and natural law theory. Then I will proceed to fundamental systematics of 
justice differentiating between formal and substantive justice and showing Hayek's position in 
this respect. I shall discuss separately the notion of social justice and explain why Hayek finds it 
obscure and for this reason rejects it as a political goal. As an example of a theory of justice with 
a  strong notion  of  distributive  justice  I  will  shortly  discuss  Rawls'  conception  of  justice  as 
fairness. Then, before proceeding to Hayek's critique of distributive justice, I shall devote some 
paragraphs to the relation between justice and law because it is crucial to formal justice and to 
Hayek's understanding of the Rule of Law. The critique of distributive justice itself encompasses 
rejection of equality and of merit as possible criteria of distributive justice, as well as Hayek's 
argument that distributive and formal justice contradict each other in practice.
4.1. The notion of justice
In the most general sense of the word justice encompasses the whole of reciprocal claims, 
obligations and liabilities as well as moral rights and duties that people have towards each other. 
Justice relates on one hand to human actions  and on the other hand to  the rules and norms 
guiding those actions216.  Suum cuique tribuere  is the classical Latin definition of justice. The 
Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy defines justice as “each getting what he or she is due”217. It 
also states that traditionally justice is associated with fair treatment. Several kinds of justice can 
be distinguished in connection to spheres of life they are concerned with. The types of justice 
that will be most important in regard to Hayek's philosophy are distributive justice and formal 
215 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge, London and New York, 2006; p 87.
216 See Peter Koller, Theorie des Rechts, Boehlau Verlag, Wien, Koeln, Weimar, 1992; p. 279-280.
217The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Second Edition, gen. ed. Robert Audi, Cambridge University Press, 
1999; p. 456.
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justice. The former describes valuation of the distribution of resources and is closely related to 
commutative justice which deals with wages, prices and exchange. Formal justice on the other 
hand does not deal with the content of rules but only with the way they are applied – whether 
they  are  exercised  in  a  consistent  and  impartial  way.  The  impartiality  is  one  of  the  basic 
principles of justice. I suppose that this is the reason why art represents justice allegorically as a 
blindfolded woman – blind to all human particularities.
In antiquity justice was widely understood not only as a principle ordering social life and 
institutions but also a principle responsible for the order of soul. This notion may be seen as 
corresponding to the modern idea that in order for societies to be just, citizens and especially 
public office holders have to be characterised by personal justice218.
As a philosophical conception justice and its valuation belong to the sphere of rationality. 
When  we  judge  something  as  just  or  unjust  we  do  this  in  relation  to  something  else.  The 
judgement thus requires awareness of parallels and similarities between particular actions and 
behaviours219.  The  question  that  concerns  law-makers  especially  in  this  respect  is  which 
analogies and equalities in which respect are  to be considered as crucial.  Justice,  not unlike 
equality,  is  a  rather  meaningless  notion  without  a  determination  in  regard  to  what  it  is 
considered220, because both these notions are relational. We say that someone is equally tall to 
someone else, equally educated or has equal rights. Similarly justice has to be referred to some 
particular circumstance: just behaviour, just treatment, just distribution etc.
Two moral notions closely related to the virtue of justice are equality and desert. Shortly 
speaking, “rewards and punishments are justly distributed if they go to those who deserve them.  
But in the absence of different desert claims, justice demands equal treatment”221. The question 
to be answered at this point, however, is how and who decides what is due to whom. There are 
several  approaches  to  this  problem.  Conventionalists,  for  example,  point  to  the  common 
understanding and customary procedures of particular societies. In this sense, what is due to an 
individual depends on established social and semiotic conventions222 . There are several problems 
with this approach. First of all, societies are hardly ever homogenous enough to produce only 
one  coherent  set  of  conventions.  Secondly,  a  universal  principle  of  justice  is  theoretically 
218 Otfried Höffe, Gerechtigkeit, Verlag C.H. Beck, München, 2001ö p. 31.
219 Recht und Moral, Texte zur Rechtsphilosophie, Hg. Von Norbert Hoerster, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 
München, 1977; p. 122.
220 See Herlinde Pauer-Studer, Autonom leben, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 2000; p. 26.
221Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, gen. ed. Edward Craig, Routledge, London and New York, 1998; vol. 5, 
p. 141.
222 I use the term 'semiotic' in the anthropological meaning of Umberto Eco who explains all cultural phenomena in 
terms of communication between individuals. Semiotic conventions are those that originate from the use of 
certain names and language constructions. For example, owing respect to those individuals who are labelled with 
certain titles is a semiotic convention.
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inaccessible  on  the  assumption  that  justice  is  internally  dependent  on  social  and,  as  such, 
accidental conventions. Thirdly, the problem with conventionalism is that it attempts to derive an 
'ought-statement'  from  an  'is-statement'  and  so  falls  under  the  famous  critique  of  Hume's 
guillotine.
In opposition to conventionalists, natural law theoreticians believe that the law of man 
has to be coherent with natural law in order to be just. According to this approach there is a 
universal and unchanging principle of justice which is accessible to human reason. This approach 
is  probably  the  oldest  tradition  of  theories  of  justice.  The  belief  that  there  is  some  higher 
obligation that all men are bound to and that it is prior to any man's authority is expressed as 
early as in ancient Greek tragedies (for example Sophocles' Antigone)223. The problem that arises 
to the proponents of the natural law theory is that in order to give an account of their philosophy 
they need to make a reference to some external cause, usually a deity. Some sort of a secular 
equivalent for this theory is utilitarianism which declares maximizing utility as the highest virtue. 
The problem with utilitarianism, however, is its counter-intuitive procedure that distributes what 
is due to a person not in regard to this person but in regard to a calculus of general state of 
affairs. Or otherwise, utilitarian philosophy concentrated on the maximizing of welfare fails to 
answer the question how this welfare is to be distributed. A critique issued against utilitarianism 
by John Rawls pointed to the fact that at its basis it lacked a conception of man as a separate 
person and treated him rather as a part of a bigger whole.
An interesting concept  is  to be found in  the works  of  David Hume.  His  is  a  sort  of 
combination of conventionalist and utilitarian approaches. Justice is specified as 'artificial virtue' 
which contributes to “utility not directly (as an act of benevolence would) but indirectly qua 
adherence to an institution that was on the whole beneficial. Hume's examples were respect for  
property, chastity (in women), allegiance to the government and promise-keeping. For Hume, 
then, justice was a convention – but it made sense to ask what good was served by following  
it”224.
Another  attempt  at  a  definition  of  the  principle  of  justice  is  formulated  in  terms  of 
practical rules and based on individualistic conception of human. This theory known as justice as 
mutual advantage assumes that “each person has a conception of their own good” and postulates 
that justice be thus understood as an agreement giving “everyone the best chance of achieving 
their  good  that  they  can  reasonably  expect,  given  that  others  are  simultaneously  trying  to  
223 Otfried Höffe, Gerechtigkeit, Verlag C.H. Beck, München, 2001ö p. 40.
224 Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, gen. ed. Edward Craig, Routledge, London and New York, 1998; vol. 5, 
p. 143.
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achieve their  (different)  good”225.  In  this  view the rules  at  the  foundation  of  justice  are  not 
unchangeable and bear a rather strong resemblance to truces – for the lack of other principles of 
agreement  they are  based  on  'relative  bargaining  strengths  of  cooperators'.  Thus  one  of  the 
fundamental  problems of  this  theory is  that  its  conception  of  justice  cannot  prove stable  in 
practice.
The idea formulated by John Rawls has a similar starting point to this conception. His 
theory  of  justice  as  fairness  has  as  strong  notion  of  distributive  justice  which  is  basically 
criticised  and  rejected  by  Hayek.  Therefore  I  will  deal  with  Rawlsian  conception  more 
extensively later on. Now let me address a distinction fundamental for systematics of justice, 
namely the distinction between formal and substantive justice.
4.2. Formal and substantive justice
The principle of formal justice requires that all should be treated equally under equal 
circumstances. No difference in the exercise of law on the grounds of sex, religion, ethnicity of 
economic status is permissible. This principle thus requires application of general rules with the 
purpose of achieving universality and impartiality of treatment. The principle of formal justice is 
in itself formal because it leaves the content of the rules undefined. It is what makes it so widely 
acceptable and universally coherent with many theories of justice. Formal justice is however 
only the necessary condition of justice in general, but it is not sufficient. It allows any norms of 
action as long as they are applied universally, yet these norms could be unjust themselves. This 
deficiency is corrected with introduction of substantive justice and specific norms although the 
universal acceptability is being lost in course.
A way of overcoming this particular problem is by dividing the whole sphere of human 
actions into smaller categories and searching for principles of substantive justice corresponding 
to them. Peter Koller suggests following four forms of social action and appropriate types of 
justice related to them. 1) Trade relations require a principle of commutative justice that implies 
property  rights  and  voluntary  participation  in  exchange.  A commonly  accepted  principle  of 
justice for this domain states that an exchange is just when objects or services in question have 
an  equivalent  value.  This  however  assumes  that  those  things  have  an  objective  or  at  least 
universally recognized values. Traditionally this value was calculated on the basis of labour time 
involved  in  the  production.  Nowadays  the  principle  of  commutative  justice  has  a  more 
225 Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, gen. ed. Edward Craig, Routledge, London and New York, 1998; vol. 5, 
p. 144.
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procedural approach based on fair circumstances of trade – voluntary participations of parties 
having equal rights226. 2) Community and business relations are guided by distributive justice. Its 
norms regulate duties that participants have towards other members as well as the allocation of 
resources and products of their cooperation. A modern approach to distributive justice is based 
on the belief that all people are born as equal and therefore any disproportions of allocation must 
be  justified  by  universally  acceptable  grounds.  Such  generally  acceptable  reasons  may 
encompass specific achievements as well as particular needs. On the whole, this is known as the 
principle of equal treatment of distributive justice. 3) Authority and power relations build the 
third of Koller's suggested categories subjected to the principles of political justice. Interestingly, 
the notions of political power and sovereignty already implies some sort of entitlement – the 
conviction of a majority that a particular person or group has the authority to make binding 
decisions for others. The factuality of political power however does not necessarily implie its 
justice. Political justice requires that the exercise of authority serves the establishment of just and 
universally advantageous social coexistence. 4) Retributive justice accounts for the last form of 
social interactions characterised by violation of rules, encroachment upon rights and liberties of 
others etc. It deals with punishment and making amends whereas the degree and measure of both 
has  to  be  proportionate  to  severity  of  violation.  Clearly,  human  interactions  being  highly 
complex require that all those principles of justice are treated as complementary and mutually 
conditional. For the purpose of this work distributive justice will be most relevant because Hayek 
is  strongly concerned with  it  as  conflicting  with  formal  justice.  In  short  his  argument  is  as 
follows: Formal justice requires equal treatment of all people in spite of all differences that may 
occur between them. Equal treatment of different people will necessarily bring about different 
results – for example, some will earn more money and achieve better positions than others. This, 
in  turn,  will  result  in  economic  inequality.  Distributive  justice  on  the  other  hand  regards 
economic inequality as wrong. Its principle thus will require redistribution of goods based on 
some  kind  of  a  pattern  (according  to  needs,  according  to  merits  etc.).  Yet  no  patterned 
distribution can be compatible with the principle of formal justice. The pattern means that people 
are  regarded  through  a  prism of  some particular  characteristic  and  not  irrespectively  of  all 
features, as required by formal justice.
226 See Peter Koller, Theorie des Rechts, Boehlau Verlag, Wien, Koeln, Weimar, 1992; p. 288. The requirements of 
the procedural principle of commutative justice are entirely fulfilled only in an ideal market order. The condition 
of their fulfilment is however, that there is a sufficient number of suppliers and providers (so that no one is able 
to dictate prices authoritatively). It means also that no participant of exchange under such circumstances is 
entitled to question its results. 
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4.3. Social justice
Peter Koller  maintains that  “social justice indicates all  claims of justice that refer to  
institutional orders and basic social relations”227. This means that, strictly speaking, the notion of 
social justice spans all four discussed types of substantive justice. However, in general use social 
justice refers primarily to the principles of distributive justice applied to public institutions and 
social arrangements. Thus the principle of social justice can be formulated as a claim that all 
members of a society have the same share of social goods as well as burdens as long as there are 
no generally acceptable grounds to justify another distribution.  This principle refers to those 
goods and burdens that come as a result of collective efforts of the whole society. Koller believes 
that these can be systematized in three groups. 1) General rights and duties that all people are 
vested with independently from any particular circumstances belong to the first group. In this 
case there can be no grounds to justify distribution other than equally because it would contradict 
the principle of equal rights. 2) Political rights and individual liberties, belonging to the second 
category,  give people the possibility to arrange their  lives  according to  their  own plans  and 
wishes and to take part in the collective decision making. These rights can be limited only in 
exceptional cases such as immaturity or mental illness. 3) As concerns the third category, that of 
economic goods, it is regulated by particular rights of ownership. These particular rights however 
have to be based on general rights of equality maintains Koller. The economic goods are social as 
far as they are a result of social cooperation. Apart from that, the work invested by particular 
individuals gives them a privileged right of ownership. Yet even those goods do not cease to be 
social is some sense because their generation required use of natural resources as well as skills 
and knowledge being part of the legacy of the whole community. For example, a writer draws 
inspiration and knowledge from  works of previous artists and in this sense it could be said that 
they  contribute  to  the  production  of  his  book.  However,  such  influences  are  practically 
impossible to determine in any conclusive manner and therefore have no impact on rights of 
ownership.  Furthermore,  growing  complexity  of  work  and therefore  specialisation  results  in 
overlapping of particular economic activities making a strict partition of inputs impossible.
There are several generally acceptable grounds justifying disproportion in distribution of 
economic goods. Koller writes that special achievements and merits as well as specific needs (for 
example resulting from handicap) are among such reasons228. Another possible justification was 
formulated  by  Rawls  in  his  aforementioned  famous  Difference  Principle  which  says  that 
227 Peter Koller, Theorie des Rechts, Boehlau Verlag, Wien, Koeln, Weimar, 1992; p. 293. My translation.
228 Peter Koller, Theorie des Rechts, Boehlau Verlag, Wien, Koeln, Weimar, 1992; p. 294.
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inequalities in distribution of goods are permitted only if they are to the benefit of the worst-off 
members of the society.
A crucial fact about social justice is that it does not demand equal results. The first reason 
for this is that whatever the opportunities are, one can squander them on one's own hook. Many 
inequalities are results of peoples' own decisions and actions. For these differences there can be 
no compensation expected from the rest of the community. Further inequalities stem from their 
differences in talent,  diligence and other such accidental  characteristics and in this  case it  is 
questionable whether the society has the duty of compensation. Rather, it seems reasonable that 
society should provide its members with equal opportunities but not carry the responsibility for 
their outcomes.
In the second volume of  Law, Legislation and Liberty  Hayek formulates a very crucial 
methodological argument against  the notion of social  justice because he believes that  it  is  a 
fundamentally ambiguous term.  He argues  that  it  is  one of  those  notions  that  gains  sudden 
popularity but lack a true meaning. The evasiveness of social justice is, according to Hayek, due 
to an erroneous belief that underlies it.
“Social justice (or sometimes 'economic' justice) came to be regarded as an attribute which the  
'actions'  of society, or the 'treatment'  of individuals and groups by society, ought to possess. As  
primitive  thinking  usually  does  when  first  noticing  some  regular  processes,  the  results  of  the  
spontaneous ordering of the market were interpreted as if some thinking being deliberately directed  
them, or as if the particular benefits or harm different persons derived from them were determined 
by deliberate acts of will, and could therefore be guided by moral rules.”229 
In this way Hayek argues that the concept of social justice is an anthropomorphism and a result 
of the “immaturity of our minds”. The error of personification of a social collective makes the 
whole idea practically inapplicable.  “The demand for 'social  justice'  is  addressed not  to  the  
individual but to society” Hayek explains. The problem, however, is that “society, in the strict  
sense in which it must be distinguished from the apparatus of government, is incapable of acting  
for a specific purpose”230. Hayek therefore insists that the distribution of wealth could be called 
just or unjust only if it was a result of a deliberate allocation mandated by particular person or a 
group of people. This however isnot the case. In his view the distribution of wealth is an outcome 
of an impersonal, spontaneous and unforeseeable process and as such cannot be subject to moral 
229 Friedrich August von Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 2, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
and London, 1976; p. 62.
230 Friedrich August von Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 2, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
and London, 1976; p. 64.
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evaluation.
4.4. Justice as fairness
Justice as fairness has a similar starting point as the conception of justice as a mutual 
advantage.  It  recognizes  that  different  people  have  different  value  hierarchies  and  pursue 
different goals and that the principle of justice needs to be universal enough as to accommodate 
those differences. It also recognizes that all people have core inviolable rights that cannot be 
overruled in the name of the welfare of the society. Basic notions that this theory works with are 
the 'initial equal claim to consideration' and 'a fair set of opportunities to pursue their idea of the 
good life'. It is, however, developed in fairly different directions by different philosophers. An 
example  of  two  essentially  distinct  theories  are  Robert  Nozick's  entitlement  theory  and  the 
conception  of  John  Rawls.  Nozick  draws  on  Lockeian  tradition  and  assumes  that  things 
originally in their natural state are ownerless and that it is the work of man that gives origin to 
ownership rights. These are for Nozick undeniable and absolute and therefore any interference 
with them is against justice. Any redistribution in order to be just has to be based on voluntary 
transfers. He does not accept any other justification of redistribution. Nozick and other advocates 
of libertarianism
“rarely see the market as a means to some desired pattern, since the principle(s) they advocate do  
not ostensibly propose a ‘pattern’ at all, but instead describe the sorts of acquisitions or exchanges 
which are themselves just. The market will be just, not as a means to some pattern, but insofar as the  
exchanges  permitted  in  the  market  satisfy  the  conditions  of  just  exchange  described  by  the 
principles.  For Libertarians,  just  outcomes are  those arrived  at  by the separate  just  actions  of  
individuals; a particular distributive pattern is not required for justice.”231
Rawls, on the other hand, emphasises the importance of equality in the original position. This 
means that all individuals require not only equal rights but also equal opportunities. The famous 
difference principle states that the only justification for unequal treatment is when it is to the 
benefit of the least advantaged.
Rawls' theory being possibly the most influential 20th century theory of justice calls for a 
more detailed elaboration, yet I am not able here to indicate more than is necessary how his 
position is different to this of Hayek. Rawls takes up the notion of justice as a subject of rational 
deliberation and starts his discussion with rational choice. He does so by asking the question 
231 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-distributive/
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“What terms of cooperation would free and equal citizens agree to under fair conditions?”232 The 
fair conditions under which his rational agents deliberate are very specific circumstances of the 
'original position' which are designed to assure that they come up with non-egoistic principles of 
justice. A 'veil of ignorance' hides before them any particularities of their condition – age, sex, 
state of health, endowment, education etc. Rawls argues that under such conditions every rational 
person would agree to such principles that would be fair to all in the actual world. He believes 
that those principles will be as follows:
“1) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties,  
which  scheme is  compatible  with  the  same scheme of  liberties  for  all.  2)  Social  and  economic  
inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: a) first they are to be attached to offices and positions  
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and b) second, they are to be to the  
greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society.”233
As Otfried Höffe observes, while the principles 1) and 2a) are generally recognized, 2b) 
known as the difference principle is controversial234. There are also several polemics concerning 
the  assumptions  of  Rawlsian  original  position.  It  can  be  questioned  for  example  how  an 
argument  starting with a counterfactual situation of a thought experiment is supposed to bring 
binding conclusions. Some also reproach that an agreement on principles made by real people, 
who are much more complex than simply rational choice makers, could be very different from 
the two suggested principles235.
Hayek himself was rather cautious of criticising Rawlsian theory openly. He even made 
an attempt at reconciling his theory with that of John Rawls by showing that, in fact, there are no 
fundamental  disagreement between them. He regrets  that  Rawls uses the term 'social  justice' 
which, as explained earlier, is a void notion in Hayek's opinion. Yet he states that he has 
“no basic quarrel with an author who, before he proceeds to that problem, acknowledges that the 
task of selecting specific systems or distributions of desired things as just must be 'abandoned as  
mistaken in principle, and it is, in any case, not capable of a definite answer. Rather, the principles  
of justice define the crucial constraints which institutions and joint activities must satisfy if persons  
232 Stanford Ecyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/
233 John Rawlas, Justice as Fairness, The Belknapp Press of Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachussets, 2001; 
p. 42. The talk of adequate scheme of equal rights is a revision of his formulation appearing  in A Theory of  
Justice, where Rawls took a more egalitarian position and demanded that “each person is to have an equal right  
to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties “. 
234 Otfried Höffe, Gerechtigkeit, Verlag C.H. Beck, München, 2001; p. 67.
235 See  Recht und Moral, Texte zur Rechtsphilosophie, Hg. Von Norbert Hoerster, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 
München; p. 127.
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engaging in them are to have no complaints against them. If  these constraints are satisfied, the  
resulting distribution, whatever it is, may be accepted as just'.”236
Despite  this  similarity  in  application  of  justice  to  social  institutions  rather  than  to  social 
collectives  or  spontaneous orders,  there  is  a  fundamental  difference  at  the  very base  of  the 
theories of these two philosophers. Rawls' conception encompasses a principle of distributive 
justice formulated as an equal of claim of all individuals to a fair share of basic goods237. In 
Hayek's  theory there  is  no such  claim.  In  fact,  even  a  claim of  equality of  opportunities  is 
problematic for Hayek because he believes it to be impossible in a free society and conceivable 
only under severe governmental control of the whole human environment238.
4.5. Justice and law
The general purpose of introducing laws is providing justice. The modus operandi of law 
is through general and abstractly formulated rules. This requirement guaranties impartiality of 
the law. However, the relation between law and justice is not as unambiguous. For example, by 
not taking into account any particularities and special circumstances, just laws may nonetheless 
lead to unjust outcomes. Thus justice is a concept predominant to law: although their aim is 
justice, being fallible, laws are themselves checked against its principles. In case when law is to 
bring  about  an unjust  result  (though being  just  in  itself)  the  principle  of  equity  “justifies  a  
departure  from the  strict  letter  of  the  legal  rule,  and a  resort  to  its  animating  purpose  or 
intention, in order to secure justice. Equity thus mediates between positive law and justice by  
importing an element of flexibility and context-sensitivity into legal adjudication”239. Apart from 
rectifying law where its generality proves problematic, the principle of equity also enables such 
differentiations as the one between crime and error.
English common law is a significant example of how the notion of equity was applied in 
practical  enforcement  of  law.  Between  the  fifteenth  and  nineteenth  century  there  existed  in 
England so called Courts of Chancery that dealt with cases where justice could not be achieved 
by simple application of laws. The Aristotelian tradition of equity also appears in contemporary 
236 Friedrich August von Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 2, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
and London, 1976; p. 100; included a quotation from John Rawls, Constitutional Liberty and the Concept of  
Justice.
237 See See Herlinde Pauer-Studer, Autonom leben, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 2000; p. 159.
238 See Friedrich August von Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 2, The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago and London, 1976; p. 84.
239 Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, gen. ed. Edward Craig, Routledge, London and New York, 1998; vol. 5, 
p. 149.
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philosophy among others in feminist  theories that emphasise discretion in legal reasoning.  A 
similar approach is represented by Martha Nussbaum who advocates a sympathetic appraisal of 
action  “in  relation  to  the  motives  and intentions  that  animate  them as  well  as  the  broader  
personal and social context in which they occur”240.
The idea of equity, however, appears problematic when contrasted with the ideal of the 
Rule of Law because it does not fulfil the requirement of legality. Also, abandoning general rules 
creates a situation where people are not able to plan their actions based on their predictable legal 
conditions.  In  other  words,  equity in  legal  practices  unavoidably brings  forth  an  element  of 
arbitrariness. The conflict appears to be “between 'formal' legal justice (which may be expressed 
in  the injunction to  'treat  like  cases  alike',  where the criterion of  likeness  is  determined by 
features pocked out in advance by general legal rules) and 'substantive' justice in the particular 
case,  which  is  the  concern  of  equity”241.  It  seems  however,  that  in  practice  some  sort  of 
compromise between legality and equity is inevitable and indeed expedient, although giving this 
compromise institutional form may pose a serious problem.
4.6. Rule of Law
In short Rule of Law means general submission to laws. It is an essential conception of 
liberal philosophy which claims that all political agents and institutions are limited by law. Rule 
of Law emphasises the supremacy of legal obligation over discretionary judgements and policy 
objectives. The stress on fairness in the administration of laws makes it an essential precondition 
of  justice  and  the  emphasis  on  generality  of  laws  provides  citizens  with  protection  against 
arbitrary  treatment.  Some  philosophers  argue  moreover  that  the  Rule  of  Law  additionally 
requires what they call 'inner morality of Law'242. This means that the content of laws has to be 
publicly known and that particular laws have to be coherent with each other. The requirement of 
legality is not fulfilled if what the laws require is impossible.
Rule of Law is based on the principle of formal justice which means that all citizens are 
equal  before  the  law.  This  principle  embraces  two  basic  ideas:  1)  that  no  one  can  be 
discriminated or treated arbitrarily, and 2) that law has to be exercised in a fair, uniform and 
impartial  way.  These  features  are  what  is  necessary  for  a  political  system to  be  legitimate. 
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Without recognition “that individuals will obey the state not because they are coerced to do so or  
because they perceive it as  in their interest, but because they regard the state as legitimate”243 
there can be no state whose citizens could be called free.
As additional to those general characteristics of the Rule of Law Hayek also emphasises 
its predictability. Law cannot be subjected to constant changes which would make it impossible 
to oversee and follow it. The ability to predict what kind of legal outcome one's activity will 
bring is a necessary precondition of any state based on the Rule of Law and governed in a 
legitimate way. It is so important for Hayek because it enables individuals to make economic 
decisions based on their knowledge of law and circumstances. If they did not have the certainty 
concerning the legality of their actions, they would not be able to undertake any enterprise. It has 
to be made clear, however, that the predictability does not mean that one can foretell beforehand 
who will be affected by law in what way but only what kind of action will bring what legal 
results. This is the demand of impartiality:
„That it is impossible to foretell who will be the lucky ones or whom disaster will strike, that rewards  
and penalties are not shared out according to somebody's views about the merits or demerits of  
different people but depend on their capacity and their luck, is as important as that, in framing legal  
rules we should not be able to predict which particular person will gain and which will lose by their  
application.“244
The fact that the Rule of Law is, as mentioned earlier, based on the principle of formal 
justice means for Hayek that it poses a “limitation upon all legislation”. This means that Rule of 
Law is paramount to any laws passed by a legislator or, as Hayek formulates it, it is a meta-legal 
doctrine245. As such it is a limitation upon government that has as its purpose the protection of 
individual liberty. Hayek argues that a government bound by the Rule of Law cannot achieve any 
particular goals, such as determining material position of particular people.
“If  the  government is  to  determine how particular people  ought to  be situated,  it  must  be in  a  
position to determine also the direction of individual efforts. [...] The restrictions which the rule of  
law imposes upon government thus preclude all those measures which would be necessary to insure 
that individuals  will be rewarded according to another's conception of merit or desert rather than  
243 Andrew Gamble, Hayek. The Iron Cage of Liberty, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1996, p. 142.
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according to the value that their services have for their fellows.”246
It is for this reason that Hayek believes that the meta-legal ideal of the Rule of Law rules out the 
possibility of governmental pursuit of distributive justice. An institution that is bound by the 
Rule of Law, and thus has to treat all its subjects equally, cannot introduce any laws that would 
redistribute wealth by taking it from some and giving it to others. Progressive taxes are precisely 
such a way of allocation of wealth and therefore Hayek strongly objects against them.
4.7. The basis of Hayek's position
The question of justice is a strictly social concept in that it describes relations between 
men and arrangements of institutions. Therefore, before addressing it, a clarification concerning 
Hayek's views on individual and society is necessary. There are basically two positions in regard 
to their dependence – individualism and collectivism. As these were addressed in more detail in 
the second chapter, here I will only revisit their basic claims in short. Individualism states that 
collectives are not proper entities but only theoretic constructs and that they are secondary in 
regard  to  autonomous  individuals.  Communities  evolve  with  the  purpose  of  advancing 
cooperation and their welfare cannot take priority over the interests and rights of its particular 
members. This is the position defended by Hayek. He rejects the second, collectivist view which 
holds communities as essentially constitutional to its members in the sense that belonging to a 
community influences the constitutive features of its member individuals. Also, the collectivist 
approach puts the interests  of the community over those of its  individuals and in this  sense 
endorses subordination of an individual to the group it belongs to.
Hayek  recognises,  similarly  to  Rawls  and  Nozick,  that  individuals  differ  in  their 
particular hierarchies of values and that that they are free to pursue different goals, each to his 
choice. Therefore he advocates a theory of justice that is general and wide enough as to be able 
to  accommodate  all  those  differences  and  to  be  compatible  with  the  value  pluralism 
characterising liberal philosophies. His emphasis on formal justice as befitting liberal societies 
results from the interrelation of other two ideals of liberalism: the ideal of personal freedom and 
individualism.  The requirement  of  neutrality  of  a  principle  of  justice  is  moreover  rooted  in 
Hayek's anti-rationalistic approach which claims that values cannot be conclusively determined 
by reason but that they continuously and spontaneously evolve together with the rest of man's 
246 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge Classics, London & New York, 2006; p. 
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civilisation. 
4.8. Against distributive justice
In this section I will introduce Hayek's general reproach against the idea of distributive 
justice as threatening to freedom. The two following sections will be dedicated to his discussion 
and rejection of two possible criteria of distributive justice.  Subsequently I will  elaborate on 
Hayek's argument that distributive justice is irreconcilable with the formal justice.
Basically, Hayek's rejection of any form of state introduced distributive justice is based 
on the fact that he embraces only the idea of equality with respect to the execution of law. There 
is however, says Hoerster, a similarly important ideal of equality with respect to the formulation 
of law. This is the moment that requires some perspective on specific characteristics of men and 
their particular situations. As an example Hoerster brings the case of inheritance law. He asks 
how can it possibly be considered without some notion of distribution and distributive justice. 
Yet Hayek, as will be shown later on, deals with the question of inheritance rather in terms of 
personal freedom of those who wish to leave their children a bequest, rather than in terms of 
distributive justice. Individual freedom always has precedence in his philosophy.
Therefore the reason why Hayek endorses equality only as an equality before the law is 
that he believes that it is also an instrument of preservation of freedom. In his opinion no other 
postulate of freedom can be secured “without destroying liberty” because liberty itself produces 
inequality.  His  argument  states  basically  that  the  actual  differences  among  people  are  no 
justification for a government to treat them differently. On the contrary, the diversity of people is 
understood as a  ground for  equal  treatment.  Hayek also believes  “if  the result  of  individual  
liberty did not demonstrate that some manners of living are more successful than others, much of  
the case for it would vanish”247. It is the Rule of Law that allows people to pursue their different 
ways of life. If it were the object of a government to assure equal positions to all its citizens it 
would have to treat them differently. Hayek rejects theories that derive formal equality from the 
assumption of factual equality of all men. “It is of the essence of the demand for equality before  
the law that people should be treated alike in spite of the fact that they are different”248.
An argument against introducing the principle of distributive justice is that it is dangerous 
to freedom and other ideals of liberalism because of its comprehensive character. Hayek fears 
that  once  introduced  “it  would  not  be  fulfilled  until  the  whole  society  was  organized  in  
247Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge, London and New York, 2006; p. 75.
248Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge, London and New York, 2006; p. 76.
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accordance with it”249. There would be hardly any sphere left for the individuals to exercise their 
judgement and freedom. The government authority would stretch nearly limitless. The principle 
of distributive justice is in Hayek's opinion just as comprehensive in the extensive meaning, as 
well as in the intensive meaning. By the extensive comprehensiveness I mean that the control 
would have to be extended over all spheres of life, whereas the intensive comprehensiveness 
means  that  each  of  these  spheres  would  have  to  be  controlled  practically  in  a  total  way. 
Furthermore, Hayek also believes, that once it is agreed that all members of a nation have a 
claim to this nation's wealth, there is no reason why members of other nations should not have 
the same claim to the wealth of the whole world.
“There are good reasons why we should endeavour to use whatever political organization we have at  
our disposal to make provision for the weak or infirm or for the victims of unforeseeable disaster.  
[...] It is an entirely different matter, however, to suggest that those who are poor, merely in the sense 
that there are those in the same community who are richer, are entitled to a share in the wealth of the 
latter”250.
Hayek does  not  specify what  kind of  reasons there are  to  support  the poorer  and weaker.  I 
suppose that one of those reasons may follow from the asymmetry that characterises individuals 
or groups of very different economic position when confronted on the market. In this regard the 
current discussion on the problem of how prosperous industrial nations exploit the global poor 
can serve as a good demonstration. Indisputably there exists a strong asymmetry of bargaining 
powers that characterises any trade between giant and prosperous economies, like for example 
the USA, and economies of the developing nations. In my opinion this asymmetry would make 
up  for  a  good  reason  for  such  political  arrangements  that  would  provide  at  least  better 
opportunities for the weaker party in these bargains.
4.9. Equality as criterion of distributive justice
Hayek presents two main arguments against regarding equality of men as a criterion of 
distributive justice. First of all he argues that it is an unacceptable violation of personal freedom 
and  secondly  he  shows  that  it  is  based  on  an  inconsequent  distinction  between  inborn  and 
conditional  differences251.  Hayek  indeed  believes  that  the  biggest  difference  between  the 
249Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge, London and New York, 2006; p. 88.
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inequalities being the result of 'nature' and those being the result of 'nurture' is that the former 
“are due to circumstances clearly beyond human control, while the latter are due to factors  
which we might be able to alter”252. There are two questions that need answering in this regard. 
The  first  one is  whether  it  is  really  of  advantage  to  abolish  differences  stemming from the 
environment.  The  second question  is,  does  it  meant  that,  if  one  person has  some particular 
advantage, another is deprived of it. Do all “unfulfilled desires have a claim on the community”,  
Hayek  asks.  If  the  answers  to  those  questions  were  positive,  then  the  idea  of  individual 
responsibility would loose its meaning. In this regard Hayek brings the example of an approach 
to the institution of family and he argues its inconsequence. On the one hand, he says, we tend to 
see family as a great value and esteem the role it plays for its members as well as a core unit of 
society. On the other hand however, when it comes to differences in material and intellectual 
backgrounds provided by family, it is often subjected to fierce critiques. Hayek argues that if we 
recognize the role of family as transmitting morals, traditions and knowledge, we cannot object 
to the transmission of material property because the “continuity of standards, of the external  
forms  of  life”  is  essential253.  There  is  also  a  pragmatic  argument  in  favour  of  inheritance. 
Assuming that it is a natural instinct of the parents to provide what is best for their children, it is 
only sensible to allow them to do this by means of bequest. The alternative would be for example 
“placing them in positions which might bring them the income and the prestige that a fortune  
would have done; and this would cause a waste of resources and an injustice much greater than  
is caused by the inheritance of property”254.
There is a further significant argument against the ideal of equality as a basis for the 
requirement  of  distributive  justice  which  I  find  important.  It  has  been  delivered  by  Harry 
Frankfurt in an article Equality as a Moral Ideal and I think it fits well with Hayek's philosophy. 
Frankfurt,  like Hayek,  recognises  the potential  harm of  the ideal  of  equality to  the  ideal  of 
freedom. He also writes that it is a mistake to consider economic equality as a moral value itself. 
In his opinion it is not morally relevant what differences there are between economic positions of 
different people. “What is important from the moral point of view is not that everyone should  
have the same but that each should have enough”255. Thus the sufficiency principle, as it may be 
called,  states  that  in  order  for  a  society to  be justly arranged all  its  members  have  to  have 
sufficient means necessary to lead a good life. It is not however the aim of this arrangement that 
all have an equal share in welfare. According to this conception there is no need or justification 
252 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge, London and New York, 2006; p. 78.
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for a constant effort to improve the material situation of the worst-off. On the contrary, it simply 
demands that a certain threshold is reached in case of all people256. The comparison of wealth has 
its application only from the point of view of economic and social competition. If, however, this 
comparison starts to play a substantial role in people's lives, it results in their alienation from 
truly important needs and goals. I believe that Hayek would basically agree with the sufficiency 
principle  proposed  by  Frankfurt,  although  he  might  add  to  it  a  further  condition.  Hayek 
maintained namely that the state should provide a “uniform minimum”, but only to those citizens 
“who are unable to maintain themselves”257.
4.10. Merit as criterion of distributive justice
Hayek  also  objects  adopting  merit  as  a  criterion  of  distributive  justice,  if  merit  is 
understood as  an “attribute  of  conduct  that  makes  it  deserving of  praise,  that  is,  the  moral 
character of the action”258. First and foremost merit is not a quality that can be measured in any 
objective  way.  As  opposed  to  unmeasurable  merit,  value  is  something  that  can  be  easily 
established through market processes. Moreover, Hayek believes that value and merit  do not 
necessarily depend on one another. Out of these two possible criteria for distribution of wealth 
Hayek thinks it is the “value which a person's capacities or services have for us and for which  
he is recompensed” which is the appropriate criterion. He argues that it is “desirable that people 
should  enjoy  advantages  in  proportion  to  the  benefits  which  their  fellows  derive  from their  
activities [rather than] the distribution of these advantages should be based on other men's views  
of  their  merits”259.  We  would  certainly  find  it  unjust  if  two  same  services  were  rewarded 
differently on the basis of someone's judgement of merit involved.
The case against merit is primarily pragmatic: there is no way of objective assessment of 
merit. It cannot be measured in regard to the outcome because this can be purely accidental. 
Outcome ruled out,  one would have to find a way of measuring subjective effort but this is 
obviously impossible, Hayek argues, without the knowledge of some very specific circumstances 
of each particular individual. And it is precisely for the reason that no one else is in possession of 
this  specific  knowledge  that  people  are  better-off  acting  upon  their  own  decisions  and  not 
submitted to bigger plan.
 A further  problem to  be taken under  consideration in  this  context  is  the reward for 
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pursuing uncertain and risky goals. In areas of research, exploration, invention and speculation, 
where the outcome is particularly uncertain, merit simply cannot serve as the criterion for prize. 
“For the same reason that nobody can know beforehand who will be the successful ones, nobody  
can say who has earned greater merit”260. It is only the fact that the remuneration one receives 
for one's risks matches what other judge to be its value for them that one is able to decide in the 
first place weather a goal is worth pursuing or not.
4.11. Formal justice versus distributive justice
Hayek is convinced that the ideals of formal and distributive justice are opposite in the 
sense that they mutually exclude each other. “From the fact that people are very different” writes 
Hayek “it  follows that, if  we treat them equally, the result must be inequality in their actual  
position,  and that  the only  way to  place them in  an equal  position  would be to  treat  them  
differently”261. Freedom – the highest ideal in Hayek's eyes – demands equality before the law 
and therefore it is the formal justice that has to be given precedence over distributive justice. 
Material equality of all citizens could be achieved only be means of coercion on the side of 
government. But the liberal perspective cannot accept the egalitarian demands as justification for 
limitation of freedom.
It is not equality as such that is objected by Hayek. He does not argue that a more even 
distribution of wealth is not desirable. It is his view, however, that it cannot be realised without 
the imposition of some sort of patterned system of distribution of goods. “But if we wish to  
preserve a free society, is is essential that we recognize that the desirability of a particular object  
is not sufficient justification for the use of coercion”262. An even distribution of wealth can well 
be a part of political effort as long as it does not dominate it and overthrow the Rule of Law. The 
demand of distributive justice requires not simply a just exercise of governmental powers but it 
also requires that the government has additional powers to those acceptable in a liberal state.
“When the choice is [...]  between a genuine market order, which does not and cannot achieve a  
distribution corresponding to any standard of material justice, and a system in which government  
uses its power to put some such standard into effect, the question is not whether government ought to  
exercise, justly or unjustly, powers it  must exercise in any case, but whether government should  
possess and exercise additional powers which can be used to determine the shares of the different  
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members of society.”263
However, the problem with those new powers is, according to Hayek, that they would have to be 
in  conflict  with the  rules  of  conduct  which  the  principle  of  formal  justice  demands  from a 
government.  “Since  people  will  differ  in  many attributes  which  government  cannot  alter,  to  
secure  for  them the  same material  position  would  require  that  government  treat  them very 
differently”, Hayek insists.
Apart from this obvious contradiction between formal and distributive justice, there is 
another reason why these two principles are not compatible. Hayek's argument is as follows. 
Once individual's reward does not reflect the value of his work for the others (as is the case in a 
free  market),  but  is  arbitrarily  determined  and  equal  to  the  reward  of  all  other  people,  the 
individual has no guidance as to what kind of enterprise to undertake. With no guidance and 
signals from the market he cannot decide what to do. Therefore he would require someone else to 
tell him this authoritatively. Every single individual would need to be directed in such a manner 
and in result a central planning board would be required to coordinate these decisions. “A central  
planning office would, however, have to decide on the tasks to be allotted to the different groups 
of individuals wholly on the grounds of expediency or efficiency”264.  Hayek's point is therefore 
that the needs of efficiency would overrule requirements of justice if economy was subjected to 
central planning. And this indeed proved to be true in countries of the Eastern Block. Although 
most  citizens  had  equal  earnings,  some had  to  work  extremely  hard  while  others  occupied 
redundant positions requiring no effort or commitment.
Hayek believes that some form of substantial injustice is inevitable in a society consisting 
of heterogeneous individuals. He is however convinced that it is infinitely better to be submitted 
to a kind of inequality that arises from the “interactions of individual skills in an impersonal 
process” than to a kind that results from the “uncontradictable decision of authority”265.
4.12. Justice on the market
Is  there  anything  like  a  just  price  of  a  commodity?  Manfred  Pirsching  in  his  article 
Gerechte Ungerechtigkeiten notices that for Hayek the notion of justice has no application in the 
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reality of a free market. He brings an example of a small grocery store that is put out of business 
by a new superstore opened around the corner. In fact there is no one to blame for the grocery 
store owner's misfortune. Neither the owner of the superstore can be blamed for supplying goods 
with lower prices, nor the customers can be blamed for choosing to buy them266.
The specific of dealings on the free market is that they are neither just nor unjust because 
no patterned distribution takes place.  The performance of the market is a result  of a mutual 
consent between the parties who are not accountable to anyone else. There is no one making 
binding decisions for others267. This concerns the question of remuneration as well. Although it is 
a common belief that a reward higher than deserved is unjust, Hayek argues that it is not possible 
to defend this view because it is based on a false assumption.
“It presumes that we are able to judge in every individual instance how well people use the different  
opportunities and talents given to them and how meritorious their achievements are in the light of all  
the circumstances which have made them possible. It presumes that some human beings are in a  
position to determine conclusively what a person is worth and are entitled to determine what he may  
achieve.”268
Such  presuppositions  are  unacceptable  for  Hayek  on  the  grounds  of  his  epistemological 
conception. Moreover he cannot accept a society that would be based on the correspondence of 
remuneration to judgements of merit and desert because it would be fundamentally contradictory 
to the ideal of freedom. He believes that it would create a situation where a single hierarchy of 
merits, and thus a single morality, was coerced upon the whole society. Yet, because nobody has 
knowledge of circumstances of others' actions comprehensive enough to be able to guide them 
effectively, it follows that also no one is “competent to reward all efforts according to merit”.
Although  no  judgements  concerning  distributive  justice  can  be  issued  form  the 
perspective of a free market, it does not mean that other judgements, for example concerning 
usefulness or desirability cannot either. For instance, Hayek argues that gains of one member of a 
community must always be regarded as a benefit of the whole community. This may not come 
uncontested  and  in  fact  “it  is  true  that  particular  people  may be  worse  off  because  of  the  
superior ability of some new competitor in their field; but any such additional ability in the  
community is  likely to benefit  the majority”269.  This kind of argumentation is  probably what 
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provoked Hoerster to criticize Hayek for leaning towards utilitarianism270.
What way is there to make sure that the market order and its outcomes are just? The only 
acceptable way from the liberal point of view is a procedural one. It is the methods and rules of 
conduct of the market that can be subject to the scrutiny of justice. Hayek adopts those rules 
from David Hume: “stability of possession; its transference by consent, and the fulfilment of  
promises.  He  retitles  them  freedom  of  contract,  inviolability  of  property,  and  the  duty  to  
compensate another for damage. So long as these are maintained, the outcomes of the market  
order will be just.”271 Thus the justice that liberalism advocates for the free market is not any 
kind of patterned distributive justice but rather commutative justice – justice of contracts and 
exchange.
4.13. Redistribution and taxation
To conclude the chapter on justice I would like to address a practical question that often 
comes up in actual political discussions nowadays – the question of progressive taxes. First of all 
it has to be stated clearly that Hayek does recognise the need of taxation in general and that he 
does not share the view of libertarian philosophers like Nozick, who argue that taxes are a means 
of enslavement and that if their purpose is providing welfare they are indeed equal to theft. On 
the contrary,  Hayek understands that  there are  services that,  though essential  and desired by 
people,  cannot  be  provided  by private  enterprise  simply due  to  the  fact  that  they would  be 
unprofitable. For the sake of such services it is desirable that the government taxes the citizens 
and with the gathered means provides those services.
Hayek  is  however  strongly  opposed  to  the  idea  of  progressive  taxation  because  he 
believes it to be a method of unjustified redistribution. He is convinced that the only acceptable 
mode of taxation is a one ruled by the principle of proportionality.
“Unlike proportionality, progression provides no principle which tells us what the relative burden of 
different  persons  ought  to  be.  It  is  no  more  than  a  rejection  of  proportionality  in  favour  of  a  
discrimination  against  the  wealthy  without  any  criterion  for  limiting  the  extent  of  this  
discrimination.”272
Thus he rejects the proposition of progressive taxes primarily on the ground that it cannot serve 
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as a just and clear principle for determination of actual amount of money that a person should 
pay. Progression is not a just principle and the form it takes is an expression of a “current state  
of opinion shaped by past policy”. Proportionality, on the other hand, “provides a rule which is  
likely  to  be  agreed  upon  by  those  who  will  pay  absolutely  more  and  those  who  will  pay  
absolutely less and which, once adopted, raises no problem of a separate rule applying only to a  
minority”273. A further strong objection against progressive taxation is that it is an arbitrary and 
discriminating procedure. The way by which individuals who are to be taxed at a higher rate are 
chosen is far from being agreeable with the principle of equality before the law. Hayek asks 
whether it is acceptable that a majority determines the amount of taxation and then lays most of 
the burden on a minority. The author believes that it is an example of an abuse of democratic 
procedures  and an  unjustified  discrimination  of  a  minority  group.  It  discriminates  particular 
individuals  by “introducing  a distinction  which  aims at  shifting  the  burden from those  who 
determine the rates onto others”274.
Hayek argues furthermore that progressive taxes offend not only the principle of formal 
justice but also the principle of economic justice which could be formulated as  'equal pay for  
equal  work'.  He  explains  his  point  with  the  example  of  two  lawyers  who,  among  other 
assignments, provide the same service. In this example one of the lawyers takes many jobs and, 
as  a  result,  earns  a  lot  of  money  in  the  course  of  the  year.  The  other  lawyer  takes  fewer 
assignments, earns less and does not reach the threshold over which he would have to pay higher 
taxes.
“If what each of two lawyers will be allowed to retain from his fees for conducting exactly the 
same kind of case as the other depends on his other earnings during the year – they will, in fact,  
often derive very different gains from similar efforts. A man who has worked very hard, or for  
some reason is in greater demand, may receive a much smaller reward for further effort than one 
who has been idle or less lucky. Indeed, the more the consumers value a man's service, the less  
worthwhile will it be for him to exert himself further.”275
Hayek believes that such an outcome contradicts our fundamental convictions concerning justice 
of remuneration as well as the principle of formal justice. Additionally it sends a signal that hard 
work  and  diligence  are  not  worthwhile.  This  has  disastrous  results  for  the  spirit  of 
entrepreneurship and for the whole economy.
273 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge, London and New York, 2006; p. 273.
274 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge, London and New York, 2006; p. 273.
275 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge, London and New York, 2006; p. 273.
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5. CONCLUSION
The three ideals that constitute the basis of liberalism as advocated by Hayek converge 
and impliy each other. The principle of individualism demands respect for people in their whole 
variety and with all their differences and particularities. Therefore it necessitates rule of law and 
formal justice because “the ideal of equality of the law is aimed at equally improving the chances  
of yet unknown people”. The rule of law and formal justice in turn “provide the most effective 
protection against infringement of individual liberty”276. But apart from this internal coherence I 
believe that Hayek's philosophy is also characterised by a certain continuity and consistency in 
the sense that the same ideals underlie his political conceptions as well as his economic analysis 
and that these are logically supported by his epistemological convictions.
In this last section of my thesis I would like to restate some of the most important ideas of 
Hayek's  philosophy and show how they all  were developed with the purpose of arguing the 
superiority of  liberalism over  socialism.  This  is  indeed what  Hayek himself  regarded as  his 
mission. In my reading his case against socialism I distinguish two parallel but completing lines 
of argumentation: one that is situated in the field of economy and other that is concerned mainly 
with  ethical  and  sociological  problems.  Although  these  two  discourses  are  simultaneously 
present in Hayek's writing, I find it useful to look at them separately, because then one can see 
clearly the comprehensiveness of his critique of socialism. In the way I interpret his work the 
first line of argumentation (I) is an economic critique of methods applied in the construction of 
socialist society, whereas the second discourse (II) deals mainly with criticism of ethical ends of 
this system. To conclude my thesis I shall outline the most important points of these two courses 
of reasoning.
I. CRITIQUE OF PLANNED ECONOMY
 Hayek prefers to use the French terminus  dirigism rather than the more popular term 
planned economy because planning an economic activity does not have to refer to state 
planning or any other form of central coercion – every individual is bound to plan his life 
and his economic activities accordingly and this kind of planning is for Hayek not only 
positive in its results but it is also indispensable.
 Hayek  compares  economic  methods  used  by  all  kinds  of  collectivisms  with  those 
employed in any state during war periods. It is characteristic for the war time that all the 
effort is subdued to one common end – the victory. It is generally accepted that private 
276 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge, London and New York, 2006; p. 184.
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property can be confiscated  and used for  the  war  effort,  people can be retrained for 
certain tasks and centrally relegated to specified works. All this is possible only because 
the priority of this single end is commonly recognized and accepted. Hayek argues that in 
order to conduct in a similar way (nationalization, central planning, etc.) systems like 
communism or fascism need to formulate a clear end and make sure of its dominance. 
Only if  the  whole  economy has  one precise  aim,  is  it  possible  to  direct  it  with  any 
efficiency.
 An important point in Hayek's critique of centrally planned economy is the inferiority of 
its  efficiency  compared  to  the  free  market.  In  his  opinion  only  the  system  of  free 
competition is able to answer with necessary swiftness to the changes on the market. The 
dynamics of demand and supply can be balanced only in an likely dynamic system, that is 
in one consisting of countless independent agents observing the market (or those parts of 
it that directly concern them) and adjusting their actions. Any centralized system of price 
control is too rigid to answer quickly to the changes.
Hayek also argues that it is mainly thanks to the competition that humanity has achieved 
such  a  level  of  civilisation.  On  the  one  hand  competition  stimulates  creativity  and 
rewards  invention,  and  on  the  other  hand  it  provokes  specialisation  and  diversity. 
Furthermore,  once  a  certain  level  of  complexity  is  reached,  the  whole  cannot  be 
supervised and directed from a single centre. Such comprehensive economic planning 
according to Hayek is bound to fail because the number of factors influencing economy 
(from atmospheric conditions and natural disasters to subjective and irrational decisions 
of individuals) is simply too high (indefinite really) to be introduced into any kind of 
matrix  or  function  whose  outcome  would  allow  the  planner  to  make  appropriate 
decisions.
 Hayek's  position  on  property  relations  can  be  well  illustrated  with  two  specific 
discussions.  The  first  discussion  deals  with  the  so  called  commanding  heights  of 
economy:  the  question  is  whether  such  significant  and  strategic  areas  of  industry as 
energy,  mining,  communication  and  banking,  should  be  in  private  hands  or  rather 
controlled by the state. Hayek generally believes that governmental economic activity 
should be limited only to those spheres which are necessary for the society but which are 
not profitable enough to encourage private enterprise. Yet in all cases it is favourable that 
there is more than just one provider because state monopoly is always a waste and a 
threat. The second problem concerns taxes, their legitimacy as such and the justification 
of the progressive income tax. In short, Hayek recognises the need of taxation with the 
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purpose of providing such services by the state that could not be effectively provided by 
anyone else.  Progressive  taxation  however  is  in  his  opinion  not  only harmful  to  the 
economy but also fundamentally conflicting with the principle of formal justice requiring 
equal treatment of all citizens.
II. CRITIQUE OF COLLECTIVISM
 One of the main objections that Hayek expresses against all collectivist doctrines is that 
they  tend  to  substitute  the  individual  subject  with  a  collective  one.  The  goals  of 
individuals are subordinated to some arbitrarily defined good of an abstract group entity. 
Yet „the welfare and happiness of millions cannot be measured on a single scale of less  
and more“ and therefore it „cannot be adequately expressed as a single end“277. Only an 
individual person is able and authorised to decide what his or her particular end is to be. 
Hayek points out that planning a state's economy would have to mean controlling „the 
entry into the different trades and occupations, or the terms of remuneration, or both“278. 
Clearly this would leave citizens with a very limited share of autonomy enforcing on 
them particular ways of life and retrieving of a whole range of choices and possibilities.
 It is argued that in order to formulate a single end which would serve the community as 
such rather than its particular members and which would be dominant and pursued by all 
people „a complete ethical code in which all the different human values are allotted their  
due  place“  would  have  to  be  adopted.  But  for  Hayek  such  a  common  ethical  code 
comprehensive enough to determine a unitary economic plan, would necessarily mean the 
end of personal freedom. And freedom is for him the ultimate ideal. In his understanding 
freedom is neither a natural right nor a quality that we are born with. People as such are 
neither free nor equal. Freedom is to be understood as a sociological concept (it „refers  
solely  to  a  relation  of  men  to  men“279 as  individuals)  and  the  right  to  freedom is  a 
historical result of a political struggle of generations of men.
 Equality is also understood as a relational ideal and not an independent quality of men. 
Hayek acknowledges the claim for equality before the law but he does not accept the 
claim for economic equality. For him formal justice (Rule of Law) and distributive justice 
cannot fully be reconciled because the latter requires treating different people in different 
277 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, The University of Chicago Press, Routledge, London, 2007; 
p. 101.
278 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, The University of Chicago Press, Routledge, London, 2007; 
p. 129.
279 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge Classics, London and New York, 2006; p. 
12.
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ways and this is contradictory to the former. He does recognize that political freedom is 
meaningless without economic freedom, but it  cannot be understood as freedom from 
economic care. It is rather the freedom to „economic activity, with the right of choice“280 
but also inevitably with whole the risk and responsibility.
 Collectivist  and  holistic  approaches  in  social  sciences  necessarily  result  with  certain 
reductionism. Hayek rejects these methods and this, in my opinion, makes his analysis 
especially  attractive  for  a  contemporary  reader.  Only  accepting  and  appreciating  the 
complexity  of  men  and  their  world  is  it  possible  to  approach  the  truth  about  them. 
Hayek's  critique  of  socialism  is  an  expression  of  his  refusal  of  generalisation  and 
discrimination of individual ends.  His emphasis on freedom and responsibility in the 
realm of economy takes into account the diversity and subjectivity of those ends and thus 
treats  human  beings  not  simply  as  rational  agents.  Such  an  approach,  although  not 
popular in economics in last decades, is lately gaining on popularity – to name just a few 
new trends: research of micro-foundations in macroeconomics by professor Phelps and 
innovative developments such as the Imperfect Knowledge Economy.
280 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom,The University of Chicago Press, Routledge, London, 2007; 
p. 133.
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ENGLISH ABSTRACT
This paper examines philosophical backgrounds of political  and economic theories of 
Friedrich  August  von  Hayek.  This  Austrian  economist  was  one  of  the  most  prominent 
representatives of liberalism in 20th century and a fierce critic of socialism. His concepts are 
based on classical British liberalism and supported by an original epistemology drawing from the 
tradition of the Austrian School of Economics.
In this paper I analyse three philosophical ideals that form the basis of Hayek's liberalism. 
These  ideals  are  individualism,  freedom  and  justice.  Individualism  is  regarded  both  as  a 
methodological principle as well as political ideal. Freedom advocated by Hayek can referred to 
as a negative personal freedom defined as lack of coercion. The promoted concept of justice is 
firs and foremost formal justice understood as equality before the law. Distributive justice is 
argued to be incompatible with the principle of formal justice.
My goal in this paper is  to show continuity and consistency of Hayek's political  and 
economic theories. Both his critique of collectivism as well as his rejection of socialist economy 
are  supported  by  the  three  philosophical  ideals  and  by  his  anti-rationalist  and  individualist 
epistemology.
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GERMAN ABSTRACT
Friedrich  Hayek  war  einer  der  einflussreichsten  politischen  Denker  des  zwanzigsten 
Jahrhunderts.  Seine  leidenschaftliche  Kritik  des  Sozialismus  und  Verteidigung  des  liberalen 
Staats  haben  einen  Widerhall  sowohl  bei  Politikern,  als  auch  bei  weiteren  Kreisen  der 
Gesellschaft  gefunden.  Seine  ökonomischen  Theorien  sind  in  großen  Teilen  von  der 
Österreichischen  Schule  der  Ökonomie  inspiriert,  welche  sich  im  Wesentlichen  dem 
methodologischen Individualismus auf  antirationalistischer Weise widmet. In Verbindung mit 
diesen Annahmen befürwortet Hayek  eine mikroökonomische Analyse des freien Marktes. Seine 
politischen  Theorien  wiederum  basieren  auf  dem  klassischen  Liberalismus  der  britischen 
Tradition, der sich gegen staatlichen Interventionismus und für einen Minimalstaat und private 
Unternehmen ausspricht. In dieser Arbeit versuche ich, die philosophischen Grundlagen dieser 
Theorien zu thematisieren.
Die Kritik des Sozialismus beginnt Hayek mit einem Wechsel der Begrifflichkeit und, in 
Folge dessen, einer neuen Problemstellung. Er weist darauf hin, dass das Wort  Ökonomie eine 
Gruppe von Handlungen darstellt, die, mit Hilfe gegebener Mitteln, eine Reihe von Zielen zu 
erreichen versuchen. Die Ziele sind laut einem einheitlichen Plan geordnet. Eine Ordnung, die 
hingegen aus mehreren, einzelnen Ökonomien auf dem freien Markt entsteht, ist, laut Hayek, 
richtiger als Katallaxie zu bezeichnen. Mit Hilfe dieser Terminologie verändert er die Bedeutung 
von Ökonomie. Der Streit zwischen der Planwirtschaft und der Marktwirtschaft präsentiert sich 
als ein Dilemma von zentraler und dezentraler Planung. Hayek lehnt zentrale Planung aufgrund 
seiner epistemologischen Überzeugungen ab. Er behauptet nämlich, dass die Menschen nur ein 
begrenztes Erkenntnisvermögen haben. Niemand ist im Stande, alle Daten zu sammeln und zu 
bearbeiten, die für eine effiziente Planung der Nationalökonomie notwendig wären. Konkrete 
Informationen  und  Kenntnisse  eines  „man  on  the  spot“  sind in  Statistiken  und 
makroökonomischen Gleichgewichtsanalysen  unerfassbar.  Hayek  argumentiert,  dass  aufgrund 
epistemischer Beschränktheit kein Mensch im Stande sei, soziale Ordnungen vollständig auf dem 
Reißbrett zu entwerfen und erfolgreich zu implementieren. Im Gegenteil, solche Einrichtungen 
wie der Markt, das Geldsystem, aber auch Sprache und Kultur, sind emergente Ordnungen, die 
spontan  und  unvorhersehbar  aus  unzähligen  Handlungen  der  Individuen  in  Folge  von 
Jahrhunderten entstehen.
Abgesehen  von  der  epistemologisch  begründeten  Kritik  der  Möglichkeit  einer 
sozialistischen  Wirtschaft,  entfaltet  Hayek  auch  eine  politische  Kritik  an  sozialistischen 
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Gesellschaftssystemen.  Seine  philosophische  Kritik  basiert  auf  Argumenten  des  klassischen 
Liberalismus.  Meine  These  lautet,  dass  es  drei  philosophische  Grundkonzepte  gibt,  die  den 
Liberalismus  Hayeks  charakterisieren:  Individualismus,  Freiheit  und  Gerechtigkeit.  Ich 
beschäftige  mich  mit  diesen  Grundprinzipien  in  den  aufeinander  folgenden  Kapiteln  meiner 
Diplomarbeit.
INDIVIDUALISMUS
Der  Individualismus  beruht  auf  der  Annahme der  Priorität  des  Individuums  vor  dem 
Kollektiv. Die Rechte der Individuen sind auf die Rechte der Gesellschaft nicht reduzierbar und 
dürfen  nicht  für  ein  kollektiv  Gutes  geopfert  werden.  Der  methodologische  Individualismus 
spricht  sich  gegen  eine  Reifikation  von kollektiven  Entitäten  aus.  Hayek  argumentiert,  dass 
kollektive Entitäten und Institutionen nicht als personifizierte Subjekte von Handlungen gelten 
können. Nur Individuen sind in der Hinsicht autonom, dass sie des intentionalen Handelns fähig 
sind. Die Priorität der Individuen besagt auch, dass sie keinen anderen Zwecken untergeordnet 
werden  dürfen.  Individuen  sind  in  bester  Kantischer  Tradition  als  „Zweck-an-sich“  zu 
betrachten.
Die  Grundlagen  des  Individualismus  für  die  politische  Philosophie  wurden,  unter 
anderen, von Locke, Kant, Smith und Mill gelegt. Diese Denker haben zum Beispiel betont, dass 
der  Aufgabenbereich  von  Regierungen  sich  lediglich  auf  unparteiliche  Schiedssprüche 
beschränken müsse. Das Aufzwingen substantieller Normen ist in der Konzeption des politischen 
Individualismus nicht legitim. Der Kantische Beitrag besteht darin, dass er die Reziprozität der 
Autonomieanerkennung  unter  Individuen  klar  machte.  Eine  weitere  individualtheoretische 
Annahme, nämlich, dass jede Person dazu berechtigt ist, das eigene Leben laut eigenen Werten 
und Plänen zu gestalten, bringt einen ethischen Pluralismus hervor. Hayek glaubt, dass dieser 
Pluralismus nur in einem liberalen Staat möglich ist. Im Gegensatz dazu beruht laut Hayek die 
sozialistische Ideologie auf einem monistischen und umfassenden Moralkodex. Hayek vergleicht 
den sozialistischen Staat mit dem eines Kriegszustandes. In beiden Fällen schränkt der Staat die 
Freiheit der Bürger ein und benutzt sie für die Erreichung eines einzigen Ziels, das der Staat 
selbst festgelegt hat.
Die  individualistischen  Annahmen  implizieren  nach  Hayek  jedoch,  dass  ein  liberaler 
Staat  folgende  Bedingungen gewährleisten  muss:  1)  alle  Personen müssen  eine  Privatsphäre 
haben,  in  der  sie  vor  staatlichem,  gesellschaftlichen  oder  irgendwelchen  anderen  Zwängen 
geschützt sind; 2) Personen sollen die Möglichkeit haben, eigene Lebenspläne zu verfolgen und 
ihre besondere Talente zu entfalten. 3) Weiters impliziert der Individualismus auch die Gleichheit 
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vor  dem  Gesetz.  Für  die  Ökonomie  bedeutet  das  Prinzip  des  Individualismus  eine 
mikroökonomische  Herangehensweise  und  die  Anerkennung  der  subjektiven  Ursachen 
wirtschaftlicher Phänomene.
FREIHEIT
Die von Hayek vertretene Konzeption der Freiheit kann als negative, persönliche Freiheit 
im Sinne der Unabhängigkeit von Zwang beschrieben werden. Das Ausmaß solcher Freiheit wird 
mit der Zahl der Möglichkeiten gemessen, die für das Individuum offen bleiben. Die Frage der 
Freiheit für Hayek besteht nur in Bezug auf zwischenmenschliche Beziehungen. Freiheit versteht 
er als Freiheit von Zwang: Zwang bedeutet hier konkret, dass eine Person x gegen ihren Willen 
durch eine intentionale Handlung von Person y, die ihre eigenen Interessen verfolgt, zu einer 
Handlung oder Unterlassung gezwungen wird. Hayek erwähnt drei Maßnahmen gegen Zwang: 
formale Gleichheit, Pluralismus und Sicherung der Privatsphäre. Besonders was den politischen 
Zwang  betrifft,  ist  Hayek  ein  starker  Befürworter  von  Machtbeschränkung  in  Bezug  auf 
Regierungen. Er glaubt, dass so viel Befugnisse wie möglich in der Hand von lokalen Autoritäten 
sein soll. 
Die ökonomische Freiheit bleibt im Allgemeinen in enger Beziehung zur persönlichen 
Freiheit. Ökonomische Ziele sind, laut Hayek, keine direkten Ziele, sondern eher Mittel, die man 
braucht, um nicht ökonomische Ziele zu erreichen. Darüber hinaus besteht die Wichtigkeit der 
Ökonomie  und  des  Privateigentums  darin,  dass  diese  die  Sicherung  der  Privatsphäre 
gewährleisten. Das heißt also, dass das Privateigentum den Menschen eigene Lebenspläne zu 
verfolgen erlaubt.  Auf diese Weise erlangt man eine Form der Unabhängigkeit  von anderen. 
Hayek argumentiert auch, dass, je mehr Entscheidungszentren in Form von Privatbesitzer und 
Privatunternehmer in einer Gesellschaft agieren, desto beschränkter ist jegliche Zentralmacht.
Hayek  anerkennt  natürlich  die  Bedingung,  die  im  berühmten  Mill'schen  Prinzip 
ausgedrückt ist: dass die persönliche Freiheit jeder Person mit der gleichen Freiheit der anderen 
beschränkt sein muss. Er begreift aber auch, dass die Freiheit der anderen mit der Anerkennung 
eigener epistemischen Grenzen verbunden ist. Keine andere Person ist epistemologisch besser im 
Stande, Entscheidungen über jemanden zu treffen, als das konkrete Individuum, das mit diesen 
Entscheidungen betroffen ist.
GERECHTIGKEIT
Hinsichtlich  des  Prinzips  der  Gerechtigkeit  ist  Hayek  überzeugt,  dass  es  die  formale 
Gerechtigkeit  ist,  die  grundsätzlich  mit  einer  liberalen  Politik  vereinbar  ist.  Die  formale 
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Gerechtigkeit fordert eine gleiche Behandlung aller Menschen vor dem Gesetz. Hayek glaubt, 
dass das Prinzip distributiver Gerechtigkeit mit dem der formalen Gerechtigkeit unvereinbar ist: 
alle Menschen sind unterschiedlich und deswegen führt gleiche Behandlung notwendigerweise 
zu unterschiedlichen Ergebnissen. Dies erklärt die ökonomische Ungleichheit unter Menschen, 
obwohl sie formal gleich gestellt sind. Wollte man zum Beispiel, dass alle dasselbe verdienen, 
dann müsste man unterschiedliche Aufwände gleich belohnen.
Hayek  kritisiert  die  Anwendung  des  Begriffes  der  sozialen  Gerechtigkeit.  Er  ist  der 
Meinung, dass die häufigste Bedeutung dieses Begriffes sich auf die Aktivitäten der Gesellschaft 
bezieht. Der Fehler solchen Denkens besteht aber darin, dass kollektive Entitäten personifiziert 
werden und als Subjekte der Handlungen betrachtet werden. Hayek betont, dass die Distribution 
des  Vermögens  nur  dann  als  ungerecht  bezeichnet  werden  könnte,  wenn  sie  ein  Resultat 
absichtlicher Verteilung wäre. Er glaubt aber, dass keine bestimmte Person oder Gruppe für die 
bestehende  Verteilung  verantwortlich  ist,  sondern  dass  diese  aus  einem unpersönlichen  und 
unvorhersehbaren Prozess der Evolution resultiert.
Hayek  hebt  hervor,  dass  der  liberale  Staat  ein  Rechtsstaatsprinzip  erfordert.  Dieses 
bedeutet, dass jede Person der rechtlichen Ordnung gleichermaßen unterliegt. Die Menschen sind 
aus eigener Anerkennung dessen Legitimität unterworfen und nicht weil sie dazu gezwungen 
sind.  Hayek  betont  aber  auch,  dass  das  Prinzip  der  Rechtsstaatlichkeit  als  Metarechtslehre 
betrachtet werden soll, weil es auf diese Weise dem Gesetz eine Grenze aufwirft.
111
CURRICULUM VITAE
Persönliche Daten
Name Maria Przyborowska
Geburtstag 07. Februar 1983
Geburtsort Warschau, Polen
Ausbildung
2005 – 2009 Studium der Philosophie, Universität Wien, Österreich
2003 – 2005 Studium der Philosophie, Universität Warschau, Polen
2002 – 2003 Studium der Naturwissenschaften, Universität Warschau, Polen
1998 – 2002 Lyzeum nr 60 in Podkowa Lesna, Polen
1990 – 1998 Grundschule nr 14 in Warschau, Polen
Berufserfahrung
2008 Praktikum in Polnischer Botschaft, Washington D.C., USA
2008 - 2009 Sekretärin in OP Arrchitekten, Wien, Österreich
2007 Au-Pair, Wien, Österreich
2006 Persönliche Assistenz, Wien, Österreich
2003 – 2004 „Ius et Lex“ Stiftung, Universität Warschau, Warschau, Polen
2002 Polnischen Institut für Biochemie und Biotechnologie, Warschau, Polen
2001 Animation, Ferienlager, Reims, Frankreich
112
